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The most important power exercised by an invader occupying a
territory is that of punishing, in such a manner as he thinks
expedient, the inhabitants guilty of breaking the rules laid down by

him for securing the safety of the army.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Creating a new judicial system, as Iraq required after the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime, was no simple task. It would have been sufficiently
difficult to find qualified candidates to serve as judges, ensure that they
had neither a penchant for corruption nor a strong affiliation with the Baath
party, and find suitable courthouses for them to conduct judicial
proceedings.2 In Iraq, however, added to these almost Herculean tasks were
1. SIR HENRY S. MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 187 (1887).

2. John C. Williamson, EstablishingRule ofLaw in Post-WarIraq: Rebuildingthe Justice
System, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 229, 232 (2004) ("During the war itself, and the looting and
civil unrest that followed, approximately seventy-five percent of the courts in Iraq were destroyed,
including ninety percent in Baghdad alone."); Michael M. Farhang, ReconstructingJustice,27 L.A.
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the burdens of protecting the new judges from assassination and instilling
newly-minted judges and lawyers with a sense of due process and fairness
when their own legal system had a tradition of repression.3 American
advisors had to accomplish these and other tasks without offending the
pride of the Iraqi lawyers and judges and without insulting their legal
traditions,4 despite the fact that some of these traditions were barbaric and
far outside the norm of modem jurisprudence.5
Comparably burdensome was the U.S. duty-an ongoing one-to
punish attacks committed by Iraqi and foreign terrorists against U.S.
soldiers.6 The American victims of these assaults, who daily risked their
45, 45 (Aug. 2004) ("Conquering coalition forces found -the Iraqi criminal justice
infrastructure, especially the court system, in a state ofnear-total paralysis. Throughout the country,
courthouses and other government buildings were looted and plundered."); Craig T. Trebilcock,
Legal Cultures Clash in Iraq, ARMY LAw., Nov. 2003, at 48 (noting that the author found
"smoldering and looted courthouses" in Iraq).
3. As Ambassador Bremer observed, Saddam Hussein's regime used the criminal justice
system "as a tool of repression." See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, Penal Code
(CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07) (2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 7], available at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/.
4. Williamson, supra note 2, at 230 ("we were always mindful of not being too heavyhanded lest we erode our image as liberators").
5. For example, prior to the liberation of Iraq, Iraqi courts permitted the use of tortureinduced confessions, so long as there was other evidence to corroborate them. See IRAQI CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971] 218, availableat https://www.jagcnet.army.
mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsfC'[I]f there is no causal link between
the coercion and the confession or if the confession is corroborated by other evidence ...then the
court may accept it"). The Coalition quickly outlawed this official use of torture and prohibited the
use of confessions produced in conjunction with torture. See CPA Order No. 7, supra note 3, § 3,
2 ("Torture and cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment or punishment is prohibited.").
6. The term "soldiers," as used throughout this Article is meant to be interpreted
expansively. Thus, the author uses the term to mean all members of the U.S. Armed Forces,
including soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen. This Article also often speaks of
"insurgents" and "the insurgency" as though there were only one group of insurgents or one
insurgency, but it is more accurate to say that there are multiple insurgencies insofar as the various
members of the insurgency are motivated by a variety of loyalties and grievances. Rod Nordland
et al., Unmasking the Insurgents, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2005, at 20 ("Interviews with guerrilla
veterans of the Iraqi war, tribal leaders and Baathists, as well as American, Coalition and Iraqi
officials, make it clear this is not one insurgency, but many."); see Noah Feldman, The SunniAngle,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004, at A24. Professor Feldman suggests that there are two groups-Iraqi
Sunnis and the foreign jihadists-but there are probably more than just these two: a pro-Baathist
element (largely composed of Sunni Moslems); a Wahabbists/al Qaeda segment; Shiite insurgents
(perhaps some loyal to Moktada al-Sadr), a nationalist, anti-occupation insurgency, Iranian-backed
Shiite insurgents (apart from the other anti-occupation Shiite insurgents); and mercenaries willing
to fight for the highest bidder, to name but a few. And these groups are often willing to work
together, at least temporarily, to achieve their individual goals, although there are also reports of
LAW.
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lives to keep Iraq safe, were entitled to justice for the injuries they had
suffered in the line of duty. This debt of justice was also owed to the
United States itself, which was footing the bill for the harm inflicted by
these attacks and, as an occupying power, had a strong interest in
punishing acts that threatened the success of the occupation.7
In almost every conflict involving America, from the Revolutionary
War to World War II, the United States has utilized military courts to
adjudicate criminal charges against guerillas and insurgents who had
attacked or threatened American forces.8 In Iraq, however, the United
States elected to depart from this long-standing tradition, and instead
permitted Iraqi judges to try Iraqi insurgents in a court known as the

infighting and deadly rivalries. See Greg Miller & Tyler Marshall, More Iraqis Lured to Al Qaeda
Group, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at Al ("Overall, the officials said, the insurgency in Iraq is
divided into three 'clumps': religious extremists such as Zarqawi; former members of the Baath
Party of Saddam Hussein; and disparate Iraqi groups acting out of local or national interests."); F.
Michael Maloof, Eerie Historical Parallels, WAsH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005 ("Reports now suggest
Iran has set up four camps to train suicide bombers."); Arnaud de Borchgrave, Iran's Strategy,
WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2005, at A14 (discussing the Iranian-backed insurgency in Iraq).
7. The Coalition clearlywas an occupying power in Iraq from March 2003 until at least July
2004. Although an Iraqi government currently rules Iraq (or attempts to rule Iraq), it does so with
the help of the United States. Furthermore, a sizeable contingent of American troops polices Iraq
and performs much of the executive function of the Iraqi government. Thus, for many purposes,
it is accurate to say that the United States is still an occupying force in Iraq, even though it has
granted Iraq's elected officials considerable autonomy. The United States has the ability to
withdraw its support, at which time the Iraqi government would crumble.
8. Eu E. NOBLEMAN, MILrrARY GOVERNMENT COURTS iN GERMANY 14 (1950).
During the past 130 years, the United States Government has engaged in 13 major
occupations: Florida; Mexico (twice); the Confederate States; Cuba; Puerto Rico;
the Philippines; the Rhineland; Japan; Korea; Austria; Italy; and Germany. In
every instance, the occupying forces of the United States have protected their
security and maintained law and order in the areas under the control by means of
military courts.

Id. (citation omitted).
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Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).9 The U.S. government unwisely
pursued this course of action despite substantial precedent to the contrary,
evidence that Iraqi judges possessed strong affinity for enemy insurgents,
and knowledge that the Iraqi judiciary was inexperienced with the rule of
law and was better known for its corruption than its legal acumen."0
The American government made this fateful decision on the mistaken
belief that: insurgents were few and their reign of terror would be brief;"
terrorists should be treated as common criminals rather than unlawful
combatants; there was a sufficient number of American troops and they
possessed sufficient training and the necessary technological assets to
serve as detectives in Iraq; Iraqi judges would respect the rule of law and
impartially decide cases involving attacks on American victims; the Iraqi
people would give greater faith and credit to Iraqi-issued judicial decrees
than ones promulgated by Americans, and thus the United States could
avoid charges of "victor's justice"; and that a sufficient body of educated
and honest judges could be found to staff the Iraqi criminal court. All of
these assumptions have proven to be outrageously optimistic and incorrect.

Under general jurisprudential norms, the United States has the right and
duty to punish captured belligerents in American-run tribunals even though
these crimes were committed outside the United States. "2After all,
9. Gregg Zoroya & Rick Jervis, When Shooting Stops, Troops Turn Detective, USATODAY,
Aug. 10, 2005, at 1 ('In a little-noticed decision made within months of the U.S.-led invasion in

2003, the United States authorized creation of an Iraqi criminal court that would treat insurgents
not as enemy combatants but as criminals."). In one case, however, the United States has elected
to try one of the terrorists in a U.S. District Court. A federal grand jury indicted Iraqi-born Wesam
Delaerna, a resident of Holland who returned to his native land to carry out terrorist attacks against
the United States. Shaun Waterman, US. Indicts Dutchman in Iraqi Insurgency, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A16. A videotape found in Delaema's apartment contains footage of attacks on
Americans in Iraq, along with Delaema teaching militants how to create and hide improvised
explosive devices. Id.
10. Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 9.
11. Id. (noting that when the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to let Iraqi courts try
insurgency cases, the "insurgency was in its infancy" and Paul Bremer inaccurately "described the
rebels as 'a small minority of bitter-enders.").
12. See The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1869) (stating that the commander-in-chief has
a duty to ensure that justice is administered in occupied territories); see NOBLEMAN, supra note 8,
at 7 ("The right of a military occupant to deprive the existing courts oftheir jurisdiction of offences
against the authority of the occupying power as well as of offences against persons belonging to
his armed forces is recognized by most writers on international law, and in practice military
occupants have usually acted in accordance with this theory.") (quoting 2 JAMES W. GARNER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD ORDER 85 (1920)); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 172 (6th rev. ed. 1944) (noting that when necessary, an occupying power may set up military
courts); PASQUALE FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED § 1553 (1918) ("The military occupant
ofa territory has not only the right to require of the inhabitants complete submission to his authority
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Americans are the primary victims of the insurgents prosecuted in the
CCCI, and attacks on U.S. soldiers are attacks on the United States itself. 3
And the failure to punish militants is destroying the security and safety

and the right to punish any violations of that obligation; he has likewise the right to prevent any
attempt at such violation by providing very severe punishments against any person making or
attempting to make an attack upon the established government and the safety of the army of
occupation."); Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445,450 (D. Kan. 1905) ("The first duty of a state
is the protection of the lives and property of its citizens, wherever lawfully situated, by peaceable
means, if possible; if not, by force of arms. More especially must this protection be afforded the
accredited representatives of this government in a foreign country... [It follows of necessity,
when the armed forces of this government, by authority of the Department of War, are
commissioned to enforce the lawful demands ofthis government against aforeign country... there
must exist military jurisdiction and power to enforce ...and protect the lives of the citizens of this
country engaged in such military occupations."); Hague Convention, Annex § III, art. 43 (1907)
(the occupant "shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety ....).
13. True, some Iraqi terrorists have increasingly targeted more vulnerable Iraqis, but that is
largely due to religious friction and the fact that Iraqis are easier targets. There are several reasons
why Iraqis are easier targets than American Soldiers. First, there are more Iraqis in Iraq than
Americans. The Americans are better protected than the Iraqis because they have better body
armor, armored vehicles, air mobility, and medical services. U.S. soldiers are always armed,
whereas Iraqi civilians on the streets generally are not. Finally, for terrorists, engaging American
forces in battle entails, a greater magnitude of peril, a magnitude not similarly found in
engagements with either Iraqi citizens or the Iraqi armed forces. See Rowan Scarborough,
TerroristsRetool Carnagein Iraq, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at Al:
With American soldiers exercising better force protection, thanks to improved
armor and training, the insurgents have shifted their attacks to more vulnerable
Iraqi troops and civilians. "Terrorists always look for the weakest point," said
Dick Bridges, spokesman for the Pentagon's IED task force. "We are no longer
the weakest point."
Jill Carroll, Evolution in Iraq'sInsurgency, CHRISTIAN SC. MoNIToR, Apr. 7, 2005, at 6 (noting
that Iraqi soldiers discovered a "fatwa issued by a radical cleric during a raid in Samarra. It ordered
jihad on Iraqi forces instead of American troops because the Iraqis are easier to attack.").
It is simple economics: insurgents seek to produce the greatest amount of destruction for the
least cost, and American forces frequently compel the terrorists to pay the price for their attacks
(often with their lives), a price that Iraqi victims do not similarly demand. Thus, it is still accurate
to say that Americans are the primary targets of belligerents, and were it not for these four factors,
the militants would almost exclusively attack Americans. Louise Roug & Patrick J. McDonnell,
8 US. Troops Killed in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at 1 (noting that insurgents have shifted
"their sights from U.S. forces to Iraqi police and troops, who are perceived as easier targets than
better-armed U.S. forces"); Greg Jaffe & Yaroslav Trofimov, lraqiInsurgentsChange Their Focus,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at A8 (noting an Army report that attacks "have shifted away from U.S.
troops to more vulnerable Iraqis"); Austin Bay, Al Qaeda's Worst Nightmare,WASH. TIMES, Apr.
15, 2005, at A21 ("U.S. forces, however, are 'hard targets'--unlike civilians standing in line to
vote, U.S. troops shoot back.").
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necessary for the United States to succeed in cultivating democracy in
Iraq, 4 to the detriment of American interests and Iraqi freedom. American
government officials, however, have persisted in their scheme of trying
Iraqi terrorists in an Iraqi court hostile to American interests. These
officials created the CCCI to be the venue of choice for trying terrorists in
part because it is a court composed solely of Iraqi judges.
Perhaps on the surface the plan had some appeal: why not let newlyminted Iraqi judges cut their teeth on these important but manageable
cases, thereby gaining important judicial experience in the democratic
process while serving under the watchful eye of American personnel? s
Not only would this demonstrate the level of trust the United States placed
in these judges, it would also save the U.S. government the time and
expense of creating an alternative forum to adjudicate these cases.
Similarly, U.S. troops were and are in short supply in Iraq,'6 so why not use
Iraqi judges, rather than American officers, to try the insurgents? American

14. Formerly the U.S. military's standard practice was that "jurisdiction of the indigenous
courts will be limited to those violations of laws of the occupied territory which do not affect the
security or interest of the occupying forces." NOBLEMAN,supra note 8, at9 n.24 (quoting Army and
Navy Manual, Civil Affairs/Military Government note 16 31 (FM 27-5) (1947)).
15. The Iraqis believe that they are uniquely qualified to judge their fellow Iraqis, just as the
Germans thought they should try accused Germans at the Leipzig trials conducted after World War
I, which turned out to be a dismal failure. Gary J. Bass, Milosevic inthe Hague, 83 FOREIGN AFF.
82, 86 (2003) (describing the Leipzig trials as "a hopelessly botched effort.., in which a German
high court either acquitted or glancingly punished German soldiers"); Gary J. Bass, War Crimes
andthe Limits ofLegalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2103,2104 (1999) ("The trials held after World War

I, in Leipzig and in Constantinople, degenerated into disaster."); W. Michael Reisman, Book
Review: Prologueto Nuremberg: The PoliticsandDiplomacy ofPunishingWar Criminals of the
FirstWorld War, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 201 (1985) ("The war crimes trials effort after the First
World War failed ....

."); SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEm

PROSECUTION AND

PUNISHMENT 32 (1944) ("The French, particularly, were both angered and saddened by the
performance of the Leipzig Supreme Court. After recalling their representatives, they and the
Belgians, who had suffered most from German atrocities during the first World War, indignantly
withdrew the documents of accusation and proof. To them the goings-on at Leipzig were clearly
a wholesale miscarriage of elementary justice."). Similarly, Yugoslavs think their courts are the
appropriate venue to address any atrocities committed by Yugoslavs. Bass, Milosevic in the Hague,
supra,at 93 ("[O]nly 32 percent of Serbians supported cooperating with the tribunal in the Hague,
while 47 percent said they would prefer to address war crimes only in Yugoslavia's own
courts ....
").They are mistaken, as history has shown.
16. Mark Helprin, They Are All So Wrong, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2005, at A16 (noting that
the United States has deployed to Iraq "a fraction of the ratio (10:1) long experience indicates is
necessary for suppression" of an insurgency); Tony Blankley, The CaseFor Victory, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2005, at A17 (noting that many suspect "the president is making do with current incountry troop levels because we don't have enough troops world-wide at our current force levels
to properly fight the war in Iraq....
.
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officials reasoned that this approach would conserve valuable human
resources for other important missions.
Despite this surface appeal, upon even minimal reflection it is obvious
that the scheme makes little sense. 7 The CCCI plan gave Iraqi judges authority over the only impediment to military success in Iraq, the
insurgency, thereby vesting these judges with significant power over U.S.
military forces, despite the judges' political, cultural, religious, ethnic, and
tribal ties to the insurgents that they must judge.
Not surprisingly, the Iraqi judges have taken full advantage of their
power. They frequently treat dangerous insurgents like petty criminals. As
one critic of the CCCI observed: "people found to have hoarded or
transported huge stashes of bombs, machine-guns and rocket-propelled
grenades are frequently treated as leniently as drunk drivers and
pickpockets."' 8 In light of the bountiful mercy of Iraqi courts, it is easy to
understand why the families of insurgents clamor for adjudication of their
cases before Iraqi judges.' 9 Despite the CCCI's popularity with Iraqis, this
abdication of the duty to punish20 is hardly the justice envisioned by the
American creators of the CCCI.
This ill-conceived plan continues to empower Iraqi judges-some of
whom, beyond their affinity for militants, harbor enmity for U.S.
soldiers-to deny U.S. soldiers the justice they deserve. 2' More
importantly, the court's acquittals and paltry sentences greatly aid the
insurgency by destroying the deterrent value that successful prosecutions
would otherwise have entailed.22 Convictions and commensurate sentences
17. In making this criticism, the author is keenly aware that it "is easy to be wise after we see
the results of experience." Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 63 (1878).
18. Colin Freeman, Saddam 's Old Judges Provoke US. Fury With Their Lenient Sentences
for Insurgents, TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 13, 2005, at 29.
19. Doug Smith & Raheem Salman, LongJailings Anger Iraqis, L.A. TIMES, May 29,2005,
at Al ("Some have called for the immediate transfer of custody to Iraqi authorities. 'This is the
Iraqi perception-let the Iraqi people judge them."').
20. Although it is true that "the decree of a court will not stay the clash of war," the proper
punishment of insurgents can deter their specific actions and the general belligerency of their
comrades in arms. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 59 (1928).
21. Dhiya Rasan & Steve Negus, Iraqi Torture ofPrisoners Seen as Open Secret, FIN. TIMES
(UK), Jan. 25, 2005, at 8 ("One judge who refused to disclose his name said he tried to let off
lightly insurgents who had targeted Americans....").
22. According to one report, Iraqi courts handling insurgency cases involving attacks on the
United States have convicted 301 of the 450 insurgents tried. See Smith & Salman, supra note 19,
at Al. More recently, the conviction rate for the CCCI was only 60%. Zoroya & Jervis, supra note
9, at 1. Perhaps the greater problem with the CCCI is its meager sentences. See generally Freeman,
supra note 18, at 29 (noting that the lenient sentences pose little deterrence for the insurgency).
More problematic still is the number of cases never brought to court--and the release of these
suspects-because American prosecutors fully grasp the futility of such endeavors. Bing West,
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could have proven a strong weapon against the Iraqi terrorists, but thanks
to the CCCI, the insurgency never had to expend its assets to defend itself
against such a weapon. Instead, terrorist leaders inform their disciples that
even if they are captured, they can look forward to a brief respite from the
fray while they serve their paltry, CCCI-imposed sentences.
Adjudicating terrorism cases in the CCCI has neither deterred attacks
nor sent the message to the Iraqi community that terrorist attacks are evil
acts transcending those of simple criminals. Instead, the CCCI frequently
sends the message that the United States is not serious about defeating the
insurgency, because the United States has abandoned its duty to punish
captured insurgents. This responsibility has been forfeited to unqualified
Iraqi judges who may themselves be part of the insurgency.
Realizing that this was a mistake, the United States eventually ignored
CCCI orders to free acquitted insurgents, a wise and completely lawful
decision.23 In other instances, however, the United States has released Iraqi
prisoners, thereby freeing them to strike again. 24 Although the United
States could try these defendants in U.S. military courts, there is no
indication that this will happen, and thus the United States has squandered
a golden opportunity to teach Iraqis about the rule of law while swiftly
punishing terrorists.
This Article considers the CCCI as an experiment in Iraqi justice. Part
II addresses the creation of the CCCI, its judges, and its manner of
operation. Included in Part II is a discussion of the initiation of cases, the
investigative and trial stages, and sentencing. This Article is highly critical
of the U.S. approach to adjudicating terrorism cases in the CCCI, and sets
forth detailed reasons for this criticism. In particular, Part III of this Article
discusses various ways in which the CCCI obstructs the prosecution of

America as Jailer,NAT'L REv., July 17, 2006, at 27 (noting that the defects in the system for
prosecuting Iraqi terrorists sometimes result in their release); see generally Freeman,supra note
18, at 29; Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 9, at I (noting that many cases are not brought to the CCCI
because American prosecutors could not prevail in that forum, and the suspects are therefore
released).
23. See WILiAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (8th ed. 1924) ("Ifthe

inhabitants of the occupied territory rise in insurrection, whether in small bodies or en masse, they
cannot claim combatant privileges until they have displaced the occupation, and all persons found
with arms in their hands can in strict law be killed, or if captured be executed by sentence of court
martial."). This practice, however, could change. See Jamie Tarabay, Wheels oflraqiJusticeTurn
Slowly, JOURNAL-GAZETrE, Aug. 23, 2004, at 3 ("'We certainly feel this is a relevant court
representing the will of the people of Iraq, and we are respecting the decisions it makes when it
finds people not guilty."') (quoting U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Barry Johnson).
24. West, supranote 22, at 27 ("What do insurgents have to lose from being arrested for
fighting if they know they will soon be released by authoritites?").
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enemy combatants, often through archaic rules that are contrary to AngloAmerican jurisprudence. For example, this Article discusses the CCCI's
employment of the two-witness rule-that is, the refusal to convict a
defendant without the testimony of two witnesses that the defendant
committed the crime charged." Also addressed is the CCCI's refusal to
impose the mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by law, among other
techniques employed by the court to thwart justice. 26 This Article concludes that although the creation of the CCCI was engendered by a noble
desire to assist the Iraqis in implementing the rule of law, the United States
should promptly abandon the practice of permitting the CCCI to adjudicate
cases involving attacks against American military personnel and such cases
should instead be entrusted to American military courts.27

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT OF IRAQ
A. The Creation of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
The occupation of Iraq has been heavily criticized for the American
government's failures to plan for a host of troubles that it should have
foreseen," such as the insurgency itself. 29 The United States and its
25. See supra Part 1.
26. Id.
27. This, of course, would still leave the CCCI free to adjudicate crimes involving both Iraqi
victims and perpetrators, cases in which the United States has no compelling interest.
28. Helprin, supra note 16, atA16 (noting the "paucity of armored vehicles, body armor, and
other staples of battle" that the United States deployed to Iraq); Bradley Graham, Prewar Memo
Warned of Gaps in Iraq Plans, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2005, at A13 ("One month before the U.S
invasion of Iraq, three State Department bureau chiefs warned of 'serious planning gaps for postconflict public security and humanitarian assistance' in a secret memorandum for a superior.");
Michael Moss, U.S. Struggling to Get Soldiers UpdatedArmor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at AI
("Officials now concede that they underestimated the insurgency's strength and commitment to
fighting a war in which there are no black lines."); Mark Helprin, No Way to Run a War, WALL ST.
J., May 17, 2004, at 20:
Having decided to remake a country of 26 million divided into warring
subcultures with a shared affection for martyrdom and unchanging traditions, the
administration thought it could do so with 100,000 troops. Israel, which nearly
surrounds the West Bank, speaks its language and has 37 years of experience in

occupation, keeps approximately (by my reckoning) one soldier on duty for every
40 inhabitants and 1/13th square mile, and the unfortunate results are well known.
29. "Part of the reason for the failure to plan for uncertainties came from the ideological
insistence that almost all Iraqis would see Americans as liberators." Mark Sappenfield, US.
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Coalition partners, however, were sufficiently prescient to prepare for
implementing the rule of law through a system of independent courts.30 Insofar as fair and independent courts are the backbone of the rule of law,
Iraq could not truly be considered free without courts that fairly applied the
law to all litigants."
To achieve this goal, the Coalition established the CCCI in July 2003
to serve as the federal criminal trial court for Iraq.32 The CCCI was designed to serve as the flagship of the new Iraqi court system, which
includes a Federal Supreme Court, 33 a Court of Cassation, Courts of
Appeals, local courts, juvenile courts, and a separate court system in the
Kurdish region. The CCCI's judges were supposed to be the judicial
Tempers Its View of Victory In Iraq, CHRISTIAN Sci.MoNrrOR,Sept. 16, 2005, at 1.
30. The Coalition also realized that these tasks would not be easy ones, particularly under the
conditions of the occupation. ERNST FRAENKEL, MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE RULE OF LAW:
OCCUPATION INTHE RHINELAND, 1918-1923 ix (1944) ("The liquidation of a war that is waged as
a struggle of law against lawlessness automatically raises the problem of the restoration of law
under the peculiar conditions of military occupation.").
31. Judicial independence and fairness "is vital in our law...." ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRT
OF THE COMMON LAW xiii-xiv (1921); Elliot A. Spoon, Compensation of the FederalJudiciary:
A Reexamination, 8 MICH. J.L. REF. 594, 601 (1975) ("[T]he concept ofjudicial independence,
though difficult to define, goes to the very heart of the American system of government."); see
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 15, Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee
(CPA/ORD/June 2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 15], availableat http://www.iraqcoalition.
org/regulations/ ("[I]t is inherent to the stability of any society that the judicial system is
independent and impartial").
32. Zoroya & Jervis, supranote 9, at 1 ("In a little-noticed decision made within months of
the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the United States authorized creation of an Iraqi criminal court that
would treat insurgents not as enemy combatants but as criminals.").
33. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court has nine members and the Chief Justice is Madhat
Mahmood. Rick Jervis,ForlraqsTop Judge, Security Tops the Docket, USA TODAY, July 7, 2005,
at A6.
34. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi judiciary was part of the executive branch's
Ministry of Justice, and not a separate branch of the government. There existed numerous courts
including the Court of Cassation (the supreme court), Courts of Appeals, Courts of First Instance,
Administrative Tribunals, Personal Status Courts (religious courts), criminal courts, civil courts,
and juvenile courts. Various tribes also ran their own tribal courts. Additionally, the military had
its own system of adjudication, as did some of the security services, and their members were
punished in these courts, rather than general courts. Robert Perito, UnitedStates InstituteofPeace
Special Report 104, Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq 5-6 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srIO4.pdf (last visited Mar. 2005); see also U.S.
Government Accountability Office, RebuildingIraq, GAO-04-902R, Enclosure IX 80 (June 2004)
("A DOJ assessment from July 2003 identified 12 types of courts, including appellate courts,
criminal courts, civil courts, and juvenile courts, among others); Jackie Spinner, Hussein Trial
Judges What PassedforJudgment, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A 16 (noting that Awad Haman
Bander was former chief judge of the revolutionary court which tried acts of treason during
Saddam's reign and sentenced most of its defendants to death); Jervis, supranote 33, at A6 ("Iraq
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elite-both in the weight of the cases handled and with respect to the
judge's legal acumen and integrity--and were to set an example of
professionalism for the rest of the Iraqi judiciary. Most importantly, the
CCCI was supposed to be free from corruption, Baath Party influence,
tribal influences, and anti-American animus," a paradigm to be emulated
by other Iraqi courts.
The Coalition entrusted the CCCI with nationwide discretionary
jurisdiction over all criminal violations.36 In exercising this discretionary
jurisdiction, the CCCI judges were instructed to concentrate on cases
relating to terrorism, organized crime, crimes that potentially could
destabilize the government, government corruption, crimes against the
government, racially- and ethnically-motivated crimes, and any cases in
which the defendants probably would not receive a fair trial in a local
court. 7 In addition, both defendants and local courts could petition the
CCCI to accept jurisdiction over particular cases," but the decision to exercise jurisdiction rested solely with the CCCI judges?9
Initially, the CCCI was obliged to hear cases initiated by U.S.
prosecutors through the auspices of the CPA Administrator, but after July
1, 2004, the CCCI was free to decline even these cases." Other than this
temporary, compulsory jurisdiction, the CCCI operated as an independent
body to the extent that the United States did not directly control its
decisions. Whether the CCCI will remain autonomous is unknown. The

at the time had two judicial systems: regular courts that were generally open to the public and
special security courts, which dealt with so-called political crimes, such as treason and dissent....
Justice Ministry officials, who took control of the courts in 1978, would pressure judges on selected
cases. Resisting meant jeopardizing your career....").
35. Gregory H. Fox, The Occupationoflraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'LL. 195,213-14 (2005) (noting
that the CCCI "was created both to serve as a model for further judicial reform and to try 'those
serious crimes that most directly threaten public order and safety'); David Luhnow, Overhauling
Iraq's Courts, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2004, at A14 ("The new court is an attempt to ensure that
corrupt judges don't let sympathizers of the former regime back on the streets."); see also Doug
Simpson, Louisiana-TrainedLawyers Become a Legal Force in IraqiCourtrooms,ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 16, 2005 ("The court was created... to prosecute insurgent fighters because the
military was concerned that Iraq's provincial courts would be influenced by anti-Americanism, and
be more likely to acquit those guilty of attacks.").
36. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13, The Central Criminal Court of Iraq
(CPA/ORD/X2004/13) (2004) § 18(1) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 13], availableat http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. § 19(2).

40. Id.
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United States has attempted to lay the groundwork for such independence,
but the Iraqis must see the venture through to fruition.
B. The CCCIJudiciary

1. Courts Under the Baathists
Courts are only as good as the judges who preside over them, and this
is certainly true of Iraqi courts. During Saddam's reign, the Iraqi courts,
like all other aspects of the government, were tightly controlled and used
to keep potential enemies in check.4' In short, the courts were corrupt to
the core, as were the other branches of government.42 The courts, like the
Baath Party, were instruments of tyranny which overlapped each other.
Insofar as Baath Party membership was a prerequisite to obtaining
government posts,43 including those on the bench, Iraq's two-year training
program for all judges was largely devoid of law, and instead entailed a
constant stream of Baath Party indoctrination. " This helped ensure that
Iraqi judges would be loyal servants of the Hussein government, rather
than fair arbiters of justice, a concept completely foreign to the Baath
Party.45
2. Purging the Judiciary of Baathist Influence
After the liberation of Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and his staff
diligently sought to sever the tentacles of the Baath Party and purge the
government of its influence.' This was no small task as Baath Party
41. Farhang, supranote 2, at 46 ("Iraq's system of criminal laws under Hussein was used to
persecute political dissidents and inflict harsh punishments on those considered disloyal to the
regime."). But see Williamson, supranote 2, at 230 ("In a country like Saddam's Iraq, one would
expect that the Ministry of Justice and the courts would be important instruments of oppression.
Undoubtedly, they played a role, but the regime primarily relied on a parallel court system to target
its opponents rather than on the 'legitimate' courts under the Ministry of Justice. Courts of real
interest to the regime tended to be shunted to these parallel structures ....).
42. See CPA Order No. 15, supranote 31, § 1 ("The Iraqi justice system has been subjected
to political interference and corruption over the years of Iraqi Ba'ath Party rule").
43. Jon Lee Anderson, Out on the Street, NEW YORKER, Nov. 15,2004, at 75 ("Membership
was a requirement for many government jobs .... ."); see L. Paul Bremer, The Right Call,WALL
ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at AIO ("The Baath Party was another important instrument of Saddam's
tyranny.").
44. Frank J. McGovern, Rebuilding A ShatteredSystem, 25 PA. LAW. 34, 35 (Oct. 2003).
45. Anderson, supranote 43, at 72 ("The Party had been virtually synonymous with Saddam
Hussein's regime; it was the instrument through which Iraqis were brutalized. At the same time,
its members filled jobs at every level of society and anchored the middle class.").
46. "The former top American administrator here, L. Paul Bremer III, purged all high-ranking
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membership may have numbered up to 2.5 million,47 although many were

undoubtedly members only for economic reasons. 4 In attempting this feat,
Ambassador Bremer roughly patterned de-Baathification efforts after the
de-Nazification programs instituted in Germany after World War II. Although the National Socialists also pervaded all aspects of German

Baathists from public positions in May 2003, but reversed that decision last spring when it became
clear that experienced people were needed to help stand up the nascent government." Edward Wong
& Erik Eckholm, Allawi PressesEffort to Bring BackBaahists,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13,2004, at A12;
see Anderson, supranote 43, at 73 ("On May 16, 2003, Bremer issued a sweeping ban of the Baath
Party: all senior party members were barred from public life; lower-level members were also
barred, but some could appeal."). Unfortunately, not enough non-Banthist-law professors exist in
Iraq to permit a purge of the law school faculties, which means that the next generation of Iraqi
lawyers are being indoctrinated with a Baathist view of the law. See Donald E. Walter, Taking
Justice to Iraq, 9 NExus J. Op. 3, 5 (2004).
47. Anderson, supra note 43, at 74 ("The Baath Party, which kept its records secret, is
estimated to have had between a million and two and a halfmillion members, most of them Sunnis,
like Saddam."). The Coalition's "purge" of the Baath Party only resulted in preventing the top 1%
of the Baath Party from participating in the government. Bremer, supranote 43, at Al0 ("And so
the Coalition prohibited the top 1% of the Baath Party from continuing in government
service.. . ."). This still left a large number of high-ranking Baathists to infiltrate the new
government, including the judiciary.
48. Yochi J.Dreazen, On BaghdadBeat, PolicemanDodges Bombs, Turncoats, WALL ST.
J. Aug. 26, 2005, at Al (discussing an Iraqi policeman who claims hejoined the Baath Party "solely
to keep his job"); Ellen Knickmeyer, IraqiAlliance Seeks To Oust Top Officials of Hussein Era,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1 ("Under Hussein, registration in the Baath Party was a
requirement for jobs on almost all levels, from army general to teacher."); Perito, supra note 34,
at 8 ("The Baath Party has a total affiliation of Ito 1.5 million, but only 50,000 are 'full members.'
Most government officials, military officers, and senior administrators are party members for
convenience rather than because of ideological commitment. Party membership is required to hold
office, for promotions, to obtain economic advantages, and to avoid harassment.").
49. Anderson, supra note 43, at 75 ("One of the steps in the appeals process for former
Baathists was attendance at a thirty-day de-Baathification course, and I asked [Mithal] Alusi what
model he had used for it. 'I've studied the de-Nazification of Germany,' he said."); see Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 1, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May
2003/01) § 1, 2 (2003) ("Full members of the Ba'ath party holding the ranks of" regional
command member, branch member, section member, or group member "are hereby removed from
their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector."), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/.
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government," there were key differences in the tasks faced by de-Nazifiers
and the de-Baathification commission, especially with respect to what
could be achieved in reforming the judiciary.
In post-Nazi Germany, despite absolute control of the Germanjudiciary
during the Nazi reign,5" there still existed a few judges who had remained
relatively uncorrupted by Nazism and had experience with the traditional
notions of justice.52 Some had resigned rather than soil their souls with
Nazism, and even judges who collaborated with the Nazis generally had
been educated in the pre-Nazi era, making at least some of them
50.

HAROLD ZINK, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

131 (1947) ("[T[he

National Socialists had succeeded in permeating virtually every nook and comer of German
government from the top to the bottom and not content with that had penetrated into the very heart
of the social and economic institutions of the Reich... ."); INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE

COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 37 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 199 1) (noting that the "Law for

Restoration of the Professional Civil Service.. ." removed from service "all judges and other
officials who were Jews, Social Democrats, or otherwise 'politically unreliable' .. . ," thereby
"destroying the independence of the courts.").
51. See EDITH ROPER & CLARA LEISER, SKELETON OF JUSTICE 57-58 (1941) ("With the

advent of the Third Reich the criminal bench was quickly and thoroughly purged. All Jewish judges
were thrown out and every other judge who boasted an iota of humanity or was suspected of
harboring progressive or liberal notions was routed from the field to the accompaniment of the
rankest accusations, even the most rabid libel. Sooner or later most of them were sent to
concentration camps.... These judges were replaced by men who adhered rigidly to National
Socialist concepts.. . ."); see NOBLEMAN, supra note 8, at 67-68 ("In fact, of all the German

institutions in existence prior to the advent of the Nazi regime, the courts received the greatest
impact of the National Socialist program."). According to Ingo Muller:
In Westphalia, for example, 93 percent of court personnel had been members of
either the Nazi party or one of its subsidiary organizations. In the district of the
Bamberg Court of Appeals, 302 out of 309 jurists had been in the party, and at the
Petty Court in Schweinfurt the figure was a solid 100 percent. In the American
enclave of Bremen in the British Zone, the Americans found a grand total of two
judges who could be considered to have an untainted record.
MULLER, supranote 50, at 202 (citations omitted).

52. For example, German law embodied notions of judicial independence which, though
compromised by the Nazis, was at least part of the German legal tradition. FRAENKEL, supra note
30, at 44 ("For more than a hundred years the independence of the judiciary had been regarded in
Germany as the cornerstone of the Rechsstaat and the chief guarantee of the freedom of the
individual ... ."). Therefore, the Allies sought to employ judges who had retired before the Nazis
came to power, although this measure still did not provide the requisite number ofjudicial officers
needed to staffthe German courts. MULLER, supra note 50, at 202 ("One solution was to call back
judges who had retired prior to 1933, and to employ attorneys on the bench part time. It soon
became clear that these measures would not solve the problem. The British decided to treat all
jurists who had joined the party after 1937 as having a clean slate, including former army judges
who for a long time had not been allowed to join.").
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salvageable. Nevertheless, in the American-controlled portion of Germany,
the military government disqualified eighty percent of the German

judiciary from service.53 Despite this significant purge of the German
judiciary, the American military ensured that the German courts in its
sector were fully functioning by March 1946.0
In contrast to the German experience, after decades of Baathist rule in
Iraq, Baath Party judges were the only ones with judicial experience. 55
American reformers thought this experience was essential to recreate a
viable Iraqi judiciary, and that the new Iraqi judiciary should be composed
largely of experienced judges or attorneys of great skill. These reformers,
however, overlooked a key point: despite their "judicial experience," these
judges had little or no experience with the rule of law. Instead from almost
the moment they donned their judicial robes, they were steeped in the
intricacies of graft and corruption.5 6 Prior to the liberation of Iraq, there
53. ZIK, supra note 50, at 125 n.2.
54. Id.at 125. ("During this period the military government had to maintain its own tribunals
to deal with certain types of cases involving Germans, but more and more the cases were placed

under the jurisdiction of German courts as additional judges were 'vetted' and high courts
reopened. By March, 1946 all German courts in the U.S. zone had been reopened."). It helped that
General Eisenhower had three million Americans under his command, and 10 million total Allied
troops in Germany, compared to 130,000 to 150,000 Coalition forces in Iraq. Mark Helprin, Our
Blindness, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at AI8. Also, some comers were cut and Nazi pasts were
overlooked in certain cases. MULLtER, supranote 50, at 202 ("The de-Nazification commissions of
the British Zone and the similar tribunals of the American Zone had begun with strong measures,
but were soon classifying virtually everyone in either Category 4 ('followers') or Category 5
('exonerated').").
55. See Neil MacDonald,BaathistPurgeMay StallHusseinTrial,CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR,
July 28, 2005, at 6 (According to an American official, "practically every judge who served in the
Iraqi judicial system under Hussein was a member of the Baath party. 'You had to be, at least
nominally,' . . . ."); John F. Bums, Hussein TribunalShaken by Chalabi's Bid to Replace Staff,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at 9 (noting that during Saddam's reign, "all prosecutors, judges and
senior court officials were required to join the Baath Party"); Jervis, supra note 33, at A6 (Judge
"Mahmood started as a judicial investigator in 1960 and became a judge in 1967. But when he
refused to join the Baath Party, his promotions stopped, he said."); Caryle Murphy, HusseinJudge
Steps Out ofthe Shadows, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at 12 (Judge Ra'ed Juhi noted that to "get
into the Judiciary Institute you needed 'to be recommended by the Baath offices in the
neighborhood you lived in."').
It is arguable whether this judicial experience is worth anything in light of the pandemic judicial
corruption in Iraq and its role in the denial of basic human rights. Those who lack judicial
experience are more likely to have the moral purity necessary for service on the bench, since they
at least did not sell their souls to become slaves of the Baath Party. See Editorial, When Hussein
Goes to Trial,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2004, at 12A ("Iraq has not had a criminal justice
system worthy of the name for decades."); see also McGovern, supra note 44,at 39 (noting the
deficiencies of the Iraqi criminal adjudication system).
56. Trebilcock, supranote 2, at 48 ("Initial assessments of the Iraqi courts revealed that the
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were roughly 870 judges and prosecutors-prosecutors are quasi-judicial
officials under Iraqi law-and the American-run Judicial Review
Committee removed about one-fifth of these based on the belief that they
were incorrigible. The Committee also appointed about 110 new judges
and prosecutors
and reinstated 80 who had been removed under Saddam's
8
regime.5
Thus, despite criticism that the Baathist purge went too far, compared
to post-World War II Germany, the Coalition did not go far enough with
respect to cleansing the judiciary. 9 Rather, by making judicial experience
under Saddam a prerequisite for judicial service in the post-Saddam era,
the Coalition essentially guaranteed Iraq a Baathist judiciary. 6 Thus, it is
courts of general jurisdiction within each of Iraq's eighteen provinces were widely subject to
political control and influence. The Ministry ofJustice in Baghdad had previously appointed judges
based on party loyalty and their willingness to support Baath party policies through their rulings.").
57. U.S. GOV'T AccouNTABILrrY OFFICE, REBUILDING IRAQ, GAO-04-902R, at 81-82
(2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The numbers differ slightly depending on the source. See, e.g.,
LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 149 (2005) (stating that the CPA judicial review
committee assessed about 600 Iraqi judges and dismissed about 120 of them for corruption,
incompetence, or ties to the Baath Party). CompareTrebilcock, supranote 2, at 48 (stating that the
Coalition removed one-third of Iraqi judges for corruption or suspicions of malfeasance). In
contrast, the CPA disqualified less than 10% of Iraqi military officers from working in the new
Iraqi government. See Dan Senor & Walter Slocombe, Too Few GoodMen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2005, at A31:
[Neither service in the old army or rank-and-file membership in the Baath party
would disqualify applicants for the new army. Only those who had worked in
Saddam Hussein's intelligence and political control organizations---rather than the
regular army or the Republican Guard-and those at the top four ranks of the
Baath Party were barred. These bases for disqualification affected less than 10
percent of the total officer corps ....
58. GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 65. The New York Times reports that by May 2005,
there were 351 "trained judges" in Iraq, up from 175 in June 2004. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque
& Michael O'Hanlon, The State ofIraq:An Update, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at A27. It is not
clear if "trained" means "newly trained" or includes judges who served under Saddam and who
have since received extensive training from American legal personnel.
59. In defense of the Judicial Review Committee, they were limited by the judiciary that
Saddam had created, and there is little the Committee could do in the short term. As the U.S.
Government Accountability Office noted, the reform of the Iraqi judiciary is a long-term process.
GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 83-84 ("[A] former member of the Judicial Review Committee
concluded that rehabilitating Iraq's judicial system would take years as a competent body of legal
professionals is developed."). With this admission, the obvious question is: Why, then, did the U.S.
government entrust these inexperienced judges with the task oftrying insurgency cases, particularly
when this approach has little historical precedent?
60. Rasan & Negus, supra note 21, at 8 ("One judge who refused to disclose his name said
he tried to let off lightly insurgents who had targeted Americans .... ").
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not surprising that Iraqi judges confess to molding their judicial decisions

to assist the Baathist-supported insurgency.6!
The general rule for the CCCI judiciary, notwithstanding some
exceptions,62 was that all of its judges were required to have at least five
years ofjudicial experience, which ensured a judiciary steeped in Baathist
ideology.63 Many officials have realized that "former Baathists who are
readmitted to the government without enough precautions can aid the
insurgency from within," judges perhaps more so than other bureaucrats.'
There were also "concerns that former Baathists may be unwilling to stand
too strongly against insurgents,"65 a concern that is only heightened when
one considers the results-oriented jurisprudence produced by the CCCI
judges." But this did not seem to have bothered the Coalition, even though
almost all judges denied having high-level affiliation with the Baath Party,
indicating that a number of judges were lying 67

61. Id.
62. One exception was Judge Zuhair al-Maliky, the Chief investigative judge of the CCCI,
who was subsequently removed from the CCCI by the interim Iraqi government. See Scott
Peterson, DemotedIraqiJudgeFearsfor his Country'sFuture,CHRIsTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 1,
2004, at 11; see also McGovern, supra note 44, at 37 (noting that in the Babil province, six new
judges were added to the bench).
63. See CPA Order No. 13, supranote 36, § 5, 1 (Revised) (requiring that judges shall have
"demonstrated a high level of legal competenceY).
64. Wong & Eckholm, supra note 46, at A12. Other countries that failed to purge their
judiciaries of leftists and totalitarian loyalists have come to rue their forbearance. For example, in
Nicaragua, when democratic elements took over from the Sandinista Marxists, "Sandinistajudges
were allowed to remain in the courts, which of course made the evolution of an independent,
property-rights oriented judiciary impossible." Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Chavez's Tyranny
Emboldens Nicaragua'sOrtega, WAL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2004, at Al l. Partially because of this
decision, the Sandinistas are mounting a strong comeback. Id. Similarly, in China "justice" is
administered according to the whim of the communist party, and is accomplished by ensuring that
the judges are party members. See Philip P. Pan, In China, Turning the Law Into the People's
Protector,WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at Al, Al5 ("More than a quarter-century after launching
economic reforms while continuing to restrict political freedom the Chinese Communist Party
remains in firm control of the courts. Most judges are party members, appointed by party leaders
and required to carry out party orders.").
65. Wong & Eckholm, supra note 46, at A12.
66. Iraqi judges were notorious for their lack of a substantial work ethic. The CCCI judges
frequently would not arrive at the courthouse before 9:30 a.m., and the court day would usually end
by noon or 1:00 p.m. In their defense, part of this schedule may have been mandated by security
concerns and power failures at the courthouse, which sometimes made working conditions
unbearably hot. For all of these reasons, the CCCI was not known for its diligence. Rajiv
Chandrasekaran & Scott Wilson, Detention Problems Widespread,PrIT. POST-GAZETTE, May 11,
2004, at Al ("[Tlhe court has moved slowly.").
67. According to Captain McGovern:
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The judges' motives for prevaricating are unknown, but one can
surmise that some judges did so simply for financial reasons: they wanted
to ensure that they could continue to work as judges. But it is also probable
that some of them were acting pursuant to orders from the Baath Party or
Iranian intelligence organizations to infiltrate the new Iraqi judiciary." Indeed, Iraqi government officials have conceded that insurgents have
infiltrated various departments of the Iraqi government. In light of the
manifold pro-insurgent decisions handed down by CCCIjudges, it is ironic
to read the prerequisites for service on the CCCI promulgated by
Ambassador Bremer, 9 including a provision that requires the judges to
Only one judge, out of approximately 40, admitted to high-level membership in
the Baath Party.... It is almost certain he was being honest with us while others
were not as forthright about their past Most judges either denied membership in
the party outright, stated that they used to be a member but quit or stated that they
were merely low-ranking members. There are some eight levels of hierarchy in the
Baath party, and, according, to Civil Administrator Bremer's proclamation,
anyone who is in one of the top five levels of the Baath party is to be excluded
from public office.
McGovern, supra note 44,at 35.
68. Beyond their covert infiltration, Sunni clerics have openly issued a fatwa for insurgents
to further infiltrate Iraq's security services. Yaroslav Trofimov, IraqiLawmakers Spar Over Role
ofEx-Baathists, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7,2005, at A12 ("Shiite suspicions were especially piqued by
an unusual fatwa issued Friday by key members of the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association, the
influential clerical body that often extends rhetorical and moral support to the insurgency. The
fatwa urges the faithful to join U.S.-trained Iraqi military and police forces while abstaining from
aid to the occupiers-a call many interpret as an order to take over the security forces from
within."); see also Arnaud De Borchgrave, ThinkAgain.... , WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A16
('Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie told the BBC, 'Iraqi security forces in
general, and the police in particular, in many parts of Iraq, I have to admit have been penetrated by
some of the insurgents, some of the terrorists as well.'"); Yochi J. Dreazen, On BaghdadBeat,
PolicemanDodgesBombs, Turncoats,WALLST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at Al (discussing an Iraqi police
officer in Baghdad who was in a shootout with an infiltrator from the insurgency caught stealing
weapons for the terrorists); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & James Glanz, US. Officials Say Iraq'sForces
FounderUnderRebelAssaults, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (noting that Iraqi security forces
are "unreliable because of corruption, desertion or infiltration").
69. SeeCPA Order No. 13, supranote36, § 5, 1:
[T]he judges of the CCCI shall be appointed by the Administrator and shall:
a.)
b.)
c.)

be an Iraqi national,
be of high moral character and reputation,
have a background of either opposition to the Ba'ath Party, nonmembership in the Ba'ath Party or membership that does not fall within the
leadership tiers described in CPAIORD/16 May 2003/01 and entailed no
involvement in Ba'ath Party activity,
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have either opposed the Baath Party or to have had only low-level
membership in the Party.70
This is not to say that all of the judges of the CCCI still retain Baathist
loyalties or are evil men. Indeed, many Iraqi judges have demonstrated
great courage against guerillas, who view some of the judges with disdain
for having collaborated with the infidels of the Coalition. " Accordingly,
judges-including CCCI judges-and their families are prime targets of
insurgents,72 and over thirtyjudges have already fallen prey to an assassin's
bullet or bomb.73 Many others have only narrowly escaped death! 4 For
judges, "the simple task of going into the office every day qualifies as an
act of bravery."" The fact that a judge was the target of an assassination
attempt, however, does not guarantee fitness for the bench, a lack of
affiliation with the Baath Party, or even honesty, since the motives for
assassinations vary. For example, a judge might be in danger of
assassination not because he opposes the Baathist insurgents, but because
d.)
e.)
f.)
g.)

have no criminal record unless the record is a political or false charge made
by the Ba'ath Party regime,
have had no involvement in criminal activities,
have demonstrated a high level of legal competence; and
be prepared to sign an oath or solemn declaration of office.

Id.

70. See supra text accompanying note 69.
71. Sinan Salaheddin, Gunmen Kill Son of Top Judge, WASH. TIMEs, May 14,2006, at Al

(discussing the assassination of Judge Midhat al-Mahmad's son). The "followers of Mohammed
divide the human race into that of the 'faithfil' on one side and that of the 'infidels' on the other
side." Theodore P. Ion, Roman Law and Mohammedan Jurisprudence, 6 MICH. L. REV. 44, 206

(1907).
72. Jonathan Finer & Andy Mosher, For Soldier, A Posthumous Day in Iraqi Court, WASH.

POST, June 28, 2005, at All ("Judges have been frequent targets of insurgent attacks.").
73. Noam N. Levey, Four US. Soldiers And Iraqi Judge Die in Attacks, L.A. TIMES, Aug.

19, 2005, at A3 (noting that "Jasim Waheeb, an investigative judge from a Baghdad appellate
courts, and his driver were shot to death in the capitals' Dora neighborhood less than two miles
from the heavily protected Green Zone"); Jeffrey Fleishman, Justice is Swifi And Deadly in
Baghdad, L.A. TIMES, June 6,2005, at 1("More than 25 judges have been assassinated in Baghdad
since major combat operations ended in 2003.").
74. The fear of assassination caused the Iraqi Special Tribunal initially to conceal the names
of most of the judges involved in the investigation and trial of Saddam Hussein and senior Baath
Party officials. The name of the Special Tribunal's chief investigative judge was revealed only after
he was seen on television conducting Saddam Hussein's initial appearance. See Robert Collier,
Human Rights Shortcomings in Hussein Tribunal, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 2004, at A- 13 ("[The

names of the tribunal's prosecutors and judges would remain secret until pretrial questioning. Five
judges have been assassinated since the fall of Hussein's regime a year ago.").
75. Bruce I.Konviser, Courage aRequirementfor Iraqi Judges, WASH. TIMES, May 9,2005,
atAl.
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he is a loyal Baathist whom Shiite assassins would like to remove from the
bench permanently.
In any event, most Iraqi judges are now well guarded; indeed, as of
March 2004, approximately 250 of Iraq's judges were protected by
personal security details.76 But no security system is terrorist-proof,
particularly considering the dangers judges face traveling to the
courthouses, and they are always vulnerable to car bombs, IEDs, and RPG
attacks. In recognition of this danger, the Coalition instituted a pension
system to provide for the support of the families of judges who are
assassinated," but this is obviously little consolation to a fallen judge or
his family.
3. Civil-Law Influence and Lack of Independence
Regardless of their loyalties to elements of the insurgency and their
inexperience with the rule of law, most of the Iraqi judges possess another
flaw: to the extent they have legal training, they are fully steeped in the
civil-law tradition-with a dash of Islamic law-in which the judge's role
is somewhat mechanistic and generally not as fluid as with common-law
judges. Thus, many of them lack the creative streak inherent in the
common-law tradition which, in turn, allows the common law to grow in
response to the fluidity of the ever-changing world!8
The Iraqi judges also display a trait common in bureaucrats from
totalitarian countries: lack of initiative. This defect is based in part on the
habit of receiving unquestionable orders from superiors, which stifles the
need to think independently, compounded by a fear of harsh punishment
for making mistakes and a dearth of rewards for demonstrating initiative.79
With this background, many Iraqi judges appear stymied by simple
variations that inevitably arise in criminal litigation, particularly in a
combat environment involving organized terrorists seeking to kill as many

76. GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 83.
77. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 52, Payment of Pensions For
Judges and Prosecutors Who Die While Holding Office (CPA/ORD/6 Jan. 2004/52) (2004),
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/.
78. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387 (1898) ("[W]hile the cardinal principles of
justice are immutable, the methods by which justice is administered are subject to constant

fluctuations....").
79. Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that, under the Baathists, Iraqi judges "who
demonstrated too much initiative or independence ran the risk of being viewed as a potential threat
to the regime," and in some quarters, "the slightest deviation from regime policies led to dismissal
and imprisonment").
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Americans as possible. In Iraq, everything is fluid, but the Iraqi judges tend
to think only in terms of solids.'0
This phenomenon may be attributable to another problem with the Iraqi
judiciary, its lack of independence. In the United States, provisions in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution insulate the federal bench from the
types of external pressure that the English crown placed on its judicial
officers, sometimes to the detriment of the American Colonists. 8' First, the
Compensation Clause of Article III guarantees judges that their salaries
will not be diminished regardless of the unpopularity of their decisions.82
This precludes the executive and legislative branches from utilizing salary
cuts as a means of retaliating against judges for their decisions, a tactic
commonly employed in former times.
Second, the Tenure or Good Behavior Clause promises judges the
opportunity to serve on the bench, potentially for the rest of their natural
lives, regardless of their judicial decisions.83 This insulates judges from the
fear of losing their judicial positions so long as their decisions are not so
fundamentally unpopular as to result in their impeachment by the House
and removal by the Senate."Y Of course, these provisions do not guarantee
that judges will remain immune from the influence ofbribes, the desire for
a promotion, peer pressure, passion, elitist loyalties, friendship with a

80. Iraqijudges have been known to exercise initiative and creativity in manufacturing legal
technicalities upon which to base acquittals or to minimize sentences. Similarly, this practice was
frequently employed by Nazi judges when the National Socialist Party was just coming to power
in Germany. MULLER, supranote 50, at 17 ("In many trials in the years that followed, the courts
continued to take the Nazi side of the ongoing political struggle, sometimes openly, sometimes
behind the facade of legal maneuvers.").
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Many state judges do not enjoy these protections.
82. The Compensation Clause states that: "[Tihe Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts. .. shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; see also United States v.
Hatter, 532 U.S. 557,560 (2001). According to Alexander Hamilton, next "to permanency in office,
nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their
support." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 520 (Alexander Hamilton).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour... "). Federal judges are not completely independent
insofar as they are subject to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, as Associate Justice
Samuel Chase learned first hand. See generally WnLAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992);
Richard B. Lillich, The ChaseImpeachment,4 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 49 (1960). District and appellate
court judges also are beholden to the executive insofar as they may seek elevation to a higher court,
and even associate justices may be seeking the chief justiceship, and they may believe that their
decisions could have bearing on achieving these goals.
84. See supratext accompanying note 83.
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party, or affinity for a particular economic or social class. 85 Article IlI,
however, completely severs two tentacles that kings and parliaments
historically had used to squeeze favorable decisions from judicial officers
or punish those who refused to conform to.their will. 6 This independence
has resulted in greater respect for the American judiciary, and ensures its
decisions greater authority than they would enjoy in a system where judges
are subject
to executive or legislative influence via threats to salary and
87
tenure.

Unfortunately for Iraqi justice, Iraqi judges do not enjoy the same
protections. Although the Coalition Provisional Authority tried to ensure
that judges would not be removed simply because of unpopular decisions," this lofty goal has proven unachievable. Several judges have been
removed for nothing more objectionable than antagonizing powerful
government officials. The CCCI judges enjoy one advantage not enjoyed
by the typical Iraqi judges: they were appointed by Ambassador Bremer

and did not have to face an election. This advantage may be short-lived,
however, since the CCCI judges can still be removed from office, which
has happened to at least one CCCI investigative judge.8 9

85. For judges to be truly independent, "they must be courageous and able to withstand
external influences whether in the form of bribes, pressure of friend or family, antipathies of class
or religion." ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNCIONS, QUALIFICATIONS
AND SELECTION 30 (1956).
86.
[I]n 1689, the Convention Parliament deposed James II, declared the throne
vacant, and offered the crown to William and Mary on the condition that they
recognize the Declaration of Rights, the principal document stating the Revolution
Settlement. The Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c.2, completed the
Revolution Settlement and provided that judges should hold office during good
behavior, that they should receive ascertained and established salaries, and that
they could be dismissed only upon the address of both houses of Parliament.
Robert A. Sprecher, The Threat to JudicialIndependence, 51 IND. L.J. 380, 385 (1976).
87. Of course, secure tenure does not need to be life tenure. Rather, a limited term of service
could be specified, and judges could be protected from removal from office during that term.
88. See CPA Order No. 13,.supra note 36, § 5(2) ("A judge of the CCCI may only be
removed by the Administrator where there is clear evidence of unlawful or unethical conduct,
breaches of the requirements of this Order, or incompetence on the part of the member."). By
permitting judges to be removed for "incompetence" the Order opens the door to abuse of the
removal provisions, as an unpopular decision can easily be construed as the product of
incompetence.
89. See Peterson, supranote 62, at 11.
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4. The CCCI Judiciary
a. Judge Zuhair Jum'ah Al-Maaliky
One judge removed from the CCCI was its Chief Investigative judge
(also called an examining magistrate), Zuhair Jum'ah Al-Maaliky. Judge
Zuhair, formerly an amateur boxer and student of English literature,
obtained his law degree from Baghdad University, but was not permitted
to practice law under Saddam Hussein because he is a Shiite Moslem. He
worked for the United States as a translator after the liberation, and later,
despite a lack of judicial experience, Ambassador Bremer appointed him
Chief Investigative Judge of the CCCI. He was generally friendly to U.S.
personnel, and spoke and understood English better than any other judge
on the CCCI, which probably explained his appointment to the chief
judgeship. Yet in November 2004, Judge Zuhair was removed from the
bench by the interim government, perhaps because he angered the
government with investigations of powerful politicians like Ahmad
Chalabi, ° but also possibly because of his close ties to the American
military.
Before his removal, Iraqi authorities retaliated against the Judge for
some of his work by arresting his wife, who is also an attorney. Besides the
harassment of his wife, Judge Zuhair had survived at least three
assassination attempts in his short tenure as Chief Judge, indicating that
some of the insurgents found him unacceptable. He could dodge bullets,
but Judge Zuhair could not survive the interim government which removed
a number of judges it found meddlesome. 9'
b. Judge Ra'ed al-Juhy
By far, the best known CCCI judge is Ra'ed al-Juhy,92 who owes his
fame to his appearance on international television while "arraigning"
Saddam Hussein and other high level Baathists in July 2004. He did so in
his capacity as the Chief Investigative Judge for the Iraqi Special
90. See id.; see also Edward Wong, Chalabi in Comeback, Siding with Shiites, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2004, at Al 6 ("In his home, Mr. Chalabi noted with a smile that the counterfeiting charges
had been dropped... and that the judge, Zuhair al-Maliky, had been moved to a lesser court. Mr.
Maliky himself said that part of his demotion might have been 'related to the Chalabi case."').
91. Doug Struck, Torture in Iraq Still Routine, Report Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at
A10 ("[J]udges who became too demanding of authorities were removed from their jobs.").
92. Because the requisite transliteration from Arabic script to English text is an inexact
science at best, the judge's first name has been spelled as "Raad," Ra'ad," "Ra'ed," "Ra'id,"
"Rai'd", and his surname: "Juhi," "Juhy," and "Jouhi."
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Tribunal,93 the judicial body that is trying Saddam Hussein and his
compatriots." Judge Ra'ed served as an examining magistrate in several
of the cases involving Saddam Hussein. " Judge Ra'ed, a Shiite Muslim
and Baghdad native, graduated from Baghdad University Law School
before serving in the Iraqi military and as an investigator in the Iraqi
Ministry of Justice.96 He later completed a two-year course at Iraq's
97
Judicial Institute, a prerequisite to judicial service in Baathist Iraq
Like Judge Zuhair, Judge Ra'ed has also survived multiple
assassination attempts, including a grenade attack after leaving the CCCI
courthouse.98 He has firther imperiled his life by working on the
investigation of Saddam Hussein.99 He is relatively young, about thirty-six
years old, and exudes optimism, a rare quality in Iraq. He is known to have
a pragmatic streak that will serve him well as he forges into new territory
prosecuting the Baathists, provided he survives with his life and job
intact. 00
93. Hannah Allam, Two HusseinAides CalledTo Account, PHLA. INQUIRER, Dec. 19,2004,
atA2.
94. John F. Bums, IraqiJudge QuestionsAides ofHussein With Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2004, at 13.
95. Edward Wong, IraqiLeader Vows to Block Purges on Hussein Tribunal,N.Y. TIMES,
July 29,2005, at A9 ("Mr. Juhi has been the lead investigator on cases involving Mr. Hussein, and
it was his research that led the tribunal to bring charges against Mr. Hussein and three associates
related to a massacre in the Shiite town ofDujail. Mr. Juhi is now investigating the Anfl campaign
of the late 1980's in which tens of thousands of Kurds were killed, and the suppression of a Shiite
rebellion in 1991 that resulted in as many as 150,000 victims being shot dead and bulldozed into

graves.").
96. Caryle Murphy, Hussein Judge Steps Out of the Shadows, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005,
at A12.
97. Id.
98. Ryan J. Liebl, Rule of Law in PostwarIraq: From Saddam Hussein to the American
Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Those Actions?, 28
HAMLINE L. REV. 91, 104 (2005) (noting that CCCI judges have been the target of death threats).
99. Murphy, supra note 96, at A12 ("Juhi is the only tribunal judge publicly identified so far.
The others remain anonymous because of threats from insurgents, many of whom supported
Saddam's government."). The Iraqi Special Tribunal has since disclosed the names of other
members of the Tribunal.
100. Ahmad Chalabi seeks Judge Ra'ed's removal from the bench because the judge had
previously issued an arrest warrant for the Moktada al-Sadr, the Anti-American Shiite cleric and
Chalabi's new best friend in the ever-changing political landscape of Iraq. Wong, supra note 95,
at A9.
Mr. Chalabi is trying to purge Mr. Juhi as a show of support of Moktada al-Sadr,
the popular firebrand cleric who has led two uprisings against the Americans. Mr.
Juhi issued an arrest warrant against Mr. Sadr in 2003 for Mr. Sadr's connection
to the killing of an American-backed Shiite cleric. That warrant was later
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c. Judge Loqmaan Thaabit 'Abdur-Razaaq As-Saamraa'i
The CCCI's chief trial judge is Judge Loqmaan Thaabit 'Abdur-Razaaq
As-Saamraa'i. I' l A Sunni Moslem, his main claim to fame is that he
sacrificed his twenty-two year judicial career under the Baathists by
refusing to order the execution of five prostitutes."°2 Consistent with reports of Saddam Hussein's meddling in judicial affairs,' 0 3 Judge Loqmaan
claims that when he was chief judge of Saddam Hussein's court, his
sentences were often dictated by Saddam Hussein or his family."° After
removal from the bench, Loqmaan practiced law for ten years before being
tapped for the CCCI post.
Although his courage in standing up to Saddam's regime is
commendable, and imperiled the judge's life, it still leaves open the
question how he managed to dance with the Baathists for twenty-two years
without dirtying his hands. In Iraq, however, cleanliness is a relative
concept. Although outwardly friendly to U.S. personnel, panels on which
Judge Loqmaan has presided over have also been sympathetic to insurgents
when it comes time to assess their guilt and determine the appropriate
punishment for their crimes. Thus, the insurgency has been fortunate to
have Judge Loqmaan looking out for its minions when they appear before
his court.

suspended because of a cease-fire agreement the Americans and the Iraqi
government reached with Sadr.
Id.
101. Jackie Spinner, Iraq's New Form ofJustice Seems to Satisfy Few, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2004, at A12. Because of the Arabic transliteration, there are various ways to spell the judge's name
in English.
102. Id.
103. Jervis, supra note 33, at A6 ('Justice Ministry officials, who took control of the courts
in 1978, would pressure judges on selected cases. Resisting meant jeopardizing your career.... In
one case in 1993, the nine judges of the Court ofCassation refused to condemn to death a defendant
who had murdered a Saddam associate, Mahmood said. All nine judges were later fired, he said.").
104. Spinner, supra note 101, at A12.
The man in charge of the court, Luqman Thabit, was also chief judge for
Hussein's special secret court, in which sentences were often dictated by the Iraqi
leader or his sons. Thabit said he was fired and persecuted by Hussein three years
ago after he refused to sentence five prostitutes to death.
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C. Iraqi CriminalLaw

The Iraqi system of criminal adjudication has long been considered
"secular" in that Iraqi positive law is not directly or generally derived from
Islamic law,"0 5 or Sharia.'°" U.S. advisors sought to carry on this secular

tradition,"7 initially by incorporating as much of the existing Iraqi law as
was possible. This was probably a mistake, however, because aspects of
105. Farhang, supra note 2, at 46 ("Iraq's criminal justice system was a secular one.. . .").
But even in countries with a strong secular-law tradition, such as Canada, Muslim groups seek the
incorporation of Sharia, at least into the law of domestic relations. See Colin Campbell, Report
Endorses Muslim Law in Ontario, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at Al0 ("An Ontario government
report recommends that Muslims be allowed to use religious law to settle inheritance and family
disputes outside the court system. The report came after an Islamic group, the Canadian Society of
Muslims, announced plans to apply Shariah, a legal code based on the Koran, to settle disputes over
issues like marriage, divorce and property."). Thus, it is not surprising that Islamic law has entered
the "secular" law of countries like Iraq. Even in Saddam's time, family-law issues were decided
for Muslim families according to Sharia,while Christian families had cases adjudicated according
to canon law. Indeed, many Middle Eastern countries that adopted "secular" law for criminal and
commercial actions retained Islamic law to govern "personal status" issues such as marriage,
divorce, succession, and child custody. See LAw AND ISLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST 3 (Daisy Hilse
Dwyer ed., 1990). It is worth noting that, pursuant to Sharia,before the middle 1800s the testimony
of Christians and Jews was not permitted in Ottoman courts. Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Introduction, in
LAw AND ISLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 3.
106. The term "Sharia"literally means "the road to the watering hole." JOHN L. ESPOSITO,
ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 79 (1991) ("The literal meaning of Sharia is 'the road to the watering
hole,' the clear, right, or straight path to be followed. In Islam, it came to mean the divinely
mandated path, the straight path of Islam, that Muslims were to follow, God's will or law."); Chibli
Mallat, FromIslamic to Middle Eastern Law A Restatement ofthe Field,51 AM. J.CoMP. L. 699,
719 (2003) ("Strictly speaking, the shari'a derives from two written sources: the Qur'an, the divine
Book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the late sixth century CE, and the sunna, which is the
reported compilation ofthe conversations (hadith) and deeds ofthe Prophet collected after his death
from his Companions."). Because of transliteration, Sharia is spelled various ways, including
"Sharia," "Shariah," "Shari'a," "Shari'ah," and "Shari'," among others.
107. Many traditionalist Moslems objected to the adoption of Western law when it was first
introduced to Islamic countries, and their dogmatic progeny continue to object to the neglect of
Sharia.See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ReinstatingIslamic CriminalLaw in Libya, in LAW AND ISLAM
INTHE MIDDLE EAST 99 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990) ("The adoption of laws of Western origin
was opposed and criticized on religious grounds by many Muslims in the Middle East. Islamic
clerics, learned in the traditional Islamic sciences, were particularly attached to shari'a law and
hostile to a development that threatened to end their long domination of the study of law and the
control of legal institutions."). This is similar to the opinion of some Orthodox Jews who, upon the
founding of Israel, thought that there was no need for any additional law beyond the religious law.
See JAMES G. MCDONAD, MY MISSION IN ISRAEL 1948-1951, at 278-79 (1951) ("While the
Orthodox groups have disavowed the intention ofestablishing a theocracy, spokesmen for the more
extreme right wing argued, during the debate on the establishment of a formal constitution in Israel,
that the law of Moses and the Torah suffice, and that any constitution of a secular nature would be
necessarily either superfluous or harmful.").
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the civil-law bureaucracy inhibit transparent judicial proceedings and make
corruption more difficult to detect.108 But in light of the limited resources
of the United States and the need to act expeditiously to create an Iraqi
court system, the thought of converting the Iraqi system into an adversarial
or common-law one was all but foreclosed.'
The reformers' retention of Iraq's civil-law system is also consistent
with international law, which seeks to prevent the violation of rights and
legal upheavals during occupation by requiring the occupying power to
preserve as much of the native law as possible. "°But this duty is limited,
and it does not require the retention of patently unfair procedures or laws
that would materially assist insurgents in thwarting the occupation."'
Regardless of international law, it was hoped that this preservation of the
civil-law system would further enable Iraqis to adjust to the occupation and
certainly would be quicker and easier than completely rewriting the Iraqi

criminal law and criminal procedure law." 2 The reformers, therefore, authorized the CCCI to utilize the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969," 3 and the 1971
108. Righting the Scales, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2005, at 45 (discussing the plan in some
Mexican states to change their court system from an inquisitorial, civil-law one to a common-law,
adversarial system more like the United States and England, in part to create more openness and
fairness in the courts and to help stamp out corruption).
109. In Colombia, the United States is helping the Colombians convert their civil-law,
inquisitorial system into an adversarial one. See Fernanda Santos, Colombia Lawyers Back in
School, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 4,2005, at A14 ("Oral trials used to be a rarity in Colombia, where
criminal proceedings were generally handled in writing, leading to a bureaucratic nightmare and,
often, corruption.").
110. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] ("The
penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be
repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in cases where they constitute a threat to
security...
."); NOBLEMAN, supra note 8, at 5 ("the laws of war require him [the occupier] to
respect existing laws, institutions and administration in the occupied area, except where their
modification or abolition is absolutely necessary in connection with the occupant's war objectives,
the safety of his army or his duty to restore law and order"); FRAENKEL, supra note 30, at 189
("Nevertheless, international law, which originates in and is deeply imbued with the principles of
natural law, does not oblige any military government to respect existing laws that violate basic
ideas of justice. An occupying power that conforms with the principles of international law is for
that very reason obliged to disallow any municipal law that is contrary to the public order of the
international community.").
111. Geneva Convention, supra note 110, art. 64.
112. Farhang, supra note 2, at 46 ("Rewriting the laws from scratch... was not a viable
option, given both the immediate need for law and order and international law requirements.").
113. See generally IRAQI PENAL CODE (1969), at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNET
Internet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsffO/d616b3e 179d620285256d0a006391 f1?Open
Document (last visited Aug. 12, 2004); see generally CPA Order No. 7, supra note 3, § 2, 1
("Without prejudice to the continuing review of Iraqi laws, the Third Edition of the 1969 Iraqi
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edition of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code," 4 with some modifications
to both. I15

The Iraqi criminal law, and thus the CCCI, utilizes the civil-law
inquisitorial system to determine criminal liability, as opposed to the
Anglo-American adversarial system. More specifically, the Iraqi judicial
16
system and penal code are roughly patterned after the French model,,l 7
which in the mid-i 800s was first introduced into the Ottoman Empire.
Penal Code with amendments... shall apply... ."). This retention of the Iraqi Penal Code was in
accordance with the Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Geneva Convention, supra
note I 10, art. 64 ("The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in cases where they constitute a
threat to security....").
114. See generally IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971],
available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternetlHomepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.
nsf.
115. See, e.g, Coalition Provisional Authority OrderNo. 31, Modifications ofPenal Code and
Criminal Proceedings Law (CPA/ORD/10 Sept. 2003) (2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 31],
availableat http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/; see also Farhang, supranote 2, at 46 ("The
CPA chose instead to begin revising Iraq's Penal Code on an emergency basis to conform to
international human rights standards."). A 2004 CCCI case suggests that further modifications of
the Code might be necessary: the CCCI charged an Iraqi by the name of Milthal al-Alusi with
violating a provision of the 1969 Code which bars Iraqi citizens from interacting with enemy states.
Erick Eckholm, IraqiIndictedforProposalto Open Talks With Israel,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004,
at A12 ("A court of Iraq's interim government has brought criminal charges against a prominent
politician for attending an antiterrorism conference in Israel and publicly suggesting that Iraq
should open talks with Israel."). The CCCI issued a warrant for Aluse's arrest because he attended
an antiterrorism conference in an "enemy" country, namely Israel. Anderson, supranote 43, at 78
("In October, after a private visit to Israel by Mithal al-Alusi, Chalabi's ally on the deBaathification commission, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Alusi's arrest, invoking a Baathistera law prohibiting travel to the Jewish state."); Eckholm, supra,at A12. Under this reading of the
Penal Code, Iraqis who cooperate with the United States would also be guilty of violating the law,
because from 1991 until the fall of Saddam's government, the United States conducted military
operations against the Iraqi government, and thus is an "enemy" like Israel.
116. Farhang, supra note 2, at 46 (stating that the Iraqi criminal justice system followed "a
French civil law model"); MATHEw LIPPMAN ET AL., IsLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDuRE 3
(1988) ("European codes of law were adopted and adapted by various Islamic states"); EsPosrro,
supranote 106, at 144 ("Modern legal change occurred in many parts of the Muslim world during
the nineteenth century, when most areas of Islamic law were replaced by modem codes based on
European law. Secular courts were created to handle civil and criminal law. . ").
117. LipPMANETAL, supra note 116, at 101 ("The second stage in the introduction of Western
laws was the adoption of laws during the tanzimat (reform) period between 1839 and 1876. In this
period the Ottomans translated the French Commercial and Penal Code and established a new
system of secular courts for the code's implementation."). Actually the Turks had some experience
with French criminal law by the 1500s, when they signed a treaty with France providing that French
subjects in Ottoman lands would be tried under French law. See WILL & ARIEL DURANT, TIHE
STORY OF CIVILzATION: PART VII: THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 524 n.* (1961) ("In 1536 France
had obtained the first Turkish 'capitulations"... agreeing that French subjects in Turkish lands
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Until 1920, the territory or present-day Iraq was part of the Ottoman
Empire, and Iraq was created after World War I from three Ottoman
provinces. "' The Iraqi law, therefore, has a distinct Ottoman flavor that
also reflects the influence of Egyptian and Islamic law." 9 In light of the
British occupation in the 1920s, 20 Iraqi criminal law also bears vestiges of
the Anglo common law, as well as Sharia:
The Criminal Code in effect in early 1968 [after which the current
Penal Code was patterned] was based on the Baghdad Penal Code,
formulated by the British military in 1918 to replace the Ottoman
Codes used by the Turks. Although it drew heavily on Ottoman law,
which in turn, was based largely on the French legal tradition, the
Baghdad Code included certain amendments and additions adapted
from the Egyptian Penal Code. These modificationswere designed

should be governed and tried by French law .... ).
118. AS'ADABUKALILET AL, THE MIDDLE EAST 255 (9th ed., 2000); J.N.D. Anderson,A Law
ofPersonalStatusfor Iraq, 9 INT'L& ComP. L.Q. 542, 542 (1960) (noting that the territory oflraq
was part of the Ottoman Empire); see Amanda Bower, Iraq Close Up, TIME, Mar. 10, 2003, at 30
("Iraq was created out of three Ottoman Empire provinces-one dominated by Sunni Arabs, one
by Shi'ite Arabs and one by Kurds."). "As a result of the creation of mandates under Article 22 of
the League Covenant, the three districts of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad, which formed a part of
Mesopotamia, were merged together to constitute the mandated area of Iraq. The Principal Allied
Powers decided, at their meeting at San Remo in April 1920, to confer a Mandate for Iraq on Great
Britain." R.V. Pillai & Mahendra Kumar, The Politicaland Legal Status ofKuwait, 11 INT'L &
COmp. L.Q. 108, 112-13 (1962) (citing H.A. FOsTER, THE MAKING OF MODERN IRAQ (1935)).
119. U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:Iraq
[hereinafter Country Report], available at http:llwww.state.gov/gldrllrlslhrrpt/2004/41722.htm.
("The criminal justice system is based on the French or civil system. It was modified under the
Ottoman Turks and greatly influenced by Egypt."); EZZELDiN FODA, THE PROJECTED ARAB COURT
OFJUSTICE 126-27 (1957) (noting that the Egyptian code was adopted, with some changes, by Iraq).
120. The British exercised substantial influence in Iraq for a span of about forty years:
[Tlhe Ottoman Empire allied with Germany in World War I, and the British
dispatched an expeditionary force to Iraq to maintain control. The British stayed
on after the war. In 1920 the Treaty of Sevres placed Iraq and Palestine under
British mandate and Syria under the French. In 1921 the British established a
constitutional monarchy in Iraq and placed at its head Faisal ibn Hussein, (Faisal
I), a Meccan Hashimite prince whose acceptance by the people derived from his
being a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. In 1932 Iraq became independent,
but British influence over the ruling elite continue for nearly three decades.
AS'AD ABUKAUL ET AL, supranote 118, at 255.
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to bring the Western-inspired law more12 1 into conformity with
Islamic law and Middle Eastern customs.
Thus, Iraqi criminal law is an amalgam incorporating elements from
Islamic, 22 Ottoman, 23 French, 124 English,'2 Egyptian, 26 and Roman
121. HARVEY H. SMITH ET AL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR IRAQ 357 (1969). S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE
EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 167 (1985) ("[E]xamples of legislation introduced by the British mandate
authority which remained applicable are the Baghdad Penal Code, 1918 and the Baghdad Law of
Criminal Procedure, 1919. These two pieces of legislation remained in force until the late 1960's.").
The Baghdad Penal Code and the Baghdad Law of Criminal Procedure were "in turn, 'an amalgam
of provisions taken from Ottoman, French, and British criminal law and procedure."' Id. at 167 n. 1.
122. SMITH ETAL.,supra note 121, at 181 ("The judicial system is based partly on the French
model as first introduced during Ottoman rule and modified since then and based partly on religious
traditions, Islamic and others."); Anderson, supra note 118, at 543 n.6 (noting that Iraqi law is
partially based on Sharia).
123. Country Report, supra note 119, § 1, (e) (noting the French, Egyptian, and Ottoman
influence on Iraqi law); JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE NEW IRAQ 174 (2003) ("Civil and Criminal Courts
drew precedents from the Ottoman canon of the late nineteenth century and new traditions
introduced by the British Mandatory government."); Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" andIslamic
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705, 1713 (2003) (stating that the Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 was
"closely modeled after the French Penal Code of 1810."); SMITH ET AL., supra note 121, at 181
("The judicial system is based partly on the French model as first introduced during Ottoman rule
and modified since then and based partly on religious traditions, Islamic and others.").
124. Country Report, supra note 119, § 1, (e) (noting the French, Egyptian, and Ottoman
influence on Iraqi law); Farhang, supranote 2, at 46 (noting the French influence on the Iraqi legal
system); LipPMAN ET AL, supranote 116, at 3 & 101 (discussing the French influence on Ottoman
law and the European influence on the legal system of Islamic states generally); Esposrro, supra
note 106, at 144 (noting the influence of European law on the criminal law of various Moslem
countries); Hallaq, supra note 123, at 1713 (stating that the Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 was
"closely modeled after the French Penal Code of 1810."); SMrrH ET AL., supra note 121, at 181
("The judicial system is based partly on the French model as first introduced during Ottoman rule
and modified since then and based partly on religious traditions, Islamic and others."); Anderson,
supranote 118, at 543 n.6 (noting the French influence in Iraqi law); Ion, supranote 7-1, at 49 n.29
("The Turks adopted, nearly in their entirety, the commercial and criminal laws of France, and
incorporated into theirjudicial system the procedure of that country in these branches of the law.").
125. BRAUDE, supra note 123, at 174 ("Civil and Criminal Courts drew precedents from the
Ottoman canon of the late nineteenth century and new traditions introduced by the British
Mandatory government."). "The period of British administration was short and the common law
system did not take root in Iraq in the same way it had in" such places as "Nigeria, India and
Pakistan. The existing legal order prevalent in Iraq successfully resisted any English law
penetration into the local and religious norms. Nevertheless, Iraq was influenced by the British
justice particularly in procedural aspects of criminal law... ." AMIN, supranote 121, at 179.
126. Egyptian law had roots in Islamic and French law. FODA, supra note 119, at 126-27
(noting that the Egyptian code, which Iraq subsequently adopted, wove together European and
Islamic law); A. Kevin Reinhart & Gilbert S. Merritt, Reconstructionand ConstitutionBuildingin
Iraq, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 781 (2004) ("[Iraqi law] is a civil law system which came
through Egypt because Egypt, during the time of Napoleon's campaign, adopted a kind of
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law,' 27 none of which were adopted in its purest form. 2 8 Further diluting
these influences, the Coalition incorporated elements of American law into
the Iraqi system-procedural and substantive rights indigenous to an
adversarial system-based on the belief that these rights are essential to
fundamental fairness in criminal litigation. For example, Iraqi defendants
now enjoy the right to confront adverse witnesses at all stages of criminal
proceedings and the right to remain silent when being interrogated. 29 The
presence of a document granting these rights, of course, does not guarantee
that government agents will always respect them, however.
D. Investigative Stage
As noted above, the Iraqi criminal courts are patterned after the French
inquisitorial system, 30 as opposed to the Anglo-American adversarial
system. Under the inquisitional system "cases are controlled and
investigated by the judiciary. Judges, not lawyers, direct the progress of a
case."'' Thus, there are two branches of the court: an investigative one,
staffed by investigative judges also known as examining magistrates, and
a trial chamber that ultimately decides guilt or innocence.' 32 The examining magistrate judge is not simply "an impartial referee," but "an active

Napoleonic code system with Islamic elements in it that was later passed along to Iraq."); JOHN
KEAY, SowING THE WIND: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 16 (2003) (discussing the
French influence on Egyptian culture and law dating from Napoleon's 1798 invasion of Egypt);
OrientalLaws andLawyers, 2 ALB. L.J. 4, 6 (1870) (noting that Egyptian and Ottoman law are
extremely similar "with scarcely any deviations").
127. The civil-law tradition has its roots in Roman law, although it also bears strong Germanic
influences, and Islamic law was also influenced by Roman law. Peter J. Hamilton, The CivilLaw
and the Common Law, 36 HARV. L. REV. 180, 180 (1922) (noting that the civil law is derived from
Roman law); William Wirt Howe, Roman and Civil Law in America, 16 HARV. L. REV. 342,343
(1903) ("But French law was not destined to be entirely Roman in its character. Another important
influence was added in the form of what we call the 'barbarian laws' proper, such as those of the
Salian Franks, the Ripuarian Franks, and the like."); see also Abdur Rahim, A HistoricalSketch of
Mohammedan Jurisprudence, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 258 (1907) (noting the assertion that
"Mohammedan Jurisprudence borrowed largely from Roman Law"); Ion, supra note 71, at 44
(noting "the influence that the laws of Rome exercised in the development of the Islamic
legislation").
128. AMIN, supra note 121, at 167 n.1, 178, 179.
129. See CPA Order 13.
130. Farhang, supra note 2, at 46. "Though there are other systems with international
scope-Islamic theocratic law, for example-most countries' legal systems derive from either
French civil or English common law." Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator,LEGAL AFF.
46,47 (2005).
131. Country Report, supra note 119, § 1, (e).
132. Liebl, supranote 98, at 102.
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inquisitor who is free to seek evidence and to control the nature and
objective of the inquiry": 33
In France, this office traces its origin back to the end of the fifteenth
century when French criminal procedure began to follow the lead
of the ecclesiastical courts by abandoning the so-called
"accusatorial" system under which prosecution was regarded, and
treated, as an open public contest between private individuals, in
favor of the "inquisitorial" system, where the public prosecutor
stepped in to protect the interests of the state, and the initial
examination before an officer of the law took on the character of a
secret written inquiry where the accused did not appear and was not
represented by counsel.'4
The Iraqi system still follows this model, with a few modifications.
Instead of an impartial court judging a dispute presented by two worthy
adversaries-a zealous prosecutor arguing for conviction and a dedicated
defense counsel clamoring for acquittal-an investigative judge conducts
the initial inquiry into a case, and when in his discretionary judgment the
inquiry is complete, he submits a dossier to the trial court. 3 The investigativejudge's "dossier" or "report" is roughly analogous-when the judge
recommends the case continue for trial-to the common law's true bill of
indictment, or a "no bill," when the investigative judge dismisses a case. 3 '
Unlike an indictment, however, the examining judge's report or dossier
also contains a summary of the evidence the examining magistrate heard,

as well as his assessment of the evidence, perhaps including even an
assessment of the witnesses' credibility. Furthermore, although an
indictment cannot serve as evidence in an American court, the CCCI trial
judges may partially or completely rely on the investigative judge's report
in deciding the defendant's fate at trial.'37 The investigating magistrate "is
expected to investigate the matter thoroughly and to prepare a complete
written record, so that by the time the38examining stage is complete, all the
relevant evidence is in the record.',

133. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CWIL LAW TRADmON 127 (2d ed. 1985).
134. JASPER YEATES BRiNTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT 117 (rev. ed. 1968).
135. "Grandjuries investigate, and the usual end oftheir investigation is either a report, a 'nobill' or an 'indictment."' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264 (1948).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 265 (noting that an indictment cannot serve as evidence against a defendant).
138. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 129.
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A criminal case is initiated by submitting a complaint to the
investigating magistrate,' 39 which can be submitted orally or in writing. In
terrorism cases involving Americans, it falls to American special
prosecutors-judge advocates from one of the military services-to bring
cases to the Iraqi magistrate's attention and arrange for an investigative
hearing. The investigative magistrates have the authority to travel around
the country to obtain evidence and interview witnesses '40 and Iraqi law
states that the "scene of the incident shall be examined by the investigator
or magistrate ... ,, 14' But in light of the dangers posed by the bombladen roads of Iraq, the CCCI examining magistrates often work
exclusively in their chambers in the CCCI courthouse.' 42
Pursuant to their duty to investigate cases, investigative judges also
have the power to issue arrest and search warrants. 43 The United States
usually never availed itself of these warrants, however, because the
American military already possessed the defendants and sufficient
evidence to prosecute the cases, and as an occupying power the United
States was sufficiently imbued with de facto authority to make arrests
without an Iraqi warrant. Because defendants could be detained under the
magistrates' warrants, the judges also have the power to make pretrial
custody determinations, including the setting of bail. Again, however,
these proceedings did not apply to defendants held by the United States.
1. Investigative Hearings
In Iraq, the formal judicial process leading to the trial of a defendant
begins with an investigative "hearing," which in many respects is more
like a deposition than a hearing. CCCI investigative hearings, like trials,

are held in the CCCI courthouse. 45 Unlike trials held in courtrooms,

139. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971] 9(A), availableat
https:llwww.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETlntemet/HomepagestAC/
CLAMO-Public.nsf ("The
initiation of criminal proceedings from an oral or written complaint is submitted to the examining
magistrate....").

140. Id. 52(B).
141. Id. ("The scene ofthe incident shall be examined by the investigator or magistrate .... ").
142. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 62, at 11.
143. CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36, § 20.
144. "Cries were initially referred to an investigative magistrate empowered to gather
evidence, interrogate witnesses, and ultimately refer a criminal case for trial before a trial court
judge panel." Farhang, supra note 2, at 46. This is the same procedure used in the adjudication of
cases against members of Saddam Hussein's regime. See also Anthony Shadid, HearingSet for
Aides ofHussein, WASH. POST., Dec. 15, 2004, at 1.
145. Most of the courthouses in Iraq survived the invasion intact, only to be ransacked
afterwards by hordes of vandals. Farhang, supranote 2, at 45; GAO REPORT, supranote 57, at 80
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however, investigative hearings are generally held in the chambers of the
investigative judge, are less formal than trials, and are not truly court
proceedings as an individual from a common-law nation would think of
them.'" There is usually one investigative judge assigned to each case, but
there is nothing to prevent more than one magistrate from gathering
evidence in a particular case. 47 Furthermore, when the assigned magistrate
is absent, another investigative judge can substitute for him.
In the American cases, often only one hearing lasting a matter of hours
was required to present all of the relevant witnesses and evidence,
including an examination of the defendants. In multi-defendant or complex
cases there is nothing to prevent an investigative hearing from lasting days
or weeks, but these are uncommon. There is also nothing preventing an
investigative judge from recalling witnesses that he has already examined,
but that was almost never done with terrorism cases.'"
(noting that in 2004, there were roughly 130 courthouses and 570 courts in Iraq). This made the
administration of justice next to impossible in many areas. As it was, because Saddam Hussein's
regime was a rule of despotism rather than a rule of law, expending financial resources to ensure
functioning courthouses was not one of its priorities, so many courthouses were already in disrepair
prior to the invasion. But the widespread looting post-invasion certainly did not help matters. One
Army attorney gave this assessment of Iraqi courthouses:
For the most part, all courthouse facilities need major repair due to years of
neglect and the looting that took place after the fall of the regime.
Most courthouses have broken windows and sections that have been rendered
useless due to fire and smoke damage that occurred during the looting. Most
courthouses have only intermittent electricity. Most have no phones, no
computers, no copiers and limited furniture. Many lost all legal and administrative
records in the looting.
McGovern, supra note 44, at 34-35.
146. Robert Perito, UnitedStatesInstituteofPeaceSpecialReport 104, Establishingthe Rule
of Law in Iraq 5-6 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srI04.pdf
("[A]n investigative judge decides whether to prosecute, issues arrest warrants, and determines
whether suspects should be remanded to custody").
147. The cases involving the senior Baath Party leaders, handled by the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
are notable in that the court utilizes a panel of investigative judges. See Allam, supra note 93, at
A2 (noting that Gen. Ali Hassan al-Majid appeared before a panel of investigative judges).
148. The practice of recalling witnesses for successive examinations is accepted in civil-law
countries and existed in the English chancery courts. To preclude using this tool to delay the case,
restrictions were placed on the number of times a witness could be recalled to give further
testimony. William Hamilton Bryson, Witnesses: A Canonist's View, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 57,
62 (1969) ("The general rule is that witnesses can be examined only three times before publication
of their testimony; they cannot be brought back after publication except on new articles, i.e. set of
questions.").
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In cases initiated by American prosecutors, the prosecution team would
submit a short, written statement of the charges to the investigative judge,
along with any documentary evidence supporting the charges. This gave
the investigative judge a rudimentary understanding of the case prior to
examining the defendant and witnesses. Other than these statements,
however, the judge comes to the investigative hearing without any
information about the case.
An Iraqi investigative hearing can be loosely analogized to an initial
appearance, arraignment, preliminary hearing, and grand jury proceedings
held in an American court. Thus, like an initial appearance or arraignment
in the United States, it is at the investigative hearing that an Iraqi defendant
is first apprised of the charges the United States has leveled against him.
These may or may not be the charges the investigative judge elects to
charge the defendant with, and the CCCI investigative judges usually
elected to charge defendants much more leniently than the U.S. prosecutors
did. Unlike an arraignment in American courts, however, the Iraqi
defendant does not enter a plea to the charges. There is also no discussion
of bail or pretrial release, at least with terrorism suspects, the only
defendants that American judge advocates prosecuted.
As mentioned above, the CCCI investigative hearings also function like
American grand jury proceedings insofar as they protect defendants from
facing a trial if there is insufficient evidence to support the accusations
leveled against them.'49 The investigative hearings result in a documentary
product analogous in function to an American indictment or a "no bill,"
depending on the magistrate's findings. The document-the magistrate's
report-is essential to the case progressing to trial, and no trial can be held
unless the examining magistrate agrees that there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant committed the specified crime or crimes.
Iraqi investigative hearings, however, differ substantially from
American grand jury proceedings, which are also commonly used by
American prosecutors as investigative tools.' Unlike grand jury proceedings in most American jurisdictions and pursuant to American reforms of
the Iraqi system, in the CCCI, Iraqi defendants are permitted to appear

149. See Robert Vouin, The Protection of theAccused in French CriminalProcedure, 5 INT'L
& COmp. L.Q. 1, 5 (1956) ("thanks to the preparatory examination, a person under suspicion is
assured of not being put on trial unless grave presumptions of guilt have first been established by
a competent judicial authority").
150. RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 233 (1995) (noting that some provisions of the
Bill of Rights "have even turned topsy-turvy, such as the provision for indictment by grand jury.
The grand jury has become an instrument of prosecutorial investigation, rather than being the
protection for the criminal suspect that the framers of the Bill of Rights expected it to be.").
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before the investigative judge and may testify before the judge without
being placed under oath.1 5 ' They are also entitled to hear all of the
testimony presented to the investigative judge and to suggest a line of
cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and are free to offer their own
evidence to rebut the prosecutor's case. American defendants generally do
not enjoy the same rights in American grand jury proceedings 52
Also in contrast to most American grand jury proceedings, defendants
enjoy the right to be present at the hearing, the right to offer testimony in
their own defense, the right to remain silent, the right to be apprised of the
151. In the United States, usually only the prosecutor presents evidence to the grand jury.
"[T]he grand jury is a secret body, ordinarily hearing no evidence but the prosecution's, attended
by no counsel except the prosecuting attorneys. . . ." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 10 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON

120 (1999) ("[U]sually the only evidence laid

before a grand jury is the evidence of guilt that the prosecutor has gathered."). That is the practice
in federal court. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) ("The following persons may be present while the grand
jury is in session: attorneys for the government, the witness being questioned, interpreters when
needed, and a court reporter or an operator of a recording device.").
A few states, such as New York, however, permit a defendant to appear and present a defense
to the grand jury. William Glaberson, New Trend Before GrandJuries: Meet the Accused, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2004, at 11 ("Although federal courts and most states, following laws dating to
17th-century England, do not allow the accused the automatic right to testify before grand juries,
New York has long granted such a right. In 1978, the state also passed an unusual law that allows
a defense lawyer to accompany the target of an investigation into the grand jury room, though not
to participate.").
Because the grand jury usually hears only the prosecution's version of events, it is not surprising
that grand juries usually indict cases as the prosecutors request, leading to some harsh criticism of
grand juries. See POSNER, supra at 131-32 ("Grand juries usually rubber-stamp the indictments
proposed by the prosecutors"); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION 229 n.6 (1991) ("[I]t is well known that any halfway competent prosecutor can get
a grand jury to indict anyone, even the proverbial 'ham sandwich."'); F. LEE BAILEY, THE DEFENSE
NEVER RESTS 256 (1971) ("[T]here is nothing less grand than a grand jury. The typical grand jury
is a flock of sheep led by the prosecutor across the meadow to the finding he wants."). This has led
some to argue that the Fifth Amendment's presentment requirement is anachronistic and that the
grand jury is no longer a valuable instrument for the protection of a defendant's interests. See
ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AMERICA 186-87 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1930) ("The grand
jury has long outlived its usefulness."); see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,533 (1883) (stating
that the presentation of a case to a grand jury is not so essential to the concept of ordered liberty
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to obtain indictment before trying a defendant).
152. "Neither the rules of evidence, nor the constitutional rights of a defendant to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures, to confront the witnesses against him, and to testify in
his own defense apply in grand jury proceedings." R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More
Independent GrandJury:Recasting andEnforcingThe Prosecutor'sDuty to DiscloseExculpatory
Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 363 (2000). Obviously the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses is nonexistent in most American grand jury proceedings, as is the right
to consult with counsel during the proceedings.
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right to remain silent, and the guarantee that the investigative judge will
not draw an inference adverse to the defendant's presumed innocence if he
exercises this right.'53 To assist the defendants in exercising their rights at
the investigative hearing," Iraqi defendants are also permitted to have an
attorney present during investigative hearings. Importantly, the right to
counsel:
does not mean that counsel for the accused has unrestricted freedom
to cross-examine witnesses or to introduce evidence on behalf of his
client. The examining phase is still conducted by a judge. Counsel
for the accused can, however, participate in the proceedings in such
a way as to protect his client's interests, calling certain matters to
the attention of the court and advising his client on how he should
respond as the proceeding unfolds. 55
Insurgency defendants are provided counsel free of charge if they
cannot afford an attorney. 56 There is usually no way to verify pleas of
153. David Luhnow, Overhauling Iraq's Courts, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2004, at A14
("American officials have already amended the country's [Iraq's] criminal code. The changes: a
ban on confession obtained through torture granting defendants the right to be silent without that
being taken as a sign of guilt.... ."). This is a right that was not afforded to Germans charged with
crimes in American military courts in post-World War II Germany. They were required to answer
questions posed to them by prosecutors and judges, and if they refused, the judges could draw the
inference that the defendant was declining to answer because he had something to hide, a
reasonable inference under the circumstances. NOBLEMAN, supranote 8, at 103. Civil-law countries
generally permit their judges to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to
answer questions. MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 130 (A defendant's "refusal to answer, as well
as his answers, will be taken into account in deciding questions of guilt or in fixing the penalty.").
154. Although the defendant's right to be present at hearings and trials is fundamental to
common-law systems, this right is not a universally recognized one, and for many years in civil-law
systems a defendant could be tried and convicted in absentia as a matter of course. I.L. HUNT,
AMERICAN MIITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY: 1918-1920, at 289 (1943) ("In
neither France or Germany is it the custom to require the presence of the defendant in court. Fines
and imprisonment may be imposed in his absence, and the civil authorities ordered by the court to
carry out the punishment."). In the U.S. federal courts, trials in absentia are permitted, but only
when the defendant has voluntarily elected to absent himself, either by absconding or by disrupting
proceedings to such an extent that they can only be continued in his absence. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
43(cXl) (setting forth instances when a defendant shall be deemed to have waived his right to be
present at trial); Illinois v.Allen, 397 U.S. 337,342-43 (1970) (trial in absentia ispermissible when
the trial judge removed the defendant for disruptive behavior).
155. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 129.
156. CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36, § 22 C'All accused persons appearing before the CCCI
shall have the right to representation by an attorney of their choice. Where an accused person is

unable to afford the services of an attorney the CCCI will provide them with a suitably qualified
attorney free of charge."); Liebl, supra note 98, at 103 (noting that in the CCCI, attorneys are
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poverty, and since most Iraqis are indigent, the investigative judges
frequently appoint attorneys to represent CCCI defendants." 7 This and
other rights, not surprisingly, did not exist in Saddam's time,' but were
instituted by the Coalition to help ensure that defendants get a fair shake
before the CCCI and other courts.1 59 Nonetheless, most defense attorneys
do next to nothing for their clients at the investigative stage. They do prove
useful to some defendants when, after hearing the prosecution's case and
its evidence, they seek out or manufacture alibi witnesses for the trial.'"
Although pretrial detention does not comport with Islamic law,16 1 Iraqi
law does recognize pretrial detention and the use of bail to ensure a
defendant's presence at court proceedings. 2 But all of the insurgency
defendants are detained by the United States from the time they are
initially apprehended until they serve their sentences, and some will remain
in custody even after their sentences are served if they continue to pose a
risk to the United States. 63 Because of the danger to U.S. troops and the
appointed for the indigent).
157. The attorneys are Iraqi nationals with law degrees from Iraqi universities, frequently
Baghdad University.
158. "In the CPA order that established the CCCI, and those that modified the Criminal Code
and the Code of Criminal Procedure, we provided certain protections for defendants that had been
absent in the Iraqi criminal justice system. Foremost among these was the right to defense counsel
from the outset of judicial proceedings. Previously, suspects were only entitled to representation
at trial, but the investigative phase in civil law jurisdictions is perhaps as crucial to the ultimate
outcome, so it was important to extend this protection during this stage as well." Williamson, supra
note 2, at 239.
159. Farhang, supra note 2, at 46:
From a U.S. legal perspective, Iraq's former criminal procedure code did not
adequately protect a defendant's right to silence. Although a defendant was
entitled not to answer questions posed by the investigating magistrate during the
investigative stage of a criminal case, the magistrate had no obligation to advise
the defendant of this right. The right to remain silent was further undermined by
provisions allowing the trial court to question a defendant in criminal proceedings
and to consider a refusal to answer such questions as evidence of guilt.
160. Williamson, supranote 2, at 240 (noting the poor quality of Iraqi defense attorneys).
161. LIPPMAN ET AL, supra note 116, at 61 ("Based on these Shari'a principles, most jurists
agree that the accused is to be firee from pretrial detention....").
162. IRAQI CODEOFCRIMINALPROCEDURE (English translation)[ 1971]IN 109-122, available
at https.//www.jagcnet.army.miliJAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
163. Some of the terrorists were handed over to the Iraqis and were subsequently released. See
West, supra note 22, at 27. At least one terrorist was captured again while carrying out attacks
against American military personnel. See Victor Davis Hanson, Western World Shows Too Much
Softness In Different Kind of War, Cm. TRil., Sept. 2, 2005, at C25 ("It turns out that the terrorist
had been captured earlier in December 2004, on suspicion of being involved in a deadly suicide
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likelihood of flight,' insurgents are never released prior to trial.6 5 Indeed,
in one case when a defendant was mistakenly released prior to trial, he was
never heard from again, and it is next to impossible to track absconders
and fugitives. Because of this and the grave nature of the crimes charged
in the CCCI, bail is never an issue or a possibility in insurgency cases.
The investigative hearing commences when the defendant and his
attorney are brought into the examining magistrate's chambers.! 7 Since
the defendant remains in the custody of the United States, American
personnel accompany the defendant, who is unshackled during the
hearing. "' Of course, the judge is also present, along with the judge's
assistant, who summarizes the testimony in writing, and the American
prosecutor, a judge advocate from either the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines,
or Air Force. No Iraqi public prosecutor is present for the investigative
hearing. This means that the investigative judge receives no benefit from

attack on an American base. Then he was turned over to the Iraqis, sent to the notorious Abu
Ghraib jail and released. Once free, he returned to his job of killing Americans ....).
164. Although Iraq's criminal justice system is utilized to deal with insurgents, one has to
remember that they are more than simple criminals and a criminal justice system-whether
American or foreign-may not be well-suited for dealing with terrorism cases. See Richard A.
Posner, The ConstitutionVs. Counterterrorism,WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,2006, at A12 ("the criminal
justice system is designed for dealing with ordinary crimes, not today's global terrorism").
American forces in Iraq cannot simply seek assistance from the local police precinct in arresting
an insurgent who failed to appear for court. In many locations, the American military is the local
police, or at least the only trustworthy police force.
165. This is consistent with the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in which "[tihe
right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will
stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951) (citing Ex
parte Milburn, 9 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835)).
166. Brady or Jencks Act rights are also generally not applicable in the CCCI insofar as there
is almost never any exculpatory evidence in the hands of the prosecution, and any written
statements made by the defendant generally were classified. See generally,Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the government to disclose to the defendant all exculpatory evidence in
the government's possession).
167. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 57 (A) ("An accused person... may attend the
investigation while it is in progress."). Under Iraqi law, the investigative hearing is not generally
open to the public. Id. 57(C) ("No person other than those previously mentioned may attend the
investigation unless the magistrate gives permission."). The United States never prevented members
of the public from observing the hearings, but because they were held in the magistrates' chambers,
members of the public never attended.
168. The practice is thus consistent with Deck v. Missouri, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (2005), in which
the Court held that the shackling of a convict during the penalty phase of his trial violates due
process because it suggests to the jury that the defendant is a threat to the community. In the Iraqi
forum there is no jury and thus no possibility that a jury will draw an inculpatory inference from
the shackles.
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any investigation or preparation by Iraqi prosecutors, 69 as a grand jury
would in the United States. It also means that prior to the trial the public
prosecutor has no familiarity with a case,' 70 so he must rely on the investigativejudge's report for any arguments he chooses to make at trial. 7
After apprising the defendant of his rights, the first prosecution
witness-almost always a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, typically the
Army-was admitted to the chambers for examination. 72 The defendant
and his attorney were present when the witnesses testified. Although the
judge, stenographer, attorneys, and witnesses were seated during the
examination, the magistrate required the defendant to stand for the entire
hearing. 173 Frequently the judge would start the examination by asking the
witness his religion, ostensibly for the purpose of determining whether he
could efficaciously swear his oath on the Koran! 4 After the oath, the
magistrate proceeded to question the witness.
Because most Iraqi judges understood only Arabic, 7' and most
American witnesses spoke only English, the questioning was performed
through an interpreter supplied by the United States.!76 As the witness
169. In insurgency cases, the Iraqi prosecutor had no role, except at trial, and then it seemed
as though his only role was to thwart conviction of insurgents. They certainly never investigated
the cases and never met with American witnesses despite invitations to do so.
170. In many civil-law nations, including Iraq, the prosecutors are considered to be part ofthe
judiciary. MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 104. Under such circumstances, it might be argued that
the prosecutor should not have any predispositions about a case, like a trier of fact. This, however,
deprives the fact-finder of the benefits that a zealous advocate can bring to a case, particularly an
advocate who knows a case inside and out.
171. American prosecutors tried to remedy this unfamiliarity by creating short memoranda for
the Iraqi prosecutor and judges. This practice had one significant drawback: its efficacy was
dependent upon the judges and prosecutor actually reading the memos. Because oftheir haphazard
filing "system," the lack of technology, and the general chaos in Iraq, papers filed with various
judges or the court were frequently misplaced.
172. Prosecution witnesses testified separately, so as to inhibit tailoring of testimony in an
effort to produce a uniform version of events. This practice is consistent with Iraqi law, which
states that "[t]he evidence of each witness shall be heard separately...." IRAQI CODEOFCRIMNAL
PROCEDURE 62.
173. U.S. soldiers would often offer the defendant a chair, but the Iraqi magistrates almost
never permitted the defendants to sit during any part of the hearings.
174. It is worth noting that before the middle 1800s, the testimony of Christians and Jews was
not permitted in Ottoman courts. June Starr, Islam andthe Struggle Over State Law in Turkey, in
LAW AND IsLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST, supranote 105, at 78.
175. Bert Caldwell, A FavorableVerdict on IraqiCourts, SPOKESMAN-REv., Oct. 4,2005, at
6A ("The proceedings are conducted in Arabic, so everything is done using translators.").
176. Arabic language interpreters are in short supply in Iraq, and thus American translators
can demand a six-figure salary while native Iraqis can command a salary of at least $400 per
month. Thomas X. Hammes, Lost in Translation,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A23 (noting the
dearth of Arabic language translators in Iraq, the problems this presents for troops seeking to

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

41

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 18

testified, the examining magistrate would summarize the testimony for his
assistant, who proceeded to write down whatever the judge instructed.'
The record, therefore, was at best a brief encapsulation of the essence of
the witnesses' testimony, as altered and interpreted, by the examining
magistrate and his scribe. The shortcomings of such a system are obvious,
though Iraq is not the first venue in which the United States has had to
contend with this practice.

communicate with Iraqis and vice versa, and the need to pay translators more than the standard
$400 per month); John M. Glionna & Ashraf Khalil, "Combat Linguists" Battle On Two Fronts,
L.A. TIMES, June 5,2005, at 1 ("U.S. troops still often rely on hand signals in communicating with
Iraqis as entire combat brigades struggle to make do with only one native Arabic-speaking U.S.
soldier."); Solomon Moore, First the Insurgents, Then Marines, L.A. TIMEs, May 14, 2005, at 1
(relating how "Iraqis ...struggle to communicate with the troops, who often lack interpreters.").
The critical need for more interpreters was demonstrated in one American-Iraqi endeavor that failed
miserably because of the inability to communicate:
On a nighttime raid in Ramadi this month, Army Sgt. First Class Chris Chapin, a
military adviser to the Iraqi army, said he had not been able to get the Iraqi troops
to mount an operation of about 40 men. Chapin had no interpreter with him, and
none of the Iraqis could speak English.
"We definitely need to do something about this interpreter thing," said Sgt. First
Class Anthony James, 33, of Vicksburg, Miss. "I don't see things changing here.
We're not reaching the people." Because the Iraqis and Americans couldn't
communicate with one another, they frequently ended up wandering in the middle
of the street, yelling commands in English and Arabic and heading in opposite
directions.
Tom Lasseter, Iraqi Forces Still FarFrom Ready, PHIA. INQUIRER, Aug. 30, 2005, at A3.
The American military suffered from a similar dearth of German language interpreters after
World War II. NOBLEMAN, supranote 8, at 74. Even non-military agencies of the U.S. government
are in need of Arabic speakers to act as interpreters. See Joel Mowbray, Arabic Words Go Free in
Jails, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at Al ("The federal Bureau of Prisons is holding 119 persons
with 'specific ties' to international Islamist terrorist groups, yet has no full-time Arabic translators
or a system to monitor their communications...
177. According to Iraqi law:
An investigation is to commence with the recording in writing of the deposition
of the plaintiff or informant, then of the testimony of the victim and other
prosecution witnesses and of anyone else whose evidence the parties wish to be
heard, and also the testimony of any person who comes forward of his own
volition to provide information, if such information will be of benefit to the
investigation, and the testimony of any other persons whom the magistrate or
investigator learns is in possession of information concerning the incident.
IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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In Germany after World War I, German examining magistrates, who
initially investigated crimes against the Allied forces before passing them
off to Allied officials, occasionally used their power to summarize
testimony so as to distort the record!"' This is one reason why the
United States generally did not rely on German courts to try crimes against
Americans:
Under the procedure followed in the examination of suspects and
witnesses by German prosecuting authorities-police officials, state
attorneys, and judges-no shorthand record is taken ofthe questions
and answers; it is up to the examining official to summarize the
statements made. Tuohy has characterized the German judge as
'something of a Torquemada,' but, if he was opposed to the statute
that he was called upon to enforce, Torquemada, far from burning
his victims, was in a position to act as co-conspirator with his
fellow nationals.'79
The same is true in Iraq, though more so, for in Iraq there is no
American judicial body trying the case. Important nuances were often lost
as the words of the defendant and witnesses were translated into the words
of the investigative judge, not to mention when they were translated from
English into Arabic. This problem was compounded on days when the
judges were presented with a large number of witnesses and thus often
succumbed to the natural temptation to further abbreviate the synopses of
the witnesses' testimony.
Since the judges' summaries were written in Arabic, it was impossible
for the single translator provided to U.S. forces to translate every court
document into English. Consequently American prosecutors were never
sure exactly what the judge's synopsis contained, a significant deficiency
because the trial judges would later base their decisions on this mysterious
record. Because such a system is unreliable and susceptible to
manipulation, the Anglo-American common law long ago abandoned this

178. FRAENKEL, supra note 30, at 181.
179. Id.
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quintessentially continental practice.' 0 Because of its civil-law roots, this
practice survives in Iraq.'8 '

Upon completion of a witness's testimony, the judge might ask the
defense counsel for any questions he wanted the judge to pose to the
witness. The defendant's attorney is free to suggest relevant questions, but
all questioning is done at the magistrate's discretion.'82 This is the defense's first chance to "cross-examine" the witnesses, but most defense
attorneys declined the invitation and never bothered to suggest any further
questions. A few took the opportunity, but they obviously had little
experience cross-examining witnesses and thus were generally ineffective.
No attorney ever suggested more than three questions, and this reticence
was not attributable to the thoroughness of the examining magistrate's
questioning.
Some judges also invited American prosecutors to raise any concerns
or suggest questions.'83 This was frequently helpful to the judges, since
some of them lacked the inquisitorial skills essential to the functioning of
the Iraqi inquisitorial system. Also, much could be lost or distorted in the
translation from English to Arabic, and so it was sometimes necessary to
get the judges back on the right track. For example, in one case, after a
brief colloquy, the judge thought the soldier-witness was accusing the
defendant of attacking him with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). In
actuality, the witness asserted only that defendant possessed and

180. As Sir Matthew Hale explained:
[Testimony is given at trial] personally, and not in Writing, wherein oftentimes,
yea too often, a crafty Clerk, Commissioner, or Examiner, will make a Witness
speak what he truly never meant, by his dressing of it up in his own Terms,
Phrases and Expressions, whereas on the other Hand, manytimes the very Manner
of a Witness's delivery of his Testimony will give a probable Indication whether
he speaks truly or falsely, and by this Means also he has Opportunity to correct,
amend, or explain his Testimony upon further Questioning with him, which he can
never have after a Deposition is set down in writing.

257-58 (1713).
181. Apparently this lack of a verbatim transcript is common in civil-law countries, despite
the inaccuracies, imprecision, and other ill effects it engenders. See MERRYMAN, supra note 133,
at 116 (noting that in civil-law countries the "hearing judge will make notes (there is no verbatim
MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND

record) of the testimony and dictate a summary to the clerk.").
182. "No question may be addressed to a witness without the permission of the magistrate or
investigator.. . . IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64(A).
183. "U.S. military lawyers who compile evidence in cases related to U.S. interests are usually
permitted to ask questions of the witnesses during" a trial's investigative phase.... ." Finer &
Mosher, supra note 72, at Al 1.
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transported the RPG. This was easily corrected by suggesting a few simple
questions to the magistrate. Although most investigative judges generally
seemed to appreciate this help, some judges held that American
prosecutors should have no role in the investigative hearing, even the
minimal role of suggesting questions. Thus, in some cases, American
prosecutors had to insist that the investigative judge ask a certain line of
questions, otherwise, the judge would have overlooked key pieces of
evidence.
As discussed below, if the investigative judge fails to mention a crucial
fact in his investigative report to the trial judges, it is nearly impossible for
the prosecution to establish that fact at trial because trial judges perceive
such efforts as an unlawful attempt to reopen a closed record."' Iraqi law
does not support this exclusion of evidence, as it provides that a trial court
"may hear the testimony of anyone who attends it himself and anyone who
puts himself forward with information[,]"' " but the CCCI trial judges have
a different understanding of the law. Of course, Iraqi defendants are not
similarly constrained by this rule, and enjoy complete freedom to submit
new evidence at trial.
After the judge's synopsis of the testimony was recorded, the magistrate
would sometimes require the initial prosecution witness to draw a sketch
of the crime scene, as is required by Iraqi law.'" When the stenographer
had finished recording the summary of the testimony,'87 the judge invited
the witness to sign the summary. The summary was written in Arabic and
translation resources were scarce, consequently, the American witnesses
frequently signed a piece of paper that was completely unintelligible to
them, although, if possible, the translator would hastily review the
summary for glaring errors or omissions. 8 After the signing, the next
184. Some Iraqi attorneys suggested that under Iraqi law, prosecution witnesses could present

testimony at trial, even if their testimony was not contained in the investigative judge's report. Iraqi
law supports this assertion as does a plain reading of Paragraph 171 ofthe Iraq Criminal Procedure
Code. Paragraph 171 provides that "[t]he court may hear the testimony of anyone who attends it
and anyone who puts himself forward with information. It may summon any person to attend to
deliver his testimony if it considered that this testimony will help establish the truth." The majority
of CCCI trial judges, however, refused to permit this practice with respect to American witnesses
in cases involving attacks on Americans.

185. IRAQI CODE OF CR5MINAL PROCEDURE
186. Id. 52(B).

171.

187. Recording of the testimony is required by Iraqi criminal procedure. Id. 128(A)
("Statements of the accused are recorded in the written record by the magistrate or investigator and
signed by the accused and the magistrate or investigator."); Id. 63 ("Statements by a witness shall
be entered into the record of the investigation without any erasures, crossings out, amendments or
").
additions to the text, which when complete shall be read through and signed by the witness ....
188. If time permitted, American prosecutors would ask the interpreter to read the summary
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witness would repeat the process until the United States had exhausted its
supply of witnesses and the judge's scribe.
After a while, and a few losses, before the CCCI trial court, American
prosecutors learned that the trial court would not convict a defendant
unless the prosecution produced at least two witnesses who personally saw
the defendant commit each element of the crime charged. So investigative
hearings inevitably entailed the questioning of at least two prosecution
witnesses, and more if they were available and could safely be transported
to the courthouse.IS9 American military commanders, however, were often
reluctant to send witnesses from their units, for obvious reasons: their
absence would deleteriously affect military operations, there was a general
shortage of combat troops, a lack of transportation assets, and the
witnesses would encounter a host of dangers while traveling on Iraqi roads.
After the prosecution presented its case, the defendant was given the
opportunity to testify. Iraqi defendants always elected to tell their own
tale, 9° despite their right to remain silent. Although the right to refuse to
to the witness, but this frequently was not feasible in light of limited translation resources, the
volume of cases, and the number of witnesses in each case (no less than three for each case,
including the defendant), and the fact that the judges worked limited hours (usually half days).
Indeed, the CCCI judges sometimes complained that American prosecutors were bringing too
many cases to the court and that this resulted in a burdensome amount of work for the judges.
Apparently the concept of working a full day is not a popular one among the Iraqi judiciary, which
is better known for its indolence and acquisitiveness than its work ethic:
Years of service under a regime where personal and political survival was the
prime goal had caused the judges to not develop any fiduciary sense of
responsibility for their courts. Rather, the main goal of many Iraqi judges was to
use their positions to secure as much personal gain as possible. As Coalition JA
personnel sought to discuss restoring court operations, senior Iraqi judges focused
on obtaining personal cell phones, sport utility vehicles, and air conditioning as
a prerequisite to working.
Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48; McGovern, supranote 44, at 36 ("In general, judges say their pay
is too low, but they do not seem to be working too hard. They work 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. six days per
week. Even during those hours, as we walked around the respective courthouses, most judges and
courthouse employees were milling about and not too busy working.").
189. Of course, sometimes only one witness saw the defendant commit the crime. Such cases
were doomed to acquittal, and after a certain point the American leadership elected not to pursue
these cases. In other cases, several witnesses existed, but their combat unit was otherwise
sufficiently engaged in important duties that transporting the witnesses to the CCCI courthouse or
permitting the witnesses to suspend their duties was essentially impossible.
190. Fleishman, supra note 73, at 1 (describing a capital murder trial in the CCCI in which
"the little testimony given was mainly the denials of the accused"). This decision not to remain
silent demonstrates, by contradiction, the truth that ."the wise are those who hold their tongues."'
Louis Couturat, quoted in BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL 211
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answer questions existed under Iraqi law even before the liberation of
Iraq,' 9' defendants had no means to compel the government to respect this
right, and it was frequently ignored. As to judges drawing an adverse
inference from a defendant's refusal to answer questions, Iraqi law
specifically stated that a "refusal to answer will be considered as evidence
against the defendant," 92 which is consistent with the practices of other
civil-law nations. Only changes to the law instituted by the United States
prevented this from occurring in the CCCI.
Defendants who elected to testify enjoyed two advantages not afforded
to prosecution witnesses. First, consistent with Islamic law and the civillaw tradition, 93 defendants were not required to testify under oath.' 9 This
probably makes the defendant's mendacity more palatable to his already
diminished ethical sensibilities: he lies, but at least he is not lying to Allah
or claiming Allah as his witness. For defendants who are devout Muslims,
this rule assures that they will not commit blasphemy because they are
permitted to lie without having to defile the Koran with a false oath and
thereby risk damnation. According to Mohammed, if a person swears a
false oath, "'when he will meet God on the day of Judgment he will find
His face turned away from him in anger." 95 Permitting witnesses to testify
without requiring an oath allowed defendants to forego the truth-enhancing
function that this threat of perdition would otherwise have engendered.
The second advantage is that defendants testified after hearing the
prosecution's entire case, including any weaknesses. In the United States,
criminal rules of discovery are such that defendants do not generally get to
hear the prosecution's entire case before trial,'" and at pretrial
proceedings, witnesses---other than the defendant-are sequestered to
prevent them from adjusting their testimony to ensure their consistency.'97
(1967). Notably, Germans tried in American military courts were always eager to tell their own
version of events, despite an insignificant penalty for remaining mum. NOBLEMAN, supra note 8,
at 103.
191. "The accused does not have to answer any of the questions he is asked." IRAQI CODE OF
126(B), available at https://www.jagcnet.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971]
arny.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
192. Id. 179.
193. MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 130 ("As a rule the defendant can be questioned during
the examining phase and at trial. He cannot, however, be sworn.").
194. "The accused does not swear the oath unless acting as a witness for other defendants."
IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

126(A).

195. Rahim, supra note 127, at 194 (quoting Mohammed).
196. "A criminal defendant is entitled to rather limited discovery, with no general right to
obtain the statements of the Government's witnesses before they have testified.. ." at trial. Degen
v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825 (1996) (citing FED. RULE CRIM. PROC. 16(a)(2)).
197. See FED. R. EVID. 615 ("At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded
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Most Iraqi defendants took full advantage of this gift, and tailored their
testimony accordingly. This free discovery also assisted defendants in
marshaling mendacious witnesses for trial who testified in accordance with
the defendant's chosen story.
Defendants in multi-defendant cases enjoyed yet another advantage at
the investigative hearing: they testified serially and in the presence of their
co-defendants with no sequestration.'98 This facilitated a consistency in
their testimony that would otherwise have been nearly impossible. It hardly
assisted the judges in ascertaining the truth, as the second and subsequent
defendants simply parroted the testimony of the first. This anomaly was
not of Iraqi origin. Rather, the presence of all defendants during
examination by the magistrate was a direct result of American-backed
reforms that gave each defendant the right to be present at all judicial
proceedings in his case. This presence makes sense under a common-law
system, because defendants have a right to attend all judicial proceedings
and to confront their accusers, and hearings in the common-law system are
truly judicial proceedings.
In contrast, the prevailing nature of CCCI investigative hearings is, as
their name indicates, investigative. Investigative hearings give the
investigative judges an opportunity to learn about the events underlying the
accusations made by the United States. In this situation, it makes more
sense to have each defendant testify separately, without the benefit of
hearing a co-conspirator's version of events. A thorough examination of
defendants, sufficiently separated to prevent collaborative testimony, is
much more likely to elicit truthful testimony or expose contradictions.
Alternatively, consistent accounts, unaided by listening to a coconspirator's version of events, would have given credibility to the
defendants' independent recollection of the relevant details.
Another advantage enjoyed solely by the defense was its option not to
have defense witnesses testify at investigative hearings. Although
defendants had a right to present defense witnesses at the investigative
hearing,199 guilty defendants had little incentive to tip their hand in advance
of trial. In contrast, the CCCI trial judges frequently barred prosecution
witnesses who did not testify at investigative hearings from testifying at
trial. In other words, the defendant enjoyed the benefit of complete
discovery of the prosecution's case, but had no reciprocal duty to share
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses ....
").
198. For a discussion of the practice of sequestration of witnesses, see generally John H.
Wigmore, Sequestrationof Witnesses, 14 HARv. L. REv. 475 (1901).
199. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58 (providing that the examining magistrate will

hear the testimony of any witness "whose evidence the parties wish to be heard.....
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even the general nature of its defense with American prosecutors. 2°° Some
defendants took full advantage of this at trial by ambushing the prosecution
with alibi witnesses.
2. The Investigative Judge's Report and Recommendation
After the American prosecutors and the defense had an opportunity to
present evidence, the investigative hearing was concluded. The next step
was for the investigative judge to prepare his dossier for the CCCI trial
court. This report operates like an indictment when it sets forth the
investigative judge's determination that there exists sufficient evidence to
warrant a trial.2"1 In other instances, the report might state that there is
insufficient cause to believe that the accused committed a crime, and that
he should not face jeopardy on the charges. 2 2 More often than not, the
investigative judges recommended prosecution and referred the case to the
trial arm of the CCCI. 0 3
Since the investigative judge is ostensibly neutral, his report should
contain information in support of the prosecution along with any
exculpatory evidence presented or discovered by the magistrate during his
independent investigation. But, as mentioned above, many defendants
choose not to submit exculpatory evidence at the investigative stage. This
presents no problem for them, as they can submit this evidence at trial.
Not so, however, for the prosecution. The investigative report operates
as a limitation on the prosecution because evidence not contained in the
report generally will not be admitted later at trial. For example, if a soldier
was on leave during the investigative phase of a case, but later returned to
Iraq and appeared at trial, the CCCI trial court probably would refuse to
hear his testimony since this testimony was not part of the investigative

200. See ChristopherC. Langdell, Discovery UndertheJudicatureActs 1873, 1875,11 HARV.
L. REV. 137, 137 (1897) ("Discovery is in law the compulsory disclosure by a litigant of such facts
within his knowledge, of the contents of such documents in his possession, as will aid his adversary
in proving his case or defence.").
201. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 130(B) ("If the act is punishable by law and the
magistrate finds that there is sufficient evidence for a trial, a decision is issued to transfer the
accused to the appropriate court.").
202. Id. 130(A) ("Ifthe examining magistrate finds that the action is not punishable by law
or that the complainant has withdrawn the complaint... he issues a decision rejecting the case and
closing the case file definitively."); id. 130(B) ("If there is insufficient evidence he [the
defendant] is not transferred, an order is issued for his release and the case file is closed
temporarily, with a statement containing the reasons for the closure.").
203. At this time the magistrate is supposed to inform the public prosecutor of his decision.
IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 130(E) ("The magistrate informs the public prosecutor
when die decision is issued....").
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record. This limitation became particularly problematic because a
defendant usually does not indicate the nature of his defense until trial,
when the prosecution can no longer rebut that defense. Several militants
were acquitted because they set forth a defense at trial which the United
States could not rebut because key rebuttal witnesses were not listed in the
investigative report and, in any event, their testimony was not
memorialized in this dossier.
In the CCCI, rules favoring the native-born terrorists sometimes were
the product of the judiciary's desire to assist their countrymen in evading
justice. If there is a statutory basis for the rule excluding evidence that is
not first submitted at the investigative hearing, it is probably paragraph 212
of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule states: "The court is not
permitted, in its ruling, to rely upon a piece of evidence which has not been
brought up for discussion or referred to during the hearing.... " 204
Paragraph 212, however, is vague and ambiguous. It is susceptible to the
alternative interpretation that the word "hearing" does not mean
"investigative hearing," but is the trial itself. Indeed, in other parts of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the term "hearing" clearly refers to the trial.2 5
Under this interpretation, paragraph 212 mandates nothing more than that
the trial judge not base a verdict on extraneous evidence not contained in
the trial record. That is, judges must not utilize extraneous evidence in
arriving at their verdict.
This interpretation is particularly reasonable when read in conjunction
with the next sentence of the paragraph: "The judge cannot give a ruling
on the basis of his personal knowledge." '' ° Facts or prejudices derived
solely from the judges' personal knowledge are similarly not matters
contained in the trial record, and thus should never be the basis for a
conviction or acquittal.20 7 The contents of a judge's personal knowledge
would also be matters not contained in the record. It appears, therefore,

204. Id. 212.
205. See id. 223(A) ("The court retires before giving its ruling. After it has formulated the
ruling, the hearingis resumed publicly. The ruling is read out to the defendant or its contents are
made clear to him.") (emphasis added). Because this provision refers to a ruling being formulated
before the hearing is resumed, the "hearing" referred to in this provision must be the trial, and not
an investigative hearing, which do not result in rulings per se. But this text is a translation from
Arabic, and there is no guarantee that the translation properly conveys all of the law's nuances.
206. Id. 212.
207. The obvious exception is facts which may bejudicially noticed. See FED. R. EViD. 201(b)
(stating that a court may take judicial notice of facts "generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction ofthe trial court...."); Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421 (1908) ("We take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge."). It is unclear whether Iraqi law permits judges
to take judicial notice of common facts.
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that the rule ensures a judgment based on evidence admitted at trial, and
not outside influences, prejudices, bribes, or other extraneous matters. But
even if Iraqi judges were accurately construing this rule to preclude the
admission of new evidence at trial, and not just outside influences, they
applied this exclusionary rule only to the prosecution, and not to the
defendant. There is no statutory basis for this distinction in the criminal
procedure law, which further suggests that the Iraqi judges were operating
disingenuously to impede the prosecution of native terrorists.
Importantly, there was no way to challenge the contents of the
investigative report, especially since the United States frequently was not
granted access to the report prior to trial. 08 Even if access were granted, it
is unlikely that the reports could have been translated into English in light

of the limited number of translators. Thus, if the investigative judge made
an error, or a deliberate omission or fabrication, this error or omission
would control the prosecution's case at trial.' 9 For example, if the investigative judge overlooked the statement ofa particular witness in drafting his
report, this witness generally would be precluded from testifying at trial.
Consequently, the investigative report operates yet again like a commonlaw indictment because an indictment limits the scope of prosecution.
Under American constitutional law, a defendant can only be convicted of
felony charges for which he was indicted by a grand jury. The CCCI
investigative report goes much further in limiting the prosecution by also
limiting the evidence that may be admitted at trial in support of a charge.
E. Trials

Trials in the CCCI are nothing like criminal trials conducted in the
federal and state courts of the United States. The differences begin with the
208. There are conflicting reports as to whether these reports are part of the case file that is
meant to be available to the public. Perhaps access will eventually be granted to all parties and the
public, as is generally the case in the United States and which is an essential check on the
judiciary's power.
209. Iraqi law sets forth the standard for a magistrate's decision to transfer a case to the trial
court:
A decision of transfer should list the name of the accused, his age, profession,
place of residence and the offence of which he is accused as well as the time and
date of its occurrence and the law which applies, the name of the victim and the
evidence obtained, along with the date of issue of the decision, signed by the
magistrate and stamped by the court.
IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971]
131, available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
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trier of fact. Trials in the CCCI take place before three-judge panels which
decide all questions of law and fact. 210 Thus, unlike the common-law
system, there are no jury trials in the Iraqi courts,2 ' which is consistent
with both the civil and Islamic-law traditions.1 2 Before trying a case, the
trial judges have access to the investigative judge's report and prepare
themselves for a trial by reading this report. The court is free to rely solely
or partially on the investigative report in reaching its verdict.
Typical of the civil-law system, the actual event of a public trial could
be dispensed with entirely, were it not believed that the public nature helps
213
to prevent corruption and adds some transparency to the process.
Consistent with this goal, CCCI trials are open to the public, 2 4 although
some reporters have claimed that Iraqi guards barred them from entering
the CCCI courthouse. 2 15 The defendants' family members frequently have

210. Three-judge panels are the norm in the civil-law system. MERRYMAN, supra note 133,
at 131 ("The usual provision is for three judges as the trial level. Even where there is no jury, the
requirement of three judges reduces the danger of an arbitrary decision.").
211. SMrrH ET AL., supra note 121, at 358 ("The jury system is not used in criminal
procedure."); CountryReport, supra note 119, § 1, (e) ("There is no jury in the criminal justice
system. A three-judge panel decides if a defendant is guilty."); GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 80
n. I ("Iraq's judiciary is based on a civil law system similar to France's. Under this system, there
are no juries. Judges hear cases, determine guilt and innocence, and sentence the convicted.").
212. LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 105, at 5 ("No jury system exists under
Islamic law."); Hossein Esmaeili & Jeremy Gans, Islamic Law Across CulturalBorders: The
Involvement of Western Nationals in SaudiMurder Trials, 28 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 14950 (2000) ("Traditional Islamic law provides for a very simple criminal procedure. There is no jury
system. There is no prosecutor, in the common law sense. Instead judges conduct the investigation,
the examination, and finally, issue the verdict."). The civil law traditionally did not utilize juries,
but this is changing in some civil-law countries, such as France.
213. As discussed by Merryman:
As a consequence of the nature of the examining phase ofthe criminal proceeding,
the trial itself is different in character from the common law trial. The evidence
has already been taken and the record made, and this record is available to the
accused and his counsel, as well as the prosecution. The function of the trial is to
present the case to the trial judge and jury and to allow the prosecutor and the
defendant's counsel to argue their cases. It is also, of course, a public event, which
by its very publicity tends to limit the possibility of arbitrary governmental action.
MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 130.
214. Liebl, supranote 98, at 103 (noting that the CCCI is open to the public); Spinner, supra
note 101, at A12 ("Although the court is open to the public, not many Iraqis know that it exists.").
215. Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Scott Wilson, MistreatmentofDetainees WentBeyond Guards'
Abuse, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at AI ("A reporter who tried to enter was turned away twice
by guards."). Apparently these were Iraqi guards, not American soldiers.
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fared better, perhaps after bribing the Iraqi security forces, and they
regularly attend trials, particularly if they reside in the Baghdad area.
1. The Iraqi Public Prosecutor
At trial, the Iraqi public prosecutor represents the Iraqi government, and
his special role is denoted by his black robe with red trim. An American
military prosecutor is also present to represent American interests, but he
is substantially handicapped because he has no standing before the 16court
and so is consigned to sit with the public in the courtroom gallery?
The Iraqi prosecutor is familiar with the case only if he has read the
report authored by the investigative judge or the synopsis produced by the
American prosecutor. The Iraqi prosecutors made a point of never meeting
with prosecution witnesses, and never attempted to gauge their credibility
by a personal conference with them. There may be a plausible excuse for
this insofar as under the civil-law system the prosecutor is an extension of
the judiciary, and not necessarily a force seeking the defendant's
conviction, as in an adversarial system." 7 Accordingly, by virtue of Iraq's
civil-law tradition, the Iraqi prosecutor was not dedicated to ensuring the
conviction and punishment of the defendants and, therefore, the United
States has no voice in a trial other than the witnesses, whose testimony is
confined to the facts of the specific case.
Under the civil-law system, prosecutors play a limited role at trial
and the Islamic criminal-law tradition dispenses with prosecutors
altogether." 8 Consistent with these two traditions, the Iraqi public
prosecutor has the discretion to be the leading actor or merely make a
cameo appearance at trial. Consider, on the one hand, the prosecutor who
presented evidence against Saddam Hussein in his first trial before the
Iraqi Special Tribunal. He vociferously argued that Saddam and his
accomplices were guilty of the Dujayl massacre and proceeded to outline
the evidence against the defendants." 9 In contrast, the CCCI public

216. Finer & Mosher, supra note 72, at All (noting that the U.S. military prosecutors lack
standing before Iraqi trial courts); Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 ("[Tihe U.S. military has no
official role in the actual court proceedings, other than to provide witnesses and an interpreter.").
217. McGovern, supra note 44, at 35 ("Prosecutors under the Iraqi system do not present the
case against the defendant. Rather, they direct the court's attention to the facts in each case and

advise the court on the law. Depending on the facts of the case, prosecutors may argue for
conviction or acquittal.").
218. Esmaeili & Gans, supra note 212, at 149-50 ("Traditional Islamic law provides for a very
simple criminal procedure. There is no jury system. There is no prosecutor, in the common law
sense. Instead judges conduct the investigation, the examination, and finally, issue the verdict.").
219. Borzou Daragahi & Zainab Hussein,Hussein'sAttorneysRefise toAttendHearings, L.A.
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prosecutor made a few general remarks in cases initiated by the United
States, and these were frequently disparaging comments about the quality
of the evidence put forth by the United States.
Iraqi prosecutors can be largely irrelevant to criminal cases, however,
in part because the inquisitorial judiciary plays such a substantial role in
civil-law systems. Thus, for example, a CCCI prosecutor may suggest
questions for the judges to pose, but does not himself interrogate witnesses
at trial,22° with minor exceptions." The Iraqi prosecutor makes a brief
closing statement, but only a few facts specific to the case are mentioned,
and it might simply be a request that the court convict or acquit a
defendant. Frequently, the prosecutor's arguments made little sense. In
short, the Iraqi prosecutor plays such a minor role. that if he were absent
from a CCCI trial, or if the position were eliminated altogether, it would
make absolutely no difference to the outcome of the cases. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for the Iraqi prosecutor to take short naps during trials, even in
capital murder cases.222
Because the Iraqi public prosecutor is supposed to represent the
"interests ofjustice," it also is not uncommon for a prosecutor to argue for
acquittal or even attempt to have a case dismissed before trial. The CCCI
public prosecutor repeatedly exercised this power to sabotage cases
involving American victims. 3 For example, there is the case of Ziyad
Hassan, who employed an improvised explosive device (TED) to murder
one U.S. soldier and nearly murdered three others who suffered severe
injuries. The public prosecutor sought to dismiss the case and strenuously
argued for acquittal based solely on the defendant's concocted alibi. Three

Oct. 24, 2005 ("As the trial opened, he launched a lengthy attack against the crimes of the
former regime that prompted at least two vocal objections from the other side of the courtroom.").
220. This is typical of the continental system. NOBLEMAN, supra note 8, at 71 ("One of the
outstanding differences between American and continental practice is the role of the judge. In
continental practice it is the judge, rather than the prosecutor or counsel for the accused, who
conducts the trial and actively examines the accused and all witnesses for both sides.").
221. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [ 1971] 168(B), available
at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf ("The
court may ask any question necessary in order to clarify the facts after completion of the testimony.
The public prosecutor, complainant, civilian plaintiff, a civil official and the defendant may discuss
the testimony via the court and ask questions and request clarifications to establish the facts.").
222. Fleishman, supranote 73, at 1 (noting that during a capital murder trial the "prosecutor
nodded off for a moment").
223. Teri Weaver, Insurgent's 15-Year Jail Sentence is Little Consolationfor Murdered
Soldier's Unit, STARS AND STRIPES (Mideast), June 20, 2005, availableat http://www.estripes.
com/article.asp?section= 104&article=29868 (noting that the "Iraqi prosecutor tried twice to get the
case [involving the murder of an American victim] dismissed").
TIMEs,
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of the defendant's friends claimed that he was at work at the time of the
attack.224
The public prosecutor repeatedly attempted to derail the case despite
solid testimony from American military personnel. The testimony
indicated that they pursued the defendant from the scene of the attack and
captured him nearby, thereby negating the possibility of mistaken identity.
The prosecutor chose to ignore the testimony of the American witnesses,
however. As Hassan's case demonstrates, in cases involving attacks on
Americans, justice would have been better served had there been no Iraqi
prosecutor. For obvious reasons, the Coalition Provisional Authority at
least should have entrusted American prosecutors with the task of
presenting the case against any defendant charged with attacking
Americans.

2. The Defense
The defendant, of course, is also present at the trial, although trial in
absentia is permitted. 6 The accused is entitled to counsel-a right not
224. Finer & Mosher, supra note 72, at All:
Hassan's trial began on March 15. Five U.S. soldiers testified, and the
judge charged him [Hassan] along with a brother who was also detained
at the scene of the attack-with terrorism. But a month later, one day
before the final phase was to begin, the Iraqi prosecutor told [Lieutenant
Colonel John] Dunlap the staffjudge advocate, he would seek to have the
case dismissed. Three of Hassan's co-workers had come forward to testify
that he had been at work when the bombing took place, and the prosecutor
said he found their statements credible.
When the trial ended, the prosecutor again argued that the case should be
dismissed, citing the alibi the defendant had offered.
Id.
225. Better yet, the CPA should have utilized American military commissions to try these
cases.
226. Hearings in absentia are also permitted. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135.
If the defendant does not appear before the examining magistrate or investigator,
and is not arrested despite the use of methods of compulsion as stipulated in this
law, or if he escapes after arrest or detention, and if there is sufficient evidence for
a transfer to court, the examining magistrate issues a decision of transfer to the
court responsible in order for a trial to be conducted in his absence.
Id. (the defendant must be afforded constructive notice by publishing the date ofhis trial in a local

newspaper).
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enjoyed under Saddam Hussein 2 27 -who wears a black robe highlighted
with green trim. Because the defendant is in the dock,228 and the defense
attorney is seated near the defense podium, they cannot consult with. one
another,
further negating the value of having a defense attorney present at
9

trial.

22

As mentioned above, indigent terrorists were provided an Iraqi attorney
at taxpayer expense. 23 0 The CCCI appoints counsel for both the
investigative and trial stages of the case. Court-appointed counsel,
however, frequently had never met with their clients prior to trial.2 3'

This issue came up in a case where an insurgent had escaped from Abu Ghraib or had been
released by mistake. It was difficult to get the court to publish the official notice, and the clerks
claimed that the court lacked the funds to pay for a published notice. Iraqi law provides:
If it becomes clear, once the notification has been issued, that the defendant has
absconded, a summons or arrest warrant is pinned up at his place of residence if
known, published in 2 local newspapers and announced on the radio or television
in the case of significant felonies or misdemeanours, in accordance with a decision
by the court. An appointment is set for the trial within a period of no less than a
month from the last date of publication in the newspaper for a misdemanour or an
infraction and 2 months for felonies.
Id. 143(A); id. 147(A) ("The trial will take place when the two parties attend. If the accused has
absconded or is absent without legal excuse, despite his having been informed, a trial will take
place in his absence."). In U.S. federal courts, trials in absentia can occur if the defendant
voluntarily absconds after his trial has commenced. See FED. R. CRNm. P. 43(c)(1)(A); Crosby v.
United States, 506 U.S. 255, 260 (1993).
227. Of course, since the outcome of trials under Saddam were predetermined, the denial of
the right to counsel was the least of a defendant's problems. As Captain McGovern noted:
Under the former regime, people charged with political crimes were prosecuted
in these [special security] courts, provided they were afforded a trial at all. In fact,
they really were not traditional courts at all but rather part of the security
apparatus of the regime. They existed for the sole purpose of bringing the
appearance of legality to the criminal and barbaric conduct of the former regime.
Defendants in these courts had no right to counsel and anyone who was assigned
to the case was used to help present the case against the defendant.
McGovern, supra note 44, at 39.
228. Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 (describing the CCCI dock as "an ornately carved
wooden cage at the front of the room.").
229. Williamson, supra note 2, at 240.
230. This was a requirement of Iraqi criminal procedure. "The Head of the Court of Felony
appoints a lawyer for the defendant if he has not appointed one and the court sets remuneration for
the lawyer during judgment on the case.. . ." IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144(A).
231. See Fleishman, supra note 73, at 1 (describing a defense attorney in a capital murder case
who represented four defendants whom he had never met):

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/1

56

Frank: Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Crimin

TRYING TIMES: THE PROSECUTION OF TERROPJN

IRAQ

Sometimes the attorney appointed for the investigative hearing was not the
same one appointed for the trial, making their utility dubious.232 Courtappointed attorneys apparently are paid the same either way, so they have
little incentive to make any extra effort, as their performance regularly
demonstrated.233 It is also common for a defense attorney to represent
multiple defendants in a single case, even if they might otherwise plead
conflicting defenses. 4
Hired counsel, however, are sometimes zealous advocates for their
clients, with some going so far as to forge official documents in an effort
to obtain acquittals. Still, their role is also minimal compared to defense
attorneys in a common-law system. Like prosecutors, defense counsel
could be banished from the CCCI and this would not affect most of the
cases.235 After all, they do not: make an opening statement; cross-examine
prosecution witnesses; examine defense witnesses; advise their clients
during trial; research, prepare, or file legal memoranda; or prepare jury
instructions. They make only a brief closing argument that hardly changes

Ghalib Rubaii sweated in a wrinkled black robe. The homicide lawyer had
received a call the night before, the friend-of-a-relative-of-a-friend kind of call
coming from a poor street in a mean neighborhood. He would represent the
defendants.
"Idon't know all the details," he said. "Ihaven't seen the full case." When asked
if he had met his clients, he said no. He double-checked a piece of paper to
remember their names.
The trial would begin in 20 minutes.
Id. See also James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, 3 Set to HangAs Executions Return to Iraq,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at Al (stating that in Iraq, defendants "see their lawyers rarely, or not at all,
before trial."). One of Saddam Hussein's co-defendants in the Iraqi Special Tribunal trial for the
Dujayl massacre also claimed that he had never met his court-appointed attorney prior to the
commencement of the proceedings. Richard Boudreauz & Borzou Daragahi, DefiantHussein, CoDefendantsPleadNot Guilty, Win Trial Delay, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2005, at 1("Azzawi Ali, after
identifying himself as a farmer, harangued the bench, saying he had just met his court-appointed
lawyer.").
232. American security forces who escorted detainees to the CCCI courthouse permitted
conferences with attorneys and their clients before and after hearings, as well as trials. It was the
Iraqi defense attorneys who frequently elected not to avail themselves of this privilege.
233. GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 83 ("[I]n some trials, CCCI defense attorneys asked no

questions").
234. Fleishman, supranote 73, at 1 (describing a capital murder case in which one defense
attorney represented all four co-defendants).
235. Country Report,supranote 119, § 1,1 (e) (noting that prosecutors and defense counsel
"asked few, if any, questions due to the questioning that has already occurred by the investigative
or trial judges. The prosecutors and defense counsel routinely gave initial and final statements to

the court.").
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from case to case. With such systematic indolence, it is hard to imagine the
prosecution ever losing a case, but this regularly happens. Recall that both
Iraqi prosecutors and defense counsel have been steeped in an inquisitorial
system that used tortured confessions and bribes to decide cases, so there
was little need or opportunity for Iraqi lawyers to utilize or develop
advocacy skills. It has been suggested that an Iraqi defense counsel's chief
function is to act as a conduit for bribes.236 In such cases, their efforts may
prove beneficial to their clients after all.237
3. Commencement of Trial and the Prosecution's Case
Unlike in American courts, the CCCI three-judge panel is already
seated on the bench when the doors of the courtroom are opened for the
public to enter. The presiding judge calls the case as the defendants are
escorted to the dock.2 3' The chief judge then sets forth the charges,
apparently reading verbatim from the charging document. Once advised of
the charges, the prosecution's witnesses, if there are any,239 begin testifying.240 Usually neither the prosecution nor the defense makes an opening
236. Before the liberation of Iraq, "most judges earned more money accepting bribes than
meting out impartial justice. 'Lawyer' and 'fixer' came to be used interchangeably...." BRAUDE,
supra note 123, at 175. Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that under Baathist-Iraq, favorable
verdicts were often dependent on bribing the judges). The use of bribes to fix cases has been a longstanding problem in the Middle East. See Oriental Laws and Lawyers, supra note 126, at 42 ("In
giving counsel to a client it is not in reference to the points of law to be established, or any specific
declarations which are to be sustained by evidence. On the contrary the lawyers endeavor to explain
the surest and most economical method of bribing the kadi.").
237. McGovern, supra note 44, at 35 ("One woman to whom we spoke in Najaf stated that no
one worked according to the law; rather, the legal system worked through personal relationships.
The lawyers would invite the judges and the police commissioner to a feast and they would work
things out regardless of the law. She stated that if she wanted to win a criminal case, she had to
have a sexual relationship with the policeman.").
238. Under Paragraph 109 ofthe Iraqi Criminal Proceedings Law, the courts theoretically can
release a defendant on bail pending trial. See IRAQI CODE OF CRlMlNAL PROCEDURE (English
109(A), available at https://www.jagcnet.army.nil/JAGCNETIntemet/
translation) [1971]
Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf. The United States ensured that this never happened with
insurgents who attacked Coalition Forces in light of the additional danger created for troops, and
the unlikelihood of the defendant ever appearing for trial. But even without American insistence,
pretrial release is uncommon in Iraqi courts. Country Report, supra note 119, § 1, (d) ("Lengthy
pretrial detention continued to be a significant problem due to backlogs in the judiciary and slow
processing of criminal investigations.").
239. In the civil-law system, the trial court can base it decision to convict or acquit on the
record compiled by the examining magistrate, thus dispensing with live testimony at trial.
240. According to Iraqi criminal procedure:
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statement; 24' instead, the court relies on the record compiled by the
investigating magistrate for context and an overview of the case. When
witnesses testify at trial, the chief judge questions them, which is
consistent with the civil-law inquisitorial system.242
As discussed more fully below, the CCCI will not convict a defendant
unless there are at least two witnesses who testify under oath that the
defendant committed the crime charged. 3 This means that for each case
there must be at least two witnesses who will testify that they observed the
defendant commit each element of the crime (other than a mens rea
element).2' They testify serially and are separated while testifying so as to
prevent witnesses from parroting the testimony of the prior witness 4
In terrorism cases involving attacks on American personnel, the United
States is responsible for ensuring that witnesses are present at trial. This is
no small feat since the time expended by soldiers in prosecuting cases
means time away from fighting the war. 2' Furthermore, even contacting
witnesses proved difficult in light ofthe communications systems available
The trial begins with the summoning of the defendant and other parties and the
formal identification of the defendant. A decree of transfer is then issued. The
court hears the testimony of the complainant and the statements of the civil
plaintiff, then sees the evidence and orders the reading of the reports,
investigations and other documents. The statements of the defendants are then
heard, along with the petitions ofthe complainants, civil plaintiffs, civil prosecutor
and public prosecutor.
IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 167.
241. This is consistent with the practice of other civil-law countries, including the former
Soviet system. EuGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 338 (1958)
("[Tihe opening statement of the prosecutor is not known in Soviet law at all.").
242. The Soviets and French thought this was the appropriate mechanism for interrogating the
Nazi defendants at Nuremberg. Id. ("The Russians were of the opinion that the tribunal itself, that
is, the judges, being the highest authority, should be the first to interrogate the defendants. The
French were of the same opinion, following, as they did, the continental practice.").
243. Islamic "rules of evidence, which have been elaborated in the Koran and the Sunna and
in its early applications, have always been a bulwark for the rights of the accused." M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Foreword,in ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 116, at xi.
244. As noted above, the CCCI sometimes relied on the examining magistrates' reports instead
of hearing live testimony from witnesses.
245. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 168(c) ("It is permissible to remove the witness
whilst the testimony of another witness is being heard and the witness may be confronted by
another witness during the testimony."). Defense witnesses were not subject to this requirement,
giving the defense yet another advantage.
246. See generally Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A War The Courts Shouldn't
Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at Al7 (noting that judicial processes will entail "calling
witnesses from the combat zone, a procedure that would divert American soldiers form waging
war").
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to the military in Iraq.247 Even when their presence is requested at trial,
witnesses may still have to travel from the hinterlands of Iraq, and
frequently are delayed by roads infested with IEDs or terrorists waiting to
'
ambush convoys.2

In Continental European criminal courts it is common for trials to be
based on the dossier or report prepared by the investigating magistrate. 249
This permits the court to dispense with many of the witnesses, and the procedural safeguards, required in an Anglo-American forum. 25" The CCCI
247. Most insurgents have cell phones, which they use to detonate IEDs, but U.S. soldiers
make due with less advanced means of communications. While some soldiers purchased their own
cell phones, there is no central directory for contacting them through these phones.
Attorneys in the Hurricane Katrina-ravaged South faced many of the same problems that
American prosecutors in Iraq faced, including difficulty finding witnesses and evidence along with
inadequate communication and transportation assets. See Brad Townsend &Lee Hancock, Katrina
Leaves Louisiana CriminalJusticeSystem in Disarray,CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 2005, at
15A (noting the difficulties prosecutors will face in prosecuting cases after Hurricane Katrina has
scattered witnesses and destroyed evidence); see Thomas M. Burton, Louisiana Legal System Is
Snarled,WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2005, at Al2 (discussing the difficulties of finding witnesses and
documents essential for litigating cases); see also Peter Applebome & Jonathan D. Glater, Storm
& Crisis:The Lawyers; Storm Leaves LegalSystem a Shambles,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.

248. The roadside bombs are among the leading killers of U.S. soldiers. Mark Washburn,
Iraq'sInsurgentsBuildBigger, BetterBombs, MIAMI HERALD, June 10, 2005, at A20 ("Improvised
explosive devices, the roadside bombs that insurgents build from castoff artillery shells and
munitions, have become the No. 1 killer of American troops in Iraq this year, despite a massive
U.S. campaign to blunt their effectiveness."); Bradley Graham & Dana Priest, Insurgents Using
US. Techniques, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at A15 ("Roadside bombs-the military calls them
"improvised explosive devices,' or IEDs--continue to rank as the number one killer of U.S. troops
in Iraq, according to Pentagon figures. About half of all combat casualties in Iraq are attributed to
them.").

249. This is based on a long-standing practice that dates to medieval ecclesiastical courts.
MERRYMAN,supra note 133, at 113 (noting that in civil cases in civil-law countries often "evidence
is received and the summary record prepared by someone other than the judge who will decide the
case.... [C]ontemporary procedural institutions in the civil law world have been strongly
influenced by medieval canonic procedures. In the canon law proceeding, evidence was taken by
a clerk, and it was the clerk's written record that the judge used in making his decision."). In light
of this long-standing tradition in continental Europe, the same practice was utilized at the
Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals. GERHART, supra note 241, at 359 ("General Donovan
argued earnestly that the American case should be proved through the testimony of witnesses.

Justice Jackson believed that it was too risky to use enemy witnesses, for regardless of how
favorable their previous testimony, on cross-examination a great deal of unfavorable testimony
could result.").

250. POSNER, supra note 151, at 175. Judge Posner describes a criminal trial typical of the
Continental European legal systems:

[A criminal trial] in the sense of an evidentiary hearing with live testimony, is
preceded by a comprehensive investigation by an examining magistrate, who lays
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touts a preference for live testimony, influenced by advisors from the
United States, but from time to time the court succumbs to the influences
of the Continental tradition,25' particularly in cases in which it was
impossible for witnesses to be present.252
In such cases, the court will rely solely on the record prepared by the
examining magistrate, and the chief judge will somnolently read the
examining magistrate's synopsis of the witnesses' testimony into the
record,2 53 verbatim. 25 Of course, this would hardly comport with the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 255
which the Framers designed to ensure that the United States did not adopt
the civil-law practice of trial by affidavit in criminal cases.256 Long ago the
English common law abandoned the practice because of the danger of
erroneous transcription of testimony before the examining magistrate, and
the inability to correct these mistakes at trial, among other reasons. As Sir
Matthew Hale explained:
his findings, in the form of a dossier or report, before the judge or panel ofjudges
that is to conduct the actual trial. Armed with the dossier, the trial panel calls
witnesses only as needed to fill gaps or resolve conflicts.

Id.
251. This is similar to the way civil proceedings are conducted in civil-law jurisdictions. See
MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 111-12 ("A typical civil proceeding in a civil law jurisdiction is
divided into three separate stages. There is a brief preliminary stage, in which the pleadings are
submitted and a hearing judge (usually called the instructing judge) appointed; an evidence-taking
stage, in which the hearing judge takes the evidence and prepares a summary written record; and
a decision-making stage, in which the judges who will decide the case consider the record
transmitted to them by the hearing judge, receive counsel's briefs, hear their arguments, and render
decisions.").
252. The Egyptian mixed courts had a similar policy. See BRINTON, supranote 134, at 120
(stating that the witnesses' testimony to the examining magistrate may not be communicated to the
trial court except through their own testimony "unless it was impossible to secure their attendance
at trial").
253. This is done even in murder cases. See Iraqi is Convicted in Shooting Death of US.
Reservist, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 12, 2004 (stating that in the case of Alaa Sartell Khthee, an
Iraqi convicted of killing Navy Lt. Kylan Jones-Huffman, "the two prosecution witnesses were not
present at the trial, but their sworn testimony was admitted....").
254. One must keep in mind that the record is the examining magistrate's synopsis of the
witnesses' testimony, and not a verbatim record of their testimony.
255. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
256. Id. at 50 ("[The principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use ofex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused"); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (stating that "[t]he
primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] ...was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits,
such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness....").
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[Testimony now is given at trial] personally, and not in Writing,
wherein oftentimes, yea too often, a crafty Clerk, Commissioner, or
Examiner, will make a Witness speak what he truly never meant, by
his dressing of it up in his own Terms, Phrases, and Expressions,
whereas on the other Hand, many times the very Manner of a
Witness's delivery of his Testimony will give a probable Indication
whether he speaks truly or falsely, and by this Means also he has
opportunity to correct, amend, or explain his Testimony upon
further Questioning with him, which he can never have after a
Deposition is set down in writing.257
But the Iraqis, consistent with the civil-law tradition,258 do not consider it
necessary to afford a defendant the opportunity to confront adverse
witnesses at trial.259 As Sir Matthew Hale pointed out, this practice also

257. HALE, supra note 180, at 257-58.
258. "English common law has long differed from continental civil law in regard to the
manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials. The common-law tradition is one of
live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in
private by judicial officers." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing 3 WILLAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1768)). In the civil-law tradition, it is thought
that a "documentary curtain" would "produce a greater likelihood of fair proceedings, unaffected
by influence brought to bear on the judges by interested persons." MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at
114. But civil-law countries are moving away from this view, for reasons of credibility
determination, as opposed to the idea that a defendant ought to be free to confront his accusers. See
id. ("preparation of the record by someone other than the judge who is to decide the case is now
seen to be a defect because it deprives the judge of the opportunity to see and hear the parties, to
observe their demeanor, and to evaluate their statements directly"); Righting the Scales, supranote
108, at 45. Some Mexican states seek "to move from a Napoleonic inquisitorial system, where
prosecutors take most of the decisions and judges act largely as rubber stamps, toward a more
British- or American-style adversarial system in which oral arguments before ajudge in court play
a key role." Id.
259. "The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right 'to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.' This has long been read as securing an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses." United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557
(1988). As Chief Justice Warren noted, this right was considered essential to fairness even in
Roman times:
When Festus more than two thousand years ago reported to King Agrippa that
Felix had given him a prisoner named Paul and that the priests and elders desired
to have judgment against Paul, Festus is reported to have stated: "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused
have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning
the crime laid against him."
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forfeits a key ancillary benefit of confrontation: an opportunity for the trier
of fact to assess credibility based on an observation of the witnesses'
demeanor and manner of speech." Lack of confrontation also makes a
liar's task easier insofar as he does not have to lie to the face of his victim.
As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized: "It is always more difficult to tell
a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' 2 61 Similarly, lack
of confrontation means that the judges or attorneys cannot propound
clarifying questions or expose erroneous testimony by a witness.2 2
Although American advisors encouraged the CCCI to adopt a system
entailing live testimony and a confrontation right for all defendants, the
Iraqi judges obviously have not fully embraced this concept,2 63 and were
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496 n.25 (1959) (Warren, C.J.) (quoting Acts 25:16); see also
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 ("The right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates back to
Roman times.").
260. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,242-43 (1895) (stating that the Confrontation
Clause compels a witness "to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief"). This facet of a lack of confrontation also does not seem to concern
practitioners in the civil-law systems. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 116 (noting that frequently
in civil-law systems, the "hearingjudge's recollection of the witness's hesitancy, furtive demeanor,
or patent insincerity-unless reflected in the written summary of his testimony in the
record-cannot affect the findings of fact."). Under Iraqi law, the trial court is the sole judge of
credibility. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [ 1971] 215, availableat
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsfC'he court
has absolute authority in evaluating testimony. It can either fully accept it, or reject it, accept the
statements given by the witness during the police investigation or during reports from the primary
investigation or given in front of another court in the same case, or completely reject the witness'
statements.").
261. Coyv. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
262. Again, Sir Matthew Hale states:
[B]y this Course of personal and open Examination, there is Opportunity for all
Persons concerned viz. the Judge, or any of the Jury or Parties, or their Council or
Attornies, to propound occasional Questions, which beats and bolts out the Truth
much better than when the Witness only delivers a formal Series of his Knowledge
without being interrogated and on the other Side, preparatory limited, and formal
Interrogatories in writing, preclude this Way of occasional Interrogations, and the
best Method of searching and sifting out the Truth is choked and suppressed.
Also by this personal Appearance and Testimony of Witnesses, there is
Opportunity ofconfronting the adverse Witnesses, of observing the Contradiction
of Witnesses sometimes of the same side, and by this Means great Opportunities
are gained for the true and clear discovery of the truth.
HALE, supra note 180, at 258.
263. In terrorism cases, the Iraqi judges had already lost much in the translation, as most
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almost always willing to revert to their civil-law practice of omitting
confrontation and instead relying on the investigative report for a
determination of the facts.'"
This practice sometimes proved beneficial to the United States, because
it necessarily denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at trial. 265 Normally, in American courts, the
prosecution can prevail despite the cross-examination of its witnesses, but
the CCCI is not a normal court. At trial, in the CCCI, even with the
abbreviated cross-examination common in the CCCI, a simpleton defense
attorney should have been able to elicit from prosecution witnesses a few
contradictions, ambiguities, or memory lapses. After all, most of the
prosecution witnesses were U.S. service personnel and were vulnerable to
minor lapses in memory because of their long shifts, 2" their lack of
sleep, 7 the stress of battle, the speed and surprise with which attacks
occurred, and the minor inaccuracies that resulted from translation of the
witnesses' testimony from English to Arabic.2
prosecution witnesses were U.S. soldiers who did not speak Arabic, and the judges did not speak

English.
264. Fleishman, supranote 73, at 1 (discussing a capital murdertrial involving four defendants

in which no prosecution witnesses testified at trial).
265. Ofcourse, the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
at the investigative hearing. The concept of trials devoid of live witnesses never sat well with
American prosecutors, probably because "there is something deep in human nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution.'" Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,404 (1965)).
266. See Jonathan Roberts, Iraq War: Media DistortionsShut Out Positives, An. J.-CONST.,
Sept. 16,2005, at 17 (recounting that U.S. soldiers in Iraq have worked "16 %A-hourdays for months
on end, with only one day off...."); Jonathan Finer, In TallAfar,A Brawl to Blow OffSome Steam,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A27 (noting that U.S. soldiers were working "18-hour days").
267. Finer, supra note 266, at A27 (noting that the U.S. soldiers involved in one campaign
"had slept an average of less than five hours a night over nearly two weeks and were exhausted."
They were constantly on foot and constantly on the move from the moment they woke on a rooftop
or living room floor or back yard of a commandeered home.).
268. Attorneys David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey have noted the difficulties of applying
America's properly high standards of evidence utilized in civilian-law enforcement cases to the
evidence-including testimony derived from a soldier's memories of attacks-obtainable under
battlefield conditions:
Moreover, there are numerous practical difficulties in applying a law enforcement
paradigm to the war on terror. For example, civilian courts assume and expect that
the prosecution will be able to obtain sufficient evidence against an accused in a
context where the evidence can be collected, controlled and validated based on a
"chain of custody." This is impossible when the "crime scene" is a foreign
battlefield, which may include hundreds of square miles, where American forces

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/1

64

Frank: Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Crimin

TRYING 77MES: THE PROSECUTION OF TERORSTS IN IRAQ

Despite careful preparation of the witnesses, they sometimes misstated
the exact time or date of an incident, the number of bullets or number and
types of weapons recovered from the scene,2 9 the names of each of the
defendants, or the list of other soldiers who were present. This created
minor contradictions with the testimony of other prosecution witnesses or
with an individual witness's own prior testimony before the investigative
judge.270 In light of their frequent exhaustion, the "fog ofwar," and the fact
are engaged in ongoing combat operations. Even eyewitness accounts by the
capturing U.S. personnel can be successfully challenged by defense lawyers,
educating the jury about fear, confusion and the fog of war that permeates all
combat.
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The FlawedAlternatives, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at
A23.
269. Soldiers have recovered plenty of munitions-well over 400,000 tons-from foreign
terrorists (Iraqis) with similar first names (frequently "Mohammed") and unfamiliar and unusual
surnames and tribal names. This makes it unlikely that soldiers will remember the minute details
of recovering munitions from a particular defendant unless they are instructed to write reports of
their activities and are afforded the means and an opportunity to do so. Mark Mazzetti & Maggie
Farley, White House Downplays Missing Iraq Explosives, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at Al.
270. When the soldiers are at the scene of a terrorists attack, they frequently receive hostile
fire when collecting evidence, or have just finished a firefight. See Michael M. Phillips, In Iraq,
U.S. Troops Try to Beat Ambushers at Their Own Game, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2006, at Al
(describing an incident where Marines went to recover the body of a terrorist they had killed,
hoping to obtain intelligence, whereupon "other insurgents opened fire, setting off a brief
skirmish"). Remembering details for a subsequent trial is not their first priority. See Phillip
O'Connor, City ProsecutorPursuesAttackers in Iraq, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar. 4,2004, at
Al (noting that witnesses were not concerned with "making a prosecutable case," rather "[t]hey
were concerned with rounding up the people who created a threat to them and their buddies.
Making a good solid case, getting all the evidence corralled, naming names and contacts, taking
photographs, chain of custody--these are thoughts that didn't cross their mind.") (quoting COL
Dwight Warren, former Chief American Special Prosecutor). "'The paperwork (needed) for
convicting these guys is substantial,' says Capt. Bart Nagle, 35, of Richmond, Va., the intelligence
chief for the Marine battalion in Ramadi." Zoroya & Jervis, supranote 9, at Al.
With increased training and constant reinforcement, evidentiary collection has improved. Smith
& Salman, supra note 19, at Al; see also Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 9, at Al (noting that
"[n]early every Humvee in the Army's 3rd Infantry Division is stocked with an 'evidence kit,'
which includes blank sworn-statement forms, a digital camera, plastic gloves and a spray that
detects gunpowder residue").
The difficulty of obtaining evidence on the battlefield may account for the fact that the United
States prosecuted only a small fraction of Iraqis whom they have detained, while releasing the vast
majority ofthose arrested. Chandrasekaran & Wilson, supranote 215,at A ("Ofthe 43,000 Iraqis
who have been imprisoned at some point during the occupation, only about 600 have been referred
to Iraqi authorities for prosecution .... ")Although the U.S. also released prisoners when it cut deals
with terrorists, such as the Sunnis. See Michael Georgy, U.S. Releases 1,000from Abu Ghraib
Prison,WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at Al ("The U.S. military said yesterday that it freed 1,000
detainees from Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison at the Baghdad government's request, in the largest release
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that these soldiers had other things on their minds-like survival-it is

" '
surprising that more contradictions were not elicited.27
Beyond misstatements at trial, "contradictions" were also created due
to the lack of a verbatim transcript of the investigative hearing. The record
of the investigative hearing, because it is a mere summary of the
investigative magistrate's understanding of the witnesses' testimony, is rife
with imprecision and inaccuracy.272 An accurate investigative report is dependent upon an accurate translation of the witness's testimony by the
translator, an accurate paraphrasing by the investigative judge, and an
accurate recording of the judge's synopsis by his scribe.273 At trial, the witness was again dependent upon the translator to express the witness's
thoughts to the trial court. If the translator, judge, or scribe made an error
at the investigative hearing, the soldier's testimony at trial would often
"contradict" his prior testimony, even though the testimony from the
witness's mouth was always accurate and consistent.
When acquitting defendants, a court might speciously focus on these
contradictions,274 claiming that the witnesses were obviously fabricating

to date. It was not clear whether the decision [to release the Sunni prisoners] was linked to a
demand from Arab Sunnis opposed to a draft constitution....").
Unfortunately, some of the released prisoners were members of terrorist organizations and have
used their freedom to strike at their former captors yet again. Hanson, supra note 163, at C25 ("It
turns out that the terrorist had been captured earlier in December 2004, on suspicion of being
involved in a deadly suicide attack on an American base. Then he was turned over to the Iraqis, sent
to the notorious Abu Ghraib jail and released. Once free, he returned to his job of killing
Americans .... ."). The U.S. was committed to trying cases in which there was a reasonable chance
of prevailing at trial, and the CCCI ensured that these cases were few.
271. John H. Wigmore, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice To be Learned from Military
Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170 (1920) ("The prime object of military
organization is Victory, not Justice. The Army's object is to kill, disable, or capture our enemy
before he can kill or capture us. In that death-struggle which is ever impending, the Army, which
defends the Nation, is strained by the terrific consciousness that the Nation's life and its own is
every moment at stake. No other objective than Victory can have first place in its thoughts ....
").
272. A difference of merely one word can have a dispositive impact on a case. See Heather
Won Tesoriero, At Vioxx Trial, Fast Talkers Challenge Court Stenographer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25,
2005, at B1, B4 (noting that in trials, very "subtle differences between words can be crucial.
Lawyers here recently argued over whether one of the parties had stated that Merck received
reprimanding 'letters' or a single reprimanding 'letter' from the Food and Drug Administration
related to its marketing practices for Vioxx.").
273. In civil-law countries, the record compiled by the investigative judge is typically made
available for examination by the prosecutor and defense counsel before trial. They can, therefore,
ensure its accuracy or at least argue that portions are inaccurate. MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 130
("[Tlhis record is available to the accused and his counsel, as well as the prosecution"). That was
not always the case with the CCCI, however.
274. Tommy Santora, LA Army National Guard Lawyers Help Convict Iraqi Terrorists Who
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evidence,275 but ignoring the fact that the witness testimony was in perfect
accord on all major points and that the practice of using handwritten
synopses practically guarantees that the system will be rife with
"contradictions," inconsistencies, and errors. In doing so, the trial judges
also sometimes ignored more egregious contradictions in the defendants'
testimony, a glaring inconsistency on their own part. Thus, to the extent
that prosecution witnesses could avoid this quagmire at trial, the United
States and the interests of justice greatly benefited 27
4. The Defense's Case
After the last prosecution witness testifies, the court will inquire
whether the defense cares to offer any witnesses. Although Iraqi
defendants now enjoy the right to decline to testify, not a single defendant
ever refused the opportunity to tell his side of the story, even when silence
would have been more prudent. One explanation for this phenomenon may
be the fact that defendants knew they would not face hostile crossexamination. Defendants also frequently would lie through their teeth,
perhaps because they were not constrained by an oath to tell the truth, and
occasionally they would forget that their new lies contradicted the yarns
they had spun for the investigative judge. Some defendants also produced
witnesses to corroborate their version of events.

Iraq does not have an equivalent to the American Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12.1, which requires defendants to advise the
prosecution in advance whenever they intend to present an alibi

Commit Crimes Against US.Soldiers, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS., Aug. 18,2005 ("Iraqi judges are
very concerned with details. If one soldier says something happened at 3:30 and another one says
3:35, that could be the difference for a dismissal.").
275. The CCCI judges almost never revealed their rationale for an acquittal, although they
may have done so post hoc in internal court documents. They would, however, make comments
from the bench in response to a witness's testimony, from which it was possible to glean the judges'
thought processes and predict with reasonable certainty when they would acquit.
276. But the United States also forfeited a potential benefit, insofar as it lost another
opportunity to demonstrate how a fair trial could simultaneously safeguard truth and the civil
liberties of defendants. Merely tacking a few American constitutional rights onto the trial
procedures of an Islamic-civil-law trial court could never result in a workable system. Tossing the
Bill of Rights to terrorist-defendants, though well intentioned, was not sufficient to extricate the
Iraqi Inquisition from the netherworld it had become accustomed to inhabiting, nor was it sufficient
to ensure justice for the atrocities committed by terrorists. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey,
A Recipe for Disaster,WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at A12 (When a defendant "is part of an
international terrorist network, engaged in openly declared hostilities against the U.S. government
and individual American citizens, the assumptions underlying the criminal justice system in
general, and the protections of the Bill of Rights in particular, also break down.").
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defense.277 Accordingly, in Iraq, the "manufactured alibi is one of the main
avenues for escape of the guilty."27 Iraqi law also imposes no duty on the
defense to disclose its witnesses before trial, even though the defense
attorney knew the prosecution's entire witness list, and had the opportunity
to see these witnesses testify before the investigative judge. Thus, the
American prosecutors never knew what a defense witness would claim at
trial.
A number of insurgency cases arose from terrorist ambushes of U.S.
soldiers, so perhaps it was only fitting that CCCI trials often were a series
of defense ambushes. The CCCIjudges compounded this problem through
their reluctance to cross-examine defense witnesses, or even ask the
defense witnesses probing questions beyond "what did you see?" and
"when did you see this?" There was effectively no cross-examination of
defense witnesses, in part because the Iraqi prosecutor seldom suggested
any questions and American prosecutors had no standing in the court 79
In many cases, the prosecution's lack of live witnesses aided the
defense because there were, therefore, no witnesses to rebut the
defendants' manufactured evidence. Like the Nazi defendants at
Nuremberg and criminal defendants in the United States, Iraqi defendants
knew that an empty chair, unoccupied by "the real perpetrator who the
stupid Americans failed to capture and mistakenly believed was the
defendant," proved a ready scapegoat to whom their own misdeeds and

277. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 provides:

Within 10 days after the request [for information about an alibi defense], or at
some other time the court sets, the defendant must serve written notice on an
attorney for the government of any intended alibi defense. The defendant's notice
must state... the name, address, and telephone number of each alibi witness on
whom the defendant intends to rely.
Id.; see generally Robert W. Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi, 24 AM. INST. CIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 849 (1933).
278. Robert W. Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 433, 350 (1921).

279. Finer & Mosher, supra note 72, at All (noting that the U.S. military prosecutors mainly
serve as advisers to Iraqi prosecutors); Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 ("[Tlhe U.S. military has
no official role in the actual court proceedings, other than to provide witnesses and an interpreter").
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culpability were easily attributed.28 ° Prosecution witnesses who could
convincingly identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime might
have thwarted such scapegoating.
Thus, in cases in which the prosecution presented no witnesses at trial,
relying instead on the testimony summarized in the investigative report,
and the defendants produced multiple alibi witnesses, there was no way the

court could seek clarification or further evidence from the American
witnesses. On more than one occasion, the Iraqi judges used this as their
excuse to acquit guilty defendants or justify measly sentences.281
Unfortunately, the two most common means of overcoming this
problem-seeking a continuance to garner more evidence and thereby
demonstrate the falsehood of the defendant's alibi or submitting rebuttal
testimony-are not permitted in the CCCI.282
Even when witnesses are present and testify, CCCI trials are generally
short, seldom lasting more than a few hours. For example, a capital murder
case involving four defendants, in which the United States was not
involved because the victim was an Iraqi official, the entire trial lasted just
two hours. 283 The abbreviated nature of CCCI trials is due in part to the
nature of the crimes typically charged (usually a straightforward allegation
that the defendant attacked U.S. troops), the inability of the United States
to present scientific evidence in support of the prosecution (because of a
lack of a crime lab and readily available experts), minimal direct
examination of witnesses, and the dearth of cross-examination.
Abbreviated trials are also consistent with the Iraqi and Islamic legal
traditions.' Under the Baath Party, Iraqi criminal trials sometimes took
280. GERHART, supra note 241, at 423 ("When hard pressed these defendants were almost
unanimous in shifting the blame on other men, sometimes on one and sometimes on another. But
the names which were repeatedly picked out were those of Hitler, Himmier, Goebbels and Borman,
all of whom were either dead or missing."); see Mary Flood, Ex-Enron Chief Ken Lay To Face Two
Criminal Trials, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 20,2004, at 1 ("[I]t's much easier to point fingers at people
who aren't sitting next to you in the courtroom') (quoting SEC attorney Jacob Frenkel).
281. Judges frequently did not state their rationale for their verdict or sentence. Sometimes the
prosecution learned of their rationale through informal contacts with various judges.
282. Theoretically, Iraqi law permits rebuttal testimony at the discretion of the court, sua
sponte or at the behest of one of the parties. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English
translation) [1971] 175, available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mit/JAGCNETIntemet/Home
pages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf ("The court may itself, or based on the request of the parties, request
discussion of a testimony or return to its discussion and seek clarification of what the witness has
said in order to establish the facts."). But the CCCI judges never saw fit to exercise their discretion
that way, and the public prosecutor never encouraged the judges to hear rebuttal testimony.
283. Fleishman, supra note 73, at 1 (noting that the "trial had lasted two hours").
284. Oriental Laws and Lawyers, supra note 126, at 21 ("All trials before Mohammedan
tribunals are short. Neither cross-questioning nor perplexing suggestions by counsel ever occur.
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a matter of minutes. This celerity was typical even in trials involving
relatively complex crimes, like currency manipulation.2"5 For better or
worse, the CCCI has continued this tradition.'
5. Entering the Defendant's Plea and Closing Arguments
After the trial court hears the prosecution and defense witnesses, and
is satisfied that a prima facie case has been established, it asks the
defendant to enter a plea.28 7 To American lawyers, the practice of entering
a plea near the end of a trial seemed strange. The Anglo-American
approach of entering a plea before the trial commence seemed more
logical, since if a defendant pleaded guilty the court could have saved itself
the time and energy of hearing all of the evidence. But under the civil-law
system, a trial
must take place regardless of whether the defendant admits
28
crime.
his
With us, the defendant who pleads guilty foregoes a trial. In the
civil law world, a trial cannot be averted by a guilty plea. The
accused's confession can be admitted as evidence, but the trial must
go on. The court determines guilt, it is said, not the defendant or the
prosecutor.28 9

Nothing impedes a direct march to the point, when two witnesses are present to establish a fact.").
285. See Michael Hedges, Iraqi Amputees Travel From Houston to White House, Hous.
CHRON., May 26, 2004, at A3:
Nine years ago the seven men were in Abu Ghraib, awaiting the terrifying moment
when they'd be placed on a gumey so a surgeon could slice off their limbs while
Saddam's secret police videotaped the mutilation. The men say they were arrested
by the regime at a time when the economic embargo of Iraq by the United Nations
and Saddam's mismanagement had wrecked the country's economy. They were
picked to serve as scapegoats by Saddam, they said. The men, small business
owners in various precincts of Baghdad, were charged with currency
manipulation, given a cursory 30-minute trial and thrown in Abu Ghraib.
286. Lenny Savino, ProsecutorHelps Bring Justice to Iraq, TAMPA TRm., Dec. 22, 2005, at
1 (noting that CCCI felony trials typically last 15 minutes). "Iraqi trials are much different from
American trials.... They are more like a culmination of the trial judges studying the investigative
file, which is prepared by a separate investigative judge and investigators." Id.
287. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 181(C) ("If it appears to the court, after the
aforementioned steps have been taken, that the evidence indicates that the defendant has committed
the offence being considered, then he is charged as appropriate, the charge is read to him and
clarified and he is asked to enter a plea.").
288. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 131.
289. Id.
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Under Iraqi law, the defense is supposed to present its case after the

defendant's plea,290whether he pleads guilty or innocent, but that was not
the usual practice in the CCCI. Whether a defendant pleads guilty or notguilty, the CCCI will hear the evidence and will only inquire about the
defendant's plea after hearing all of this evidence. Thus, the only
advantage gained by a guilty plea in the Iraqi system is that perhaps the
judges are not burdened with making a decision as to the defendant's
guilt. 29' The prosecution is still required to present its full case.

After the court enters the defendant's plea, the prosecution and defense
counsel give their closing arguments regardless of whether the defendant
has admitted his guilt.292 As mentioned above, these arguments are
generally quite bland and generic. Their only redeeming quality is their
brevity, generally never exceeding five minutes in length, and for some
otiose attorneys, closing arguments may take as little as thirty seconds. 93
Closing arguments generally exceeded three minutes only in "complex"
cases. Usually either the Iraqi prosecutor diffidently claimed that the
defendant was guilty and should, therefore, be convicted, or he execrated
the American witnesses for minor contradictions and argued that these
required the court to acquit.2'
290. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
181(D) ("If he [the defendant] denies the
charge... defence witnesses are heard and the remaining evidence in his defence is heard, unless
the court finds it to be an unjustified attempt to impede the investigation or to mislead the court.").
291. This is similar to the practice used in U.S. courts-martial, where the prosecution must set
forth an abbreviated case, usually testimony from the defendant himself; to show the judge that the
defendant is indeed guilty. See 10 U.S.C. § 845(a). Arguably this is another layer of protection for
a defendant, ensuring that he was not coerced into a guilty plea for a crime he did not commit.
However, it also takes valuable time and resources, and may bring out facts that will harm the
defendant at sentencing.
292. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 181(D) (stating that at the end of the trial "the
commentary of the other parties the public prosecutor and the defence of the defendant are heard").
293. Recall that one of the purposes of holding a trial in the civil-law system is to permit the
attorneys to argue their case to the judges. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 130 ("The function of
the trial is to present the case to the trial judge and jury and to allow the prosecutor and the
defendant's counsel to argue their cases."). Since argument is almost nonexistent in the CCCI, the
judges can base their decision on the written record, and under this system there is little need for
a trial.
294. Under Iraqi Law, Iraqi prosecutors have the power to argue for acquittal. Perito, supra
note 146 ("The prosecutor has the power to argue against the conclusion reached by the
investigative judge, if he or she thinks the investigation was mishandled or the accused is
innocent."). Iraqi prosecutors frequently take full advantage of this power. See Lenny Savio,
ProsecutorHelps BringJusticeto Iraq,TAMPA TRm., Dec. 22, 2005, at 1 (noting that during "his
summation, one [Iraqi] prosecutor says there is not enough evidence to convict the defendants" of
entering Iraq with the intent to commit jihad.").
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Although the prosecution has the burden of proving the defendants'
guilt to the court's standard of certainty-to convict, the CCCI must be
"satisfied that the defendant committed the offence of which he is
accused" 295 -the defense never argued that the prosecution failed to meet
its burden, possibly because Iraqi defense attorneys do not readily
conceptualize burdens of proof or persuasion. Instead, the defense
attorneys typically asked the court for mercy because the defendants were
poor and the sole means of financial support for their large families. They
would also add, sometimes almost as an afterthought, that their clients
were innocent and the U.S. soldiers were obviously prevaricating. They
might pepper their closing arguments with an invective that American
witnesses always perjured themselves, but they never fully developed this
point with examples or evidence. Unlike American trials, the Iraqi defense
attorneys usually neither critique the prosecution's evidence nor discuss its
deficiencies." 9
6. Announcing the Verdict and Sentencing
Unlike American jurisdictions, in Iraqi courts there is no bright line
separating the guilt phase of a trial from sentencing. After closing
arguments, the baliff clears the CCCI courtroom except for the panel of
judges.297 They remain in the courtroom to carry out their deliberations in
private."' This conference usually lasts no more than ten minutes, 2
whereupon the bailiff calls the participants back into the courtroom and the
chief judges announces the court's verdict.°° The verdict must have the
295. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

182(A). The law similarly states:

The court's verdict in a case is based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the
evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing. Evidence
includes reports, witness statements, written records of an interrogation, other
official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians and other legally
established evidence.
Id. 213(A).
296. Fleishman, supra note 73, at 1 (describing one closing argument by a defense attorney
as "a flourish of a textured voice, a plea, strings of words and outrage, but little evidence.").
297. Id.
298. Id. (noting that at the end of the defense's closing argument the "judges cleared the

courtroom to begin deliberations").
299. Id. (noting that in a murder case involving four defendants, the judges deliberated all of
nineteen minutes); Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 (noting that the CCCI judges deliberated ten
minutes in a terrorism case); Oriental Laws and Lawyers, supra note 126, at 5 (noting that in
Moslem courts "the law has no delays").
300. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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support of at least two of the three judges on the panel.3 ' 1 If the defendant
is found guilty, the sentence is also read.3
Because there is no bifurcation of the determinations of guilt and
punishment, a defense attorney must argue mitigating circumstances as an
alternative to his argument that his client is innocent. This puts the defense
attorney in the unenviable position of having to argue: "There is absolutely
no doubt that my client is truly, truly innocent; but if he is not, please show
him mercy." Similarly, since defense counsel has only one opportunity to
call witnesses, including witnesses to argue in mitigation of punishment,
he has to do this before the judges have announced their verdict. Perhaps
for this reason, most defense attorneys do not call mitigation witnesses,
and instead refer in their closing arguments to the defendant's good
character and family responsibilities.
Under Iraqi law, judges are supposed to articulate the rationale
supporting their verdicts and sentences, 3 3 but in the CCCI, the judges do
so only in a cursory fashion. Their "rationale" rarely amounts to anything
more than a statement of the obvious. For example, when acquitting a
defendant, the court might unhelpfully explain: "We find the defendant
not-guilty because the evidence failed to persuade us that he is guilty."
Their "not-guilty" verdict already communicated this idea, so this terse
statement of their reasoning was essentially worthless.
Greater particularization would have been helpful, but perhaps the
judges believed that this would have cabined their discretion in subsequent

ruling. After it has formulated the ruling, the hearing is resumed publicly. The ruling is read out to
the defendant or its contents are made clear to him.").
301. Id. 224(B) ("Rulings are issued on the basis of consensus or a majority of them. All
those dissenting from the majority decision must explain their views in writing.").
302. Country Report, supra note 119, ("Defendants who are found guilty are sentenced
immediately."); IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

182(A) ("If after the trial has been

conducted as above, the court is satisfied that the defendant committed the offence of which he is
accused, it issues a verdict of guilty and rules on the penalty to be applied."); id. 223(B) ("Ifthe
verdict is guilty, then the court must issue another ruling at the same hearing with the penalty and

explain them both.").
303. The Iraqi criminal procedure law states:
The ruling should contain the name of the judge orjudges who have issued it, the
defendant, the other parties and a representative of the public prosecutor, a
description of the offence he is accused of perpetrating, the paragraph of law
which applies, the reasons for the court's ruling and the reasons for the level of
sentence passed.
Id. 224(A).
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cases, 30 4 as it would have proven unseemly "to decide the same question
one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another."305 Providing reasons would have created an expectation that the
CCCI judges would consistently apply the same evidentiary standard to
both prosecution and defense witnesses, 3° thereby inhibiting the judge's
discretion. Perhaps the most striking difference between the Iraqi legal
system, being that of a civil-law country, and the American legal system
(a common-law system), is that judicial precedent is not a binding source
of law, and the CCCI clearly was not going to depart from this practice by
explaining the rationale for its decisions.
More often than not, the CCCI judges would acquit the insurgents of
the felony charges proposed by the American prosecutors, and instead hold
them accountable for some minor infraction. Iraqi law gives judges
considerable discretion in this respect. They can find the defendant guilty
of a crime which the defendant was not formally charged, so long as the
crime for which the court convicts is less serious than the crime charged.3 °8
304. One of the key reasons why stare decisis is so important to the rule of law is its role in
limiting the discretion of courts, thereby preventing them from favoring one party in a particular
case. Litigants will remind a court of decisions in similar cases and will ask the court to act
accordingly in their case. The court will either comply or will be forced to explain how the cases
differ such that the previous rule is inapplicable. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate expectations
of those who live under the law, and, as Alexander Hamilton observed, is one of the means by
which exercise of arbitrary discretion in the courts is restrained.") (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78).
305. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1920).

306. Neither the civil-law nor the Islamic-law traditions strictly adhere to the rule of stare
decisis to the same extent that common-law judges generally do. MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at
22 ('[The familiar common law doctrine of stare decisis-i.e. the power and obligation of courts
to base decision on prior decisions-is obviously inconsistent with the separation of powers as
formulated in civil law countries, and is therefore rejected by the civil law tradition. Judicial
decisions are not law."); ESPOSITO, supra note 106, at 86 ("Islamic law does not recognize a case
law system of legally binding precedents."); J.N.D. Anderson, A Law ofPersonal Status for Iraq,
9 INT'L & CoP. L.Q. 542, 545 (1960) (noting that "the doctrine of stare decisis is unknown" in
the Islamic tradition); Rahim, supra note 127, at 266 ("The Mohammedanjurisprudence... does
not accept legislation by the State as a legitimate source of law. Nor does it admit the principle of
judge-made law. The Qadhi's legal pronouncement were binding only for the decision of the
particular case before him, but had no value as a precedent."). Despite disdain for stare decisis, at
a certain point it becomes embarrassing for Iraqi judges to decide identical cases dissimilarly.
307. S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 227 (1985).

308. It appears that this power is derived from paragraph 192 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal
Procedure. See IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971]

192, available

at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf ("If it
appears that the defendant has committed a minor offence which has no connection with the offence
with which he has been charged the court completes the trial and issued the verdict without the need
for a new offence.. ").
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Thus, a defendant could be charged with and tried for attempted murder,
but the CCCI might instead find him guilty of negligently discharging a
firearm. This tactic was frequently employed by the CCCI judges. They
relished this power and used it extensively, presumably because they
thought it unwise to anger the United States by acquitting the defendants
outright. The judges thought that convicting defendants of other, lessserious crimes would placate American soldiers.
As discussed more fully below, the CCCI judges theoretically do not
have complete discretion in sentencing. 3°9 The Iraqi Criminal Law sets
forth maximum punishments, and the orders of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, while in effect, set forth mandatory minimum punishments.1 °
The judges, however, found these restraints on their discretion irksome, so
they invented novel means of evading the mandatory minimum sentences.
Accordingly, in most insurgency cases, the sentences were extremely
lenient. Sentences ranged anywhere from time-served to thirty years of
imprisonment. Fines are permitted, but with Iraq's abject poverty," they
are seldom imposed and most assuredly never collected. Sentences can be
suspended, and CCCI judges occasionally utilized this device to further
minimize the effects of a conviction. Iraq has no parole system, nor
sentence reduction for good behavior, at least not formally.
F. Appeals
Appeals from the CCCI trial court are heard by the Iraqi Court of
Cassation, Mand they are commenced by filing a petition with the CCCI

or with the Court of Cassation within thirty days of the trial court's
ruling.3 13 Consistent with the civil-law tradition, an appellant may
309. See CPA Order No. 3.
310. Id.
311. The average annual salary in Iraq is between $1,000 and $2,000. Hammes, supra note
176, at A23 (relating that Iraqi translators, who earn above-average salaries, can command up to
$400 per month); Beth Potter, Many StillRely on Rations to Keep Foodon the Table,USA TODAY,
Oct. 22, 2004, at A6 (noting that the average government salary in Iraq is less than $200 per
month); Cesar G. Soriano, Iraqis Enjoy New Freedom of Expression on Web Journals, USA
TODAY, Apr. 20,2004, at A16 (noting that Iraqi physicians earn about $160 per month); Edward
Wong, IraqiPolice:Hunting andHunted,SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3,2004, at All (noting that Iraqi
police earn about $228 per month); John Tierney, The Strugglesfor Iraq, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 10,
2003, at AlI (noting that the average annual salary for Iraq's middle-class worker is $2,000).
312. See CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36, § 211. Consistent with the civil-law tradition,
appeals could be heard as to issues of both law and fact. MERRYMAN, supranote 133, at 120 ("In
the civil law tradition, the right of appeal includes the right to reconsideration of factual, as well
as legal issues.").
313. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 252(A) ("The appeal takes place by means of
a petition presented by the petitioner, or his legal representative, to the Criminal Court which issued
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challenge the trial court's legal or factual determinations, or both. Another
novel feature, in contrast with U.S. jurisprudence, is that the prosecution
can also appeal acquittals, based on either legal or factual errors.314 Thus,
an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the defendant is off the hook
for his crime. That depends on whether the prosecution elects to appeal the
acquittal and how the appellate courts receive the appeal.
The prosecutor might also appeal a conviction if he believes that the
defendant is innocent or the trial court committed a reversible error. The
Court of Cassation bases its decision largely on the written record, but may
also hear oral argument at its discretion.3"5 It also has substantial discretion
as to the form of its own judgment. Thus, it can: completely reverse
findings of fact or law, completely reverse the sentence, order resentencing or re-sentence the defendant itself, reverse regarding one
element of the crime, completely or partially affirm convictions on
multiple charges, remand for any further hearings, or even demand a full
retrial.316 Like the trial court, the Court of Cassation must give an
explanation for its rulings.
Although Iraqi insurgents were acquitted in a number of cases, to the
best of the author's knowledge, the Iraqi prosecutor never pursued appeals
of those cases, despite requests to do so from American prosecutors. This
is not surprising, since the Iraqi prosecutor himself advocated acquittal in
many of these cases, and had he appealed, he would have been arguing a
position contradictory to the one he espoused at trial. In one case, when
American prosecutors approached the Iraqi prosecutor beseeching him to
appeal an adverse sentencing decision, the prosecutor initially balked, then
reluctantly agreed to file the appeal. But in light of his opposition to filing
the appeal and his ability to sabotage any appeal he did file, the United
States elected not to travel down this road. Because the United States, as
a non-party, lacks standing to pursue appeals, they were not a weapon in
the American legal arsenal. More recently, as adverse decisions
accumulate, there are reports that military attorneys have started to seek
more appeals. Military attorneys either press the public prosecutor or

the judgment, to any other Criminal Court, or direct to the Court of Cassation, within a period of
thirty days, starting from the day after the judgment was issued ....
).
314. McGovern, supranote 44, at 35-39 ("Prosecutors may appeal the court's decision in a
criminal case if they disagree with the outcome, whether it is conviction or acquittal.").
315. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMeNAL PROCEDURE 258(B) ("It is up to the Court of Cassation to
summon the accused, the plaintiff, the civil plaintiff or person with civil liability (or both), or the
representative of the Public Prosecutor to hear their statements or for any purpose it requires in
order to obtain the truth.").
316. Id. 259(A).
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pressure the Iraqi courts to give American prosecutors the authority to
pursue appeals, independent of the public prosecutor.
Like trials, appeals move swiftly in Iraq in part because little other
litigation occupies the appellate judges, although the number of cases
requiring appellate review is increasing. This swiftness in rendering
decisions is consistent with Islamic tradition, according to which justice is
speedily administered to malefactors." 7 Thus, for example, in a death penalty case that arose in the CCCI (but which did not involve an attack on
U.S. forces), the defendants exhausted all of their appeals within two
months of their trial and sentencing. This contrasts starkly with the snail's
pace appeal process common in the United States, but also leads to
questions about the extent of review these Iraqi cases receive on appeal.
The rapidity of the Iraqi appellate courts' decisions suggests that only
cursory review is afforded to these cases. Of course, the brevity of the
process may also be a result of the limited number of issues that Iraqi
appellate courts review compared to American ones. Iraqi defendants have
fewer rights than American defendants, there is no jury and thus no claims
that the jury was prejudiced by a piece of evidence, defense counsel are
nearly always ineffective due to the limited role they play, and the
prosecution does next to nothing, so it cannot be claimed that its nonexistent actions prejudiced the defendant. There is also no verbatim
transcript of the trial for an appellate court to peruse, which further limits
the extent of the appellate court's review. Iraqi courts also do not permit
collateral attacks on convictions, as are permitted in U.S. courts under
sections 2254 (state convictions) and 2255 (federal convictions) of title 28
of the U.S. Code."'
III. ABSURDITIES AND ANOMALIES OF THE CCCI

The foregoing gives an overview of what Iraqi "justice" entails for
insurgents and their American victims as a case progresses through the
CCCI. The following sections narrows the focus, zeroing in on particular
317. OrientalLaws and Lawyers, supranote 126, at 21 ("Punishment is never delayed long

after conviction, whether for a capital or minor offense, but follows the sentence.... Arguments
in favor of the criminal, with a view to showing extenuating circumstances, or appeals, in the form
of petitions after sentence, either to modify the punishment on account of newly discovered
testimony, or a pardon, seem wholly unknown among the people who are thus quick to punish an

infraction of law.").
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (authorizing federal habeas corpus review for inmates in state
custody); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (authorizing federal habeas corpus review for prisoners in federal

custody).
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shortcomings and absurdities of trials in the CCCI. After all, it is the CCCI
trials where the damage is actually done to American interests, where
insurgents are allowed to escape punishment for their crimes, and where
CCCI judges employ various techniques to defeat justice.
A. Exemption of Defendantsfrom the Oath Requirement
As mentioned above, prosecution witnesses were required to testify
under oath at both the investigative hearing and the trial,3" 9 a practice the
United States readily endorsed. The truthful man has nothing to fear from
an oath, although some religions frown upon the practice of administering
2
oaths to witnesses, such as the Jewish religion and some Christian sects.3
In pre-Norman England, suits were often decided on oaths alone, and oaths
remain the only sacramental observance-a
"ceremonial appeal to divine
21
agency"-left in American law?
In modem times, oaths exist for purposes beyond simply calling upon
a deity to confirm the truth of testimony or punish those who testify
falsely. Oaths serve to remind witness of the importance of truthful
3
testimony and thereby encourage witnesses to testify truthfully, 1
particularly in criminal cases where the stakes may give rise to a strong

319. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 168(A) ("Before giving testimony each witness
is asked to give his full name, profession, age, place of work and relationship to the parties. Before
giving his testimony, he must swear that he will speak the truth and nothing but the truth.").
320. With respect to Jewish law:
Neither the Bible or the Talmud imposes upon the witnesses any oath to confirm
his testimony. This provision is respected in the Civil Practice ofNew York State.
The Divine prohibition of bearing false witness was considered by Moses and the
Jewish Legislators succeeding him, as sufficient to induce people to state truths
only. Indeed, some Jewish Philosophers consider swearing injurious in itself; for
he who swears is Ipso Facto suspected of lacking credibility....
Theodore Spector, Some FundamentalConcepts of Hebrew CriminalJurisprudence,15 J. AM.
INST. CReM.L. & CRMINOLOGY 317, 319 (1924).
321. Albert S. Thayer, SacramentalFeaturesofAncient andModern Law, 14 HARV. L. REV.
509 (1901) ("In our own system of law we have but one sacramental observance remaining, and
that is the oath.").
322. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 76 n.32 (1984) ("The function of an oath is to
impress upon its taker an awareness of his duty to tell the truth...
.") (citing MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE 582 (2d ed. 1972)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (Confrontation
"insures that the witness will give his statements under oath--thus impressing upon him the
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury").
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urge to prevaricate.323 Similarly, oaths give witnesses added incentive to
tell the truth, for while testifying under oath, a witness who commits
perjury is subject to prosecution for providing false testimony?24
In the Iraqi courts and the courts of other civil-law nations,3 25 defendants, and only defendants, are exempted from the oath requirement.
Although some defendants were denied the opportunity to swear an oath
in Marian England,3 26 because they were considered unworthy of taking an
oath, 327 courts in common-law nations abandoned this exclusion long
ago. 328 The reason is obvious: exempting defendants from the oath
requirement thereby inhibits the ascertainment of truth. It means that
defendants are not instilled, at least through an oath, with the notion that
truthful testimony is supremely important. They are also deprived of any
benefit that testimony under oath could entail for their defense.
By refusing to employ oaths for the defendants' testimony, the CCCI
was practically inviting defendants to perjure themselves.329 Indeed, this is
323. "In criminal law, the desire of the offender to escape, and the desire of his friends and
relatives that he escape, are strong and active." POUND, supra note 151, at 67-68.
324. See IRAQI PENAL CODE § 3, 251 (1969), at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNET
Internet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/0/d616b3e1 79d620285256d0a006391 fl ?Open
Document.
325. It was common practice not to require an oath ofwitnesses testifying in court proceedings
in America's western territories which has been governed by Spanish or Mexican civil-law systems,
although this practice changed as American settlers forced the adoption of the common-law system
in these areas. AURORA HUNT, KRBY BENEDICT: FRONTIR FEDERAL JUDGE 52 (196 1) ("An oath
was seldom required of a witness .... ).
326. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,52 (2004) ("Under the Marian statutes, witnesses
were typically put on oath, but suspects were not.") (citing 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 52
(1678)).
327. A.T. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 3 (7th ed. 1944) ("In Criminal cases
also the Oath was used, but in the background was the Ordeal if the accused was of bad character
and not oath-worthy....").
328. American military courts in post-World War II Germany initially did not administer oaths
to defendants. NOBLEMAN, supranote 8, at 102 ("For reasons which are not clear, at no time during
a trial or proceeding in a military government court, was the accused permitted to be sworn."). This
practice later changed, however. Id. at 178 ("The accused may, but need not testify in any
proceedings... if he desires to testify, he must be sworn and may then be cross-examined like any
other witness .... "). All testimony in the post-World War I tribunals was under oath. See id.at 36
(noting that in American military courts created in post-World War I Germany, all "evidence was
required to be under oath."); HUNT, supra note 325, at 93-94 ('All evidence was required to be
under oath."). This historical use of oaths by military courts is yet another factor militating in favor
of utilizing military courts in Iraq.
329. Because "perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of
judicial proceedings," United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,576 (1976), one would think that
the Iraqi courts would do their utmost to discourage perjury. According to Machiavelli "men will
always be false to you unless they are compelled by necessity to be true," and an oath may be one
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part of their rationale for not subjecting defendants to an oath. It is
expected that a defendant will lie to save his skin, therefore the court
should not profane the Koran by "requiring" the defendant to commit
perjury after swearing an oath upon the Koran.33 This practice is also, in
some sense, contrary to the Sharia,which in cases where the prosecution
lacked two witnesses, required the aggrieved party or complainant to swear
an oath that his accusations were true.33 ' Similarly, under Islamic law, a
defendant was sometimes compelled to take an oath that he did not commit
the crime charged.332 This system placed great emphasis on the oath, for
upon taking the oath, the defendant was acquitted, but if he refused, he was
found guilty and punished.333
Perhaps the CCCI's practice may also be explained by the Islamic legal
custom that perjury is nota punishable offense (although it is theoretically
punishable under Iraqi law).3"4 Since a defendant who lies under oath
cannot be punished under Islamic law, a judge might conclude, there is
little reason for placing him under oath. The CCCI jurists might also
believe that anyone willing to commit serious crimes like those of the
insurgents probably is not shy about adding perjury to his list of
malefactions, and thus there is no sense in requiring an oath or threatening
prosecution for perjury.
It is also true in Islamic countries that various aspects of the civil law
arose as a means of evading burdensome and irrational practices under
Sharia.Thus, in many Islamic countries, Shariawas applied to family law
and inheritance cases, while a separate body of law applied to criminal and
commercial disputes.335 The decision to permit a defendant to testify

way to compel veracity. NIcCOLO MACHIAVELU, THE PRINCE, 117 (Luigi Ricci ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1999) (1532).
330. U.S. military personnel would sometimes swear on the Bible, but more frequently no holy
book was used to administer their oaths.
331. LiPPMANETAL.,supra note 116, at 71.
332. Id.
333. Id.("Where the plaintiffis unable to produce the required number of qualified witnesses,
the qadi customarily requests the defendant to take a holy oath denying the allegations ....If the
defendant takes the oath, the case is dismissed; if he declines following three requests, judgment
is entered for the plaintiff."). Notice that this practice requires the drawing of an inference, which
Islamic law generally disdains.
334. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIc LAw 187 (1964) ("There is no
punishment for perjury, nor for giving false evidence; it is merely made known publicly (ta riJ),
and in certain cases liability for the damage caused arises.... .'); LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116,
at 70 ("Bearing false witness is a Ta 'aziroffense punishable by tashir (public labeling--taking the
offender to every part of the city and proclaiming that he is not to be trusted).").
335. EsPosrro,supra note 106, at 87-88 ("Islamic society possessed a dual system of laws and
courts (Sharia and Grievance), religious and secular, with complementary jurisdictions. Sharia
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unsworn may be part of this secularization of the law. Perhaps it is an
attempt to get around the swearing contests that arose under Shariawhen
neither the defense nor prosecution could produce two witnesses to
corroborate their respective stories. Additionally, civil-law nations
frequently let defendants testify unsworn-a practice also adopted at the
Nuremberg Trials, influenced as they were by French and Soviet
law 33 -- so it is also likely that in some quarters the Iraqi law simply
adopted this custom from its civil-law cousins.
Regardless of the origin of the rule, the CCCI judges apparently agree
with Dostoevsky that "nothing in the world is harder than speaking the
truth,9337 particularly for guilty defendants, 33' and so the judges do not require oaths of defendants. One CCCIjudge opined the court's rationale for
this rule: because the defendant could lose his liberty, the law permits him
to defend himself with whatever weapons he finds at his disposal. In
justifying this rule, he compared the CCCI's practice to the American

defendant's right to remain silent and to refuse to answer questions. This
is a misleading and defective analogy, however. The two practices are
similar insofar as in both cases the defendant declines to reveal the truth.
But refusing to answer questions is not as misleading as deliberately
stating a falsehood, and the two are generally not considered to be morally
equivalent. Affirmatively representing that something is true when the
defendant knows it to be false is hardly the same thing as refusing to
answer questions. To be silent is one thing;
to deliberately fabricate
39
testimony and mislead a court is another?

courts were increasingly restricted to the enforcement of family laws (marriage, divorce,
inheritance) and the handling of religious endowments. The Grievance courts dealt with public law,
especially criminal law, taxation, and commercial regulations. This approach continued throughout
Islamic history.").
336. GERHART, supra note 241, at 381 ("At the end of all the evidence, each of the defendants
would be allowed to rise and make a final unsworn statement to the tribunal as in the continental
criminal procedure.").
337. FyODoRM. DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 440 (Constance Garnetttrans.,1981)
(1866).
338. But it is for exactly that reason the CCCI should use whatever force religious belief can
bring to bear to encourage defendants to testify truthfully. This is consistent with Dean Pound's
suggestion that "[t]he enforcement of law depends largely upon the extent to which the lawmaker
can identify social interests with individual interests, and thus enlist individual desire to enforce his
precepts." POUND, supra note 151, at 67-68.
339. In otherwords: "Perjury is one thing; testimonial recalcitrance another." Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958). This is consistent with the legal maxim: aliud est celare, aliud
tacere-To conceal is one thing, to be silent another. See Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co., 132 S.E.2d
273, 275 (S.C. 1963); Twing v. Schott, 338 P.2d 839, 844 (Wy. 1959).
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Furthermore, according to the American practice, a defendant can
choose either to testify or remain silent; he is not given the discretion to
pick and choose which questions he will answer on cross-examination. 4"
If the defendant testifies in an American court, it is likely he will be
subjected to a grueling cross-examination. The Iraqi defendant, however,
has the benefit of answering only some questions truthfully, thereby
lending credence to the lies he carefully weaves into the truthful testimony.
CCCI defendants are not subjected to serious questioning from a skilled
adversary, and are immune from cross-examination from American
prosecutors, therefore, they have an excellent chance of using their lies to
commit a fraud upon the court. Of course, it became obvious in the CCCI
that some judges were willingly duped.
The key premise underlying the practice of unsworn testimony is that
defendants frequently lie, even when sworn. One would think, then, that
the CCCI judges would habitually discount the value of the defendants'
testimony. If the law expects those accused of crimes to be mendacious,
judges have been fairly warned that they should exercise at least a
minimum level of skepticism when faced with a defendant's testimony. It
is obvious from the CCCI verdicts, however, that the court regularly
credits the incredible, unsworn testimony of defendants over the sworn
testimony of U.S. military personnel. Various CCCI verdicts definitively
demonstrate that the CCCI habitually gives less weight to the sworn
testimony of American witnesses than to uinsworn Iraqi ones.
But perhaps criticism of this practice is much ado about nothing, for
Iraqi terrorists probably would have lied regardless of whether they had
taken an oath to tell the truth because the truth would have thwarted their
hopes for obtaining an acquittal. Nevertheless, it seems strange that at least
in cases involving terrorism, where the stakes are higher, a court would not
at least attempt to encourage truthfulness through requiring defendants to
testify under oath, since truth is essential to the court's determination of
guilt and innocence, and the rule of law.
Furthermore, many insurgents were devout Muslims, upon whom the
oath might have had a powerful effect: "Practicing Muslims believe in an

340. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980) ("It is essential... to the proper
functioning of the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the government be
permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth."); Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958) ("He who offers himself as a witness is not freed from the
duty to testify. The court (except insofar as it is constitutionally limited), not a voluntary witness,
defines the testimonial duty."); United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) ("When a
defendant offers an innocent explanation he 'opens the door' to questioning into the truth of his
testimony, and the government is entitled to attack his credibility on cross-examination.").
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omniscient God who will punish severely those who take a false oath."34 '
In a study of the courts of Islamic Morocco, it was found that lying
litigants would frequently "maintain their testimony 'right up to the
moment of oath-taking and then to stop, refuse the oath, and surrender the
case.' "2 Accordingly, perhaps at least a few Muslim terrorists would have
admitted their guilt rather than risk punishment from Allah for falsely
swearing on the Koran.
Another reason why the rule permitting defendants to testify unsworn
will not have a long-term benefit to the insurgency is that U.S. troops are
adapting to the rule. Thus, although the CCCI rule exempting defendants
from the oath requirement may be designed to aid guilty terrorists, the
judges' tack may actually be proving more dangerous to the militants still
battling U.S. forces than the truth would have. The acquittals and paltry
sentences resulting from this practice exposed the U.S. military to
contempt and frustrate the soldiers who risk their lives daily to destroy the
insurgency.343 They have also undermined the morale of the soldierwitnesses and their comrades. 3 "
American soldiers who learnedof the CCCI's shady practices quickly
brought word back to their units that Americans are unlikely to receive
justice at the CCCI. This denial of justice may have resulted in orders to
kill these insurgents-which are lawful orde4S--or the adoption of
341. LIPPMANETAL,supra note 116, at7l.
342. Id.
343. Zoroya & Jervis, supranote 9, at 1. Trying insurgency cases in the CCCI disadvantages
the United States and its soldiers in multiple ways:
The decision to treat insurgents as criminals has forced soldiers to act as cops and
has authorities scrambling to build cases against thousands of detainees in U.S.run prisons. Some soldiers say running rebels through the courts places American
forces at a disadvantage, burdening soldiers in a guerrilla war with peacetime
rules.
"A lot of times, we'd catch a guy but didn't have enough evidence, so he gets
released," says Staff Sgt. John Perdue, whose unit is hunting for car bomb
factories in Baghdad. "Then you see him a few days later, same guy. It's
frustrating."
Id.; West, supranote 22, at 27 ("What do insurgents have to lose from being arrested for fighting
if they know they will soon be released by authorities?").
344. Freeman, supra note 18, at 29 ("'There are times when the sentences are a source of
frustration for the soldiers involved.' . . .") (quoting Lieutenant Colonel Barry Johnson).
345. "What has been called the paramount law of self-defense, common to all countries, has
established the rule that whatever force is necessary is also lawful." Commonwealth ex rel.
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 A. 952, 955 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1903); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
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informal practices, to ensure that terrorists who demonstrate hostile intent
are killed, 3" rather than captured and taken before the CCCI. 47 Adoption
of these practices may be seen as necessary to achieve victory and protect
fellow soldiers,34 since merely capturing terrorists will simply result in
their appearance before the CCCI and the lenient treatment or freedom that
adjudication in that forum frequently entails. 49

Goldsmith, InternationalLaw, ClearStatement Requirements, and ConstitutionalDesign, 118
HARv. L. REv. 2683, 2689 (2005) ("It is widely recognized that a nation involved in an armed
conflict is permitted under the laws of war to use force against most of the enemy's armed forces,
regardless of whether those forces meet the direct participation standard."); Karima Bennoune,
Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 171, 186 (2004) (acknowledging that "it is mostly lawful to kill enemy soldiers in conflict");
Paul M. Barrett, A Young Lawyer Helps ChartShift in ForeignPolicy,WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005,
at Al ("'A nation at war may use force against members of the enemy at any time, regardless of
their proximity to hostilities or their activity at the time of attack."') (quoting Professor John Yoo);
HALL, supra note 23, at 562 ("if the inhabitants of the occupied territory rise in insurrection,
whether in small bodies or en masse, they cannot claim combatant privileges until they have
displaced the occupation, and all persons found with arms in their hands can in strict law be killed,
or if captured be executed by sentence of court martial.").
346. After all, as American judges have recognized, the "purpose of battle is to kill."
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
347. Phillips, supranote 270, at Al ("When they see someone in the act of planting a bomb,
their orders are to shoot to kill."); Tom Lasseter, US., IraqiForces Open Assault in Deadly Zone,
PHILA. INQUIR, Aug. 6,2005, at Al (noting that one Marine instructed his troops: "'If somebody
shoots at you, you waste' him.... ."); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., A Volley ofFireFrom a Fast-Moving
Target,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4,2004, at A8 ("One recent morning Sergeant Floyd helped lead a team
of soldiers on an ambush mission to take out mortarmen caught firing at the base. Before the
mission he admonished the youngest soldiers: 'Hostile intent, kill them dead, O.K.? Don't try to
detain them. Kill them dead."'); see also Edward Wong, Back by U.S., Iraqis Raid Camp and
Report Killing80 Insurgents,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at Al, AlI1 (describing a joint attack on
80 Iraqi insurgents in which "no prisoners were taken"). There is also substantial evidence to
support a contrary position, including reports of large-scale captures of insurgents. See Ellen
Knickmeyer, BaghdadToll Nears 200 as InsurgentStrikes Continue,WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2005,
at A27 (discussing the Tall Afar campaign in which U.S. and Iraqi troops killed 371 and captured
1163 suspected insurgents).
348. Iraqis seem to be adopting a similar idea that the self-help remedy may be the only one
available to them. See Edmund Sanders, BaghdadBlast Kills Scores ofIraqis, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
14,2005 ("'We are fed up with the government,' said Adhmed Qusay, another job seeker. 'They
are doing nothing. They should exterminate those terrorists. If the government can't do it, we will
do it ourselves."').
349. This is not to say that the soldiers based their "decisions" whether to kill or capture an
attacker on the decisions of the CCCI. In most instances the soldiers kill to defend their own lives
or those of their friends, and thus the CCCI judgments never come into play. But there might be
some close cases-perhaps when a terrorist is spied holding a rifle, and thus is a legitimate target,
but the soldier "believes" that the enemy might be persuaded to surrender or could be disabled with
non-lethal force-where the terrorists will now be killed because American forces do not want to
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Indeed, several soldiers and Marines informed American prosecutors
that they had no choice but tell their troops to kill insurgents in light of the
verdicts and light sentences handed down by the CCCI. So in that sense,
the CCCI unwittingly might have helped to thwart the insurgency by
demonstrating to American troops that their own brand of justice was the
only justice that many of the terrorists would face. Of course,
quintessentially judicial decisions-such as the degree of guilt and
proportionality of punishment-should not be made under the heat of
hostile fire, but the CCCI leaves U.S. soldiers little alternative.
B. The IraqiTwo- Witness Rule
Another rule wielded by Iraqi judges to stymie the prosecution of
insurgents was the two-witness rule. This rule holds that all criminal cases
require the testimony of two eyewitnesses for conviction, and that a court
may not convict any defendant absent testimony from at least the requisite
two witnesses.3' 0 Strictly speaking, Iraqi black-letter law does not literally
require the testimony of two witnesses to prove a case. It merely states:
"One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not corroborated by
other convincing evidence or a confession from the accused. The exception
of this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of proving a case, which
must be followed.""35 But the CCCI judges have interpreted this rule, or
have adopted their own rule, to require the testimony of two eyewitnesses
in all criminal cases.
This rule probably entered the Iraqi legal tradition from Islamic3 3 Islamic
religious law,3 2 which has "extensive evidential requirements.""
take the risk that he will escape justice in the CCCI.
350. Compare this to the principle generally followed in the United States that "the truth is not
to be determined merely by the number of witnesses on each side of a controversy." Weiler v.
United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945).
351. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971] 213(B), available
at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
352. Courts in civil-law systems draw heavily on customary law as the basis for decisions.
MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 23. It is not difficult to imagine that courts in the Islamic world
would incorporate elements of the Islamic law into the customary criminal law, and vice-versa. Cf.
LAW AND ISLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 107, at 3 ("Much of what is deemed Islamic
originated in pre-Islamic custom and the incorporation of customary or European law into legal
corpuses that are labeled as Islamic on their home ground continues to this day .... "). Indeed,
because of English involvement in the area, one can even see strains of English common law in
Iraqi law, just as American law is now beginning to influence Iraqi law. This specific amalgamation
is somewhat unique, although the concept is not. Safla K. Hohsen, Women and Criminal Justice
in Egypt, in LAW AND ISLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST , supra note 107, at 16 (noting that Egyptian
criminal law has elements of French, Islamic, Ottoman, Indian, Belgian, and Italian law);
Thompson, supra note 130, at 47 (noting that Japanese law is generally based on Chinese law, but
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law also generally disdains circumstantial evidence that would be required
to prove a case in the absence of eyewitnesses to a crime, and it entails
strict prerequisites concerning the number of witnesses necessary for
proving various crimes,354 particularly sexual crimes.355 For example, the
Koran requires four eyewitnesses to prove adultery, while other crimes can
be prosecuted with only two witnesses. 356 Since many crimes occur
without the observation of two or four individuals, it is an understatement
to say that Islamic law provides "considerable protection for the
accused."357 Sharia"makes the prosecution of criminal cases difficult, if
not impossible, in practice."358
also has elements of German law, which had incorporated elements ofFrench and Roman law, and
due to the American influence on post-World War II reconstruction, Illinois law).
353. LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supranote 107, at 3.
354. NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 419 (Cyril Glasse ed., rev. 2001) ("It is not possible to

incriminate someone in shari'ah law upon circumstantial evidence; there must be witnesses, or the
confession of the accused."). This disdain -for circumstantial evidence is troubling, since
circumstantial evidence is often the only form of evidence available, especially in Iraq, where
witnesses are reluctant to testify and a lack of plea bargaining prevents "flipping"' co-defendants.
See Zoroya & Jervis, supranote 9, at I ("In the case of the Ramadi ambush [that killed 5 Marines],
Marines collected as much circumstantial evidence as they could. After that, the evidence was
turned over to the CCCI."). Furthermore, circumstantial evidence can be just as reliable as
eyewitness testimony. See Robert A. Mintz, Building Up A Case,NAT. L.J., Nov. 22, 2004, at 31
("Those who underestimate the power of circumstantial evidence do so at their peril. While
eyewitness testimony, Perry Mason-style, can make for moments of high drama in the courtroom,
experienced prosecutors know that more often than not it is circumstantial evidence that brings
home the conviction."); see also Ann Coulter, Contrary to Court 7V, Most Evidence in Murder
Cases is Circumstantial,SHREVEPORT TIMES, Dec. 19,2004, at 7 ("There's a name for people who
take a dim view of circumstantial evidence because they don't understand the concept of
circumstantial evidence: They're called 'O.J. jurors."').
Unlike Iraqi law, American jurisprudence permits convictions based solely on circumstantial
evidence. See United States v. Hirschberg, 988 F.2d 1509, 1516 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Circumstantial
evidence may be the sole support for the conviction.").
355. Judges in Islamic countries, even in countries that have developed a secular law, still
resort to the command of Islamic evidentiary law that there be two witnesses to support a charge
of spousal abuse, for example. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Slave To Custom, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
28, 2004, at A3 (discussing how Afghani Supreme Court Justice Sayeed Omar Munib utilized
Sharialaw, which requires two witnesses to spousal abuse, rather than Afghani civil law, in holding
that a thirteen year-old girl must return to the husband whom she accuses of beating, raping, and
sodomizing her since she was nine years old).
356. LIPPMAN ET AL, supranote 116, at 69 ("The number of eyewitnesses required to prove
the defendant's guilt is set out in the Koran. Four witnesses are required to establish the offenses
of adultery and sodomy, while two witnesses are required for other offenses."); Koran 65:2 ("And
take for witnesses two person from among you.").
357. Michael M.J. Fischer, Legal PostulatesIn Flux: Justice, Wit, And Hierarchyin Iran, in
LAW AND ISLAM INTHE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 107, at 117.
358. NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 354, at 419; see also Ferris K. Nesheiwat,
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The Iraqi two-witness rule is also consistent with ancient civil law.359
Indeed, the Iraqi manifestation of the two-witness rule may have been
derived in part from the civil law, which has influenced Iraqi law in
various ways and which also contains certain numerical prerequisites for
testimonial evidence.3" Such a rule would have been highly palatable to
Iraqi Muslims in light of it concurrence with Islamic law on this point. As
with the Koranic version of the multiple-witness rule,36 ' the civil law appropriated much of this rule from the Biblical command regarding the
requisite prooffor serious crimes-including a two-witness rule-although
forms of this practice existed in the Roman law even before Constantine
and the Christianization of Europe.3 62
A form of the two-witness rule appears in both the Old and New
Testaments,363 where it was obviously designed to protect innocent
HonorCrimes in Jordan:Their Treatment.UnderIslamic andJordanianCriminalLaws, 23 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REv. 251,266 (2004) (noting that under Islamic criminal law a "conviction can only
be attained by evidence of a high degree of reliability."); see Esmaeili & Gans, supranote 212, at
155 (noting that sometimes Islamic evidentiary rules "are practically an insurmountable barrier to
any conviction....").
359. William H. McBratney, The One Witness Rule in Massachusetts,2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
155, 155 (1958) ("The early civil law used a technique of proof whereby a party had to present a
number of oaths according to a schedule based upon the nature of the fact to be proved and upon
the rank and importance of the adversary.").' ' "
360. In the civil law tradition, the "rules governing the weight to be given to certain kinds of
testimony were mechanical in operation. The court was required to give predetermined weight to
testimony based on the number, status, age, and sex of the witnesses. To prove a fact, a given
number ofwitnesses was required." MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 118 (emphasis added).
361. Insofar as Islam has roots in Judaism and Christianity, it presumably inherited the twowitness rule from these religious traditions. LIPPMAN ET AL., supranote 116, at 2 (discussing that
Islamic criminal law "absorbed elements from ancient Rome, Greece, Persia, Europe, and the Old
and New Testaments."); Ion, supranote 71, at 47 (noting that Mohammed and his disciple Abdallah
Ibn Abbas were acquainted by Jewish writings and probably derived some of the Islamic legal
tradition from Judaism); id. at 200 n.75 (noting the Christian influence on Arabic tribes before the
founding of Islam).
362. John H. Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses: A BriefHistory ofthe Numerical
System in England,15 HARV. L. REv. 83, 84 (1901) ("It has been doubted whether the Roman law
in its prime (that is, before 200 A.D.) proceeded upon a numerical system in its treatment of
witnesses. But it is clear that by the time of the Emperor Constantine, and also in the later
codification of Emperor Justinian, which served as a sufficient foundation for the Continental civil
law, the Roman law had adopted the general rule that one witness alone was insufficient upon any

point.").
363. See Deuteronomy 17:5-6 (Douay-Rheims Bible) ("Thou shalt bring forth the man or the
woman, who have committed the most wicked thing, to the gates of they city, and they shall be
stoned. By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain. Let no man be put
to death, when only one beareth witness against him."); see Deuteronomy 19:15 (Douay-Rheims
Bible) ("One witness shall not rise up against any man, whatsoever the sin or wickedness be: but
in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand."); see Numbers 35:30 (Douay-
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individuals from false accusations, particularly those facing the death
penalty for fictitious crimes.'" The two-witness rule was also common in
old English law, both in equity courts and the common-law courts.3 6 It
could also be found in the law of certain American colonies, such as
Massachusetts, in cases punishable by death.3 " But the rule was generally
abandoned by the Anglo common law by the seventeenth century as an
irrational limitation on the trier of fact's province to rely on circumstantial

Rheims Bible) ("The murder shall be punished by witnesses: none shall be condemned on the
evidence ofone man."); see Matthew 18:15-16 ("If thy brother offend against thee go, and rebuke
him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother. If he will not
hear thee, take with thee one or two more that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
may stand."); see 2 Corinthians13:1 ("In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word
stand."); see I Timothy 5:19 (Douay-Rheims Bible) ("Against a priest receive not an accusation,
but under two or three witnesses.").
364. Jewish law also contains a two-witness rule when the defendant is Jewish; gentiles are
not afforded the same protection, however:
[W]ithout the testimony of two competent witnesses, a Jew cannot be convicted
for a capital crime, or for an offense whose penalty is flogging. The witness must
describe the criminal act directly; circumstantial evidence is not allowed. By way
of contrast, the Noahide courts trying non-Jews are free of such formal
restrictions. A single witness's testimony suffices to convict. Any witness is
competent to testify to what he knows about the matter and the court may judge
the truth of the case by free evaluation of the witness' credibility.
Arnold N. Enker, Aspects ofInteractionBetween the TorahLaw, the King'sLaw,and the Noahide
Law in Jewish CriminalLaw, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1991).
365. Bryson, supra note 148, at 63 (stating that in the chancery courts a "party cannot prove
a point by the evidence of a single witness; there must be at least two, but two is sufficient, and the
inference is that no more should be produced."). Wigmore described the practice in English
common-law courts:
There was.., in the English common law courts of the 1500s, nothing at all of
repugnance to the numerical system already fully accepted in the ecclesiastical
law. The same popular probative notion there prevailed among judges, juries, and
counselors as on the Continent. They were equally prepared and accustomed to
weigh testimonies by numbers, and therefore would see nothing fallacious in a
rule declaring one witness not enough, and requiring a specified number of
witnesses.
Wigmore, supra note 362, at 90-91.
366. McBratney, supra note 359, at 158 ("After observing the proceedings in Plymouth, the
members of the General Court of Massachusetts enacted specific legislation on the subject in
1641 ... 'no man shall be put to death without the testimonie of two or three witnesses, or that
which is equivalent thereunto."'). Notice that in Massachusetts there was not a strict "two-witness"
rule insofar as other "equivalent" evidence would suffice.
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evidence and to make credibility determinations."" Nonetheless, vestiges
of the two witness requirement still exist in English and American law,""
but only with respect to the prosecution of treason and certain acts of

perjury.369

367. Sir Matthew Hale observed:
[I]t is one of the Excellencies of this Trial above the Trial by Witnesses, that
although the jury ought to give a great Regard to Witnesses and their Testimony,
yet they are not always bound by it, but may either upon reasonable
Circumstances, inducing a Blemish upon their Credibility, though otherwise in
themselves in strictness of Law they are to be heard, pronounce a Verdict contrary
to such Testimonies, the Truth whereof they have just cause to suspect, and may
and do often pronounce their Verdict upon one single Testimony, which Thing the
Civil Law admits not of.
HALE, supra note 180, at 259. Again, he notes:
[Juries] are not precisely bound to the Rules of the Civil Law, viz. To have Two
Witnesses to prove every Fact, unless it be in Cases of Treason, nor to reject one
Witness because he is single, or always to believe Two Witnesses if the
Probability of the Fact does upon other Circumstances reasonably encounter
them....
Id. at 260.
368. See United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373,1377 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The two-witness rule
arose in England, during the seventeenth century. At that time, the common law courts assumed
jurisdiction over perjury cases with the abolition ofthe Court of Star Chamber, which had followed
the practice of the ecclesiastical courts of requiring two witnesses. As a result, even in the common
law courts, in which the testimony of a single witness was usually sufficient . . .a perjury
conviction could be obtained only on the testimony of two witnesses.") (citation omitted). Besides
requiring two witnesses, under the law, unswom confessions of treason were not sufficient to
support a conviction. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 70 n.3 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
369. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 ("No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of Two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in Open Court."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2381 (criminalizing treason); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (treason); McBratney,
supra note 359, at 156-57 ('[I]t
is well settled that at least two witnesses are necessary to a
conviction of treason. In the United Sates, the requirement is specifically set forth in the
Constitution, and is now so firmly implanted in Anglo-American law that the exception is know
as the 'treason rule,' and has become an integral part of the law on that subject."). For the history
of the two-witness rule in English law, see L.M. Hill, The Two-Witness Rule in English Treason
Trials:Some Comments on the Emergence ofProceduralLaw, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95 (1968);
Wigmore, supra note 362, at 90-91. Canada has moved beyond a literal two-witness rule, and
instead created one that looks more like America's two-witness rule with respect to perjury, for
example, one witness plus some corroborating evidence. See C.R.C. ch. C-34 s. 47(3) (2005) ("No
person shall be convicted of high treason or treason on the evidence of only one witness, unless the
evidence of that witness is corroborated ...by evidence that implicates the accused.").
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Regardless of its origin,37 ° it is easy to understand one rationale for a
two-witness rule, ensuring that only the guilty are convicted. In a sense it
" ' that it is
comports with the Anglo-American view, noted by Blackstone,37
better to let a number of guilty persons go unpunished than to convict one
innocent man.372 The key term, however, is the "number of guiltypersons"
that are to go free, for opinion as to the appropriate number varies from
scholar to scholar.
Blackstone said it was better that ten guilty persons escape justice, but
Benjamin Franklin thought it better that one hundred guilty men go free
rather than one innocent man be punished, to list but two examples.3 73 Fear
of Moslem terrorists has led some Dutch politicians to propose a contrary
calculus. "'When it comes to preparing for a terrorist attack, it's better to
have 10 possibly innocent people temporarily in jail than one with a bomb
on the street,' said Mixime Verhagen, the floor leader of the Dutch
Christian Democrats." 374
Of course, the practicality of Blackstone's aphorism is highly
dependent on the number of guilty persons who are to go free to ensure
that the innocent are adequately protected. Thus, this principle is practiced
in the United States only to an extent. 375 After all, the only way to ensure
370. The two-witness requirement in the Constitution was based on an analogous requirement
in English statutory law, which was derived from Canon-law provisions dealing with the crime of
heresy, which was in turn derived from the civil law. See United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685,
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (L. Hand, J.) ("The requirement of two witnesses probably had its rise from
the canon law.... It was the rule of canon law, borrowed from the civil law, that two witnesses
were ordinarily necessary.").
371. 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIESONTHELAWSOFENGLAND 352 (photo reprint
1967) (1783)) ('[Tlhe law holds, that is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."). According to one source, this is exactly the idea motivating the Islamic two witness rule,
among other evidentiary rules, that exists in Iraq. See LDPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 68
("Islamic law thus shares the common law principle that it is preferable that several guilty persons
should escape punishment than that one innocent person should be convicted.").
372. See Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 174-75 (1997). In reality,
mistakes in either direction, convicting the innocent or letting the guilty escape just punishment,
are unfortunate and should be minimized to the extent reasonably possible.
373. See id.
374. See Robert Wieloard, Dutch Lawmakers Say Government UnderestimatedIslamic Terror
Threat, ASSOCIATED PRESS., Nov. 11, 2004.
375. Like all other principles, this one is valued relative to other important legal principles.
See Rodriguezv. United States, 480 U.S. 522,525-26 (1987) ("[N]o legislation pursues its purposes
at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a
particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice.. . ."); GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFr
AS SOULcRAFr: WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES 93 (1983) ("The most important four words in politics
are 'up to a point.' Are we in favor of free speech? Of course-up to a point. Are we for liberty,
equality, military strength, industrial vigor, environmental protection, traffic safety? Up to a point.
(Want a significant reduction of traffic deaths? Then ban left turns. You say that would be going
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that the innocent are never wrongly convicted is to never convict anyone, 76
a practice that would prove suicidal for civilized society.
In the Moslem world, 7 as well as parts of Europe, the purpose of the
two-witness rule was ignored and the operation of rule was so perverted
that it actually led to great harm for defendants. Because the rule makes it
so difficult to convict defendants, including obviously guilty defendants,
governments quickly found a way around the rule: torture.3 7' Rather than
too far? Then you are for improving traffic safety--but only up to a point.)"); Cf.LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONSTiTUTIONAL CHOICES 15 (1985) ("[P]eople draw lines.., as a way or ordering social
existence....).
376. In the words of Judge Kozinski:
Any rule of decision must strike a balance between two kinds of potential
error-alpha and beta. For example, in the criminal context, the two types of error
are unjust convictions of innocent persons (alpha errors) and wrongful acquittals
of guilty ones (beta errors)....
Any rule of decision reflects a policy judgment as to the proper trade-off
between alpha and beta errors. The rule of decision we've adopted in criminal
cases tilts heavily away from alpha errors (erroneous guilty verdicts), embodying
the popular notion that it is better for ten guilty persons to go free than to convict
an innocent one. Even there, however, we do not adopt a rule that calls for
absolute certainty. Rather, we accept as inevitable that some, although hopefully
few, alpha errors will slip through; the occasional conviction of an innocent is the
bitter price we pay for avoiding the wholesale acquittal of the guilty.
Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citing G.
Keppell, Design and Analysis 65-66 (1973)).
377. In using the adjective "Moslem," it is important to note, as Pope Benedict XVI did, that
"Islam is not a uniform thing. In fact, there is no single authority for all Muslims.... [n]o one can
speak for Islam as a whole; it has, as it were, no commonly regarded orthodoxy." Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, quoted in John L. Allen, Jr., PopeBenedict on Islam, NAT'L CATH.REP., July 29,2005,
at 20.
378. The use of torture to compel truthful testimony has an extensive history. See A. Lawrence
Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture, 11 HARV.L. REV. 220 (1897). But tortured and coerced
confessions have been prohibited in civilized nations for a considerable time. See Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). They were also prohibited by Iraq's criminal procedure law, but
this was ignored in practice. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971]
127, availableat https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/ CLAMOPublic.nsf ("The use of any illegal method to influence the accused and extract a confession is not
permitted. Mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence or use of
drugs or intoxicants are considered illegal methods."); but see id. 218 ("It is a condition of the
acceptance of the confession that it is not given as a result of coercion, whether it be physical or
moral, a promise or a threat. Nevertheless, if there is no causal link between the coercion and the
confession or if the confession is corroborated by other evidence which convinces the court that it
is true or which has led to uncovering certain truth, then the court may accept it.").
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granting defendants their liberty when accusations were uncorroborated by
two eyewitnesses, authorities would torture or imprison defendants until
they obtained a confession, regardless of actual guilt or innocence.379 The
more severe the torture, the quicker the confession.
This practice continued through the time of Saddam Hussein38 and
" ' For exreportedly remains standard police procedure in Iraq to this day.38
ample, in one CCCI case, which did not involve U.S. soldiers, the
defendants were accused of murdering a senior intelligence official in the
Iraqi Interior Ministry. One of the defendants had confessed to the crime
prior to trial, but he told the CCCI trial judges that the confession was
procured by torture. He claimed that the Iraqi police "'tortured me for five
days, tore off my clothes and underwear and threatened to rape me and

In light of the widespread use of torture in the Middle East, the condemnation of the abuse at
Abu Ghraib by Middle Eastern governments was hypocritical. These governments regularly utilize
torture in their criminal justice systems. Bret Stephens, Birth ofa Nation, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2005, at A12, (describing various torture methods and devices used by Syrian officials to coerce
confessions from the innocent); Alasdair Palmer, Briton Hates "Savages," WASH. TIMES, June 1,
2005, at A13 ("For nearly three years, Sandy Mitchell was held in a Saudi Arabian jail and tortured
until he confessed to a bombing he did not commit."); Glenn Frankel, Briton's Tale of Torture
Offers View of Saudi Justice, WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, at A20 (discussing Saudi Arabia's
prosecution of an Englishman, Sandy Mitchell, for terrorist attack by Islamic militants and in which
the government knew Mitchell had no involvement; besides a mock execution, Mitchell was
"punched, kicked, spat at, beaten on the soles of his feet with an ax handle and chained for nine
days to a steel door from in his cell"). The court sentenced Mitchell to death after a ten-minute
hearing.
379. LIPPMANETAL,supra note 116, at 122 ("The requirement oftwo 'adl male eyewitnesses
at times resulted in acquittals based on failure of proof. Some doubted the ability of the threat of
divine punishment to guarantee truthful oaths and testimony, and supported the extraction of
confessions by threat, torture and imprisonment."). The two-witness rule may also be the root cause
of the use of torture in Roman canon law. Id. (citing JoHN H. LANOBEiN, ToRTuRE AND THE LAw
OF PROOF 7 (1977)).
380. See Salih SaifAldin & John W. Anderson, Suspect's DeathEvokes Hussein Era,WASH.
POST., Apr. 9, 2005, at 18 (noting that "techniques favored by Iraq's old justice system" included
"torture, disappearances and death-in-custody"); Luhnow, supra note 35, at A14 ("American
officials have already amended the country's criminal code. The changes: a ban on confession
obtained through torture .... ").
381. Country Report, supra note 119 ("Reportedly, coerced confessions and interrogation
continued to be the favored method of investigation by police. According to one government
official, hundreds of cases were pending at year's end alleging torture."); see Naomi Klein,
Torture'sPartofthe Territory,L.A. TIMES, June 7,2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 9082668 ("An
internal report from the 1st Cavalry Division ... states that 'electrical shock and choking' are
'consistently used to achieve confessions' by Iraqi police and soldiers."); Aldin & Anderson, supra
note 380, at 18 (noting the continued use of torture by Iraqi police services); Struck, supra note 91,
at A10 (noting routine use of torture).
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bring my wife and sisters in to rape them." 382 To avoid further suffering
and to protect his family, the defendant promptly confessed.
Jeremy Bentham said that the two-witness rule was designed to "giv[e]
security to the innocent" and that "the law which causes a man to perish
upon the deposition of a single witness is fatal to liberty."3 3 It is possible
to protect the innocent from false testimony, however, without adopting a
rule requiring a minimum of two eyewitnesses. Alternatively, the twowitness rule does not need to be strictly applied or applied to every crime,
or it could be applied flexibly according to the Anglo-American tradition
of the two-witness rule, which is not as rigid as the Islamic version.3 Thus
for example, under English law, the weight of the rule was somewhat
mitigated by the fact that the "two witnesses could be divided within the
indicted offence, so that one testified to one criminal act and the second to
another .... . 3 5 Under this approach, a prosecutor could prevail even
without two eyewitnesses for each element of an offense, so long as there
were a total of two witnesses to testify about an offense. Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that witnesses obviously cannot testify as to the
defendant's state of mind, knowledge, or intent when he was committing
his criminal acts,3" 6 and thus the two-witness rule is not applied to the
mens rea elements of crimes.
In the perjury context, there are also various exceptions and ways to
circumvent the two-witness rule.38 7 Under the Anglo-American version of
the perjury two-witness rule, "the falsity of a defendant's testimony cannot
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the uncorroborated testimony of
3 ' Originally, the rationale behind the rule was that in
one person .... ."
perjury prosecutions, the defendant's testimony under oath would counter
the evidence of a single prosecution witness, hence the need for a second
382. Fleishman, supra note 73, at 1.
383. EDWARD J. WHITE, THE LAW iNTHE SCRIPURES 122 (1935) (quoting Jeremy Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence Book IX).
384. Hill, supra note 369, at 95.
385. Id.
386. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945) ("What is designed in the mind of an
accused never is susceptible of proof by direct testimony. Ifwe were to hold that the disloyal and
treacherous intention must be proved by the direct testimony of two witnesses, it would be to hold
that it is never provable. It seems obvious that adherence to the enemy, in the sense of a disloyal
state of mind, cannot be, and is not required to be, proved by deposition.of two witnesses.").
387. See, e.g., United States v. Nicoletti, 310 F.2d 359,362 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that the
two-witness rule does not apply when the allegedly pejurious testimony concerns the defendant's
state of mind).
388. POSNER, supra note 151, at 51 n.63; 18 U.S.C. § 1621; Hammer v. United States, 271
U.S. 620,626 (1926) ("The uncorroborated oath of one witness is not to establish the falsity of the
testimony of the accused set forth in the indictment as perjury.").
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prosecution witness to break the "tie."'38 9 But this anachronistic rationale
soon evolved into one of protection for trial witnesses who, without such
protection from a perjury prosecution, might be reluctant to testify39°
As the Supreme Court observed:
In order that witnesses may be free to testify willingly, the law has
traditionally afforded them the protection of certain privileges, such
as, for example, immunity from suits for libel springing from their
testimony. Since equally honest witnesses may well have differing
recollections of the same event, we cannot reject as wholly
unreasonable the notion that a conviction for perjury ought not to
rest entirely upon "an oath against an oath." 9 '
Thus, the two-witness rule protects witnesses from facing a perjury
prosecution unless at least two witnesses can be found to contradict his
testimony.392
In the United States, the two-witness rule operates as a common-law
evidentiary standard rather than an element of the crime.3 93 It nevertheless
limits the ability of courts to dispense justice in perjury cases. Because it
has the propensity to impede justice, the two-witness rule has been
criticized by legal scholars as a crude and anachronistic device almost to
389. United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting 7 Wigmore on
Evidence 2040(a), at 359-60 (Chadbourne rev. 1978)). But as the Chaplin panel commented: "In
light of modern notions of the function of the jury, this original justification of the two witness rule
provides a very weak rationale for the application of the rule in the contemporary trial setting." Id.
at 1378.
390. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609 (1945).
391. Id.
392. Other common-law rules protect witnesses in criminal proceedings from civil suits for
defamation or malicious prosecution. The rationale is that such immunities will more often
encourage truthful testimony in criminal proceedings and it is better to let the judge or jury hear
a wider spectrum of evidence and permit them to decide credibility issues. To prevent "harassment
of witnesses and to promote unrestrained testimony in criminal cases, the Supreme Court held that
witnesses at trials are absolutely immune form suits under § 1983 for providing false testimony at
trials." Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.
325, 334 (1983)); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (1 th Cir. 1999) (holding that a witness
is absolutely immune from civil suits for false testimony provided to a grand jury); Curtis v.
Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281,285 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a police officer was entitled to immunity
from suit for false testimony at a probable cause and suppression hearing). It is worth asking
whether this rationale is sound, and indeed, the common law did not extend this immunity to socalled "complaining witnesses," the witness who instigated the criminal prosecution in the first
place. See Cervantes, 188 F.3d at 809-10; White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1988).
393. United States v. Onomonu, 999 F.2d 43,46 (2d Cir. 1993); Gebhard v. United States, 422
F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1970).
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the same extent as others like Bentham sing its praises.3 Critics contend,
however, that the rule is not likely to result in more reliable results than
trials conducted without the "benefit" of such a rule.3 9' In light of this
criticism, it is not surprising that Congress found a way around the twowitness rule by enacting a perjury statute making perjury provable
regardless of whether the prosecution can muster two witnesses.
Even without this statute, the "two-witness rule" was something of a
misnomer because prosecutors were never absolutely compelled to produce
two witnesses in support of a perjury prosecution. The rule "'does not
literally require the direct testimony of two separate witnesses, but rather
may be satisfied by the direct testimony of one witness and sufficient
corroborative evidence.' 397 Indeed, in its present form, the two-witness
rule "is really nothing but a short-cut way of stating that in a perjury trial
the evidence must consist of something more convincing than one man's
word against another's."3 98 Thus a prosecutor can choose to satisfy his

394. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609 ("It is argued that since effective administration of justice
is largely dependent upon truthful testimony, society is ill-served by an 'anachronistic' rule which
tends to burden and discourage prosecutions for pejury."); see United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d
1373, 1378 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The two-witness rule has been criticized as an historical
anachronism.");Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1945) (Jackson, J.) ("It is not
difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modem researches in psychology
warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical
calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous
to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction."); c.f, United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685,
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (Hand, J.)
("Such a procedural requirement, wherever it comes from, implies
a system of trial not rational in its processes at all, one in which the cause was tried by the
sacramental nature of the oath itself.., one where the witnesses were guarantors or sponsors for
the parties.
").
395. Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609.
396. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1999) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is
sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number
of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence."); Chaplin,25 F.3d at 1378 n.5 (stating
that Congress has "abolished the two-witness rule in prosecutions brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1623,
which concerns false declarations made before a grand jury or a court.").
397. Chaplin, 25 F.3d at 1377 (quoting United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir.
1977)); see United States v. Davis, 380 F.3d 183, 195 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 443 (2d Cir. 1967)). The statutory text of the Iraqi "two witness" rule
similarly permits reliance on other credible evidence. IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(English translation) [1971]
213(B), available at https://www.jagcnet.arny.mil/JAGCNET
Interet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf ("One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is
not corroborated by other convincing evidence or a confession from the accused. The exception of
this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of proving a case, which must be followed."). The
CCCI judges ignored this caveat, however, and always required the testimony of two witnesses.
398. United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 1961).
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burden of proof with two witnesses, but may also use one witness and
"independent evidence so corroborative ofthe direct testimony that the two
when considered together are sufficient to establish the falsity of the
accused's statement under oath beyond a reasonable doubt."3 9 This is
frequently not difficult to do. Accordingly, this diminishes the danger that
the two-witness rule will permit a defendant to evade justice.
Not so with the Iraqi two-witness rule. It was more burdensome
because U.S. personnel were not aware of the strict manner in which the
CCCI would apply the rule until they saw it operate as the ostensible
rationale for several acquittals." For their part, the investigative judges
had recommended several one-witness cases for trial-the equivalent of
an indictment-which suggested that these judges believed these cases
warranted a trial, even with only one witness. The trial judges, however,
refused to place any stock in the testimony of only one American witness,
even when supported by other substantial evidence. The CCCI acquitted
defendants, ostensibly on this ground, after full trials.o
Such a strict and bizarre application of a mere evidentiary rule so
inhibits justice that it virtually begs for the crafting of exceptions,
particularly in cases where the application of such a rule would result in
the release of dangerous terrorists. Thus, for example, judges with an
ounce of creativity might be expected to craft a rule in murder cases that
the testimony of the medical examiner concerning the cause of the victim's
death, along with testimony connecting the defendant with the murder
weapon would constructively constitute one witness to the crime. A rule
holding that expert testimony, when combined with testimony from an
actual witness to the crime, is sufficient evidence for a conviction would

399. Chaplin, 25 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Diggs, 560 F.2d at 270); see Weiler, 323 U.S. at 610
("Two elements must enter into a determination that corroborative evidence is sufficient: (1) that
the evidence, if true, substantiates the testimony of a single witness who has sworn to the falsity
of the alleged peijurious statement; (2) that the corroborative evidence is trustworthy.").
400. Strange rules like this one often lead creative common-lawjudges to formalistic measures
designed to evade application ofthe rule. See, e.g., GRANT GU.MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
38 (Yale Univ. Press 1977) ("Justice Story of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Shaw of
Massachusetts are among the notable judicial figures of the period who are known to have been
convinced antislavery men.... It fell to the lot of both men to write opinions in slavery cases. In
these opinions they seem to have been driven into a formalism which was entirely foreign to the
ideas they had expressed and the principles they had stood for during their long careers."). But
formalistic procedures devoid of any practical value also lead pragmatic judges to find creative
means of evading such rules.
401. "Undoubtedly in some cases documents emanating from the accused and the attending
circumstances may constitute better evidence... than any amount of oral testimony." Hammer v.
United States, 271 U.S. 620, 627 (1926). Apparently the Iraqi judiciary does not concur with these
sentiments.
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be reasonable and would permit the court to keep up the pretense of
adhering to the two-witness rule.' 2
Indeed, the strange results this rule engenders suggest that Iraqi judges
do not punctiliously enforce their two-witness rule anyway. They
presumably do not enforce it as to any scienter requirements of a crime.' 3
What is certain is that the judges of the CCCI strictly enforced their twowitness rule whenever the victims were U.S. soldiers.' Notably, the Iraqi
judges do not preclude an insurgent's close friends and family members
from testifying on his behalf as alibi witnesses. This happens despite the
fact that Islamic law precludes such testimony because these witnesses
have too great a stake in the outcome to ensure truthfulness. ' 5 Perhaps this
aspect of Sharianever made it into Iraqi law, or perhaps the judges pick
and choose the evidentiary rules they apply on a given day.'
To the extent that the Iraqi judiciary seems to have a fondness for the
two-witness rule or perhaps feels compelled by Sharialaw to enforce the
rule in defense of Iraqi defendants,' it is unlikely that there will be any
modification of this rule anytime soon.

402. "Mohammed himself said that the laws should be modified according to the exigencies
of the time," and since the inception of the two-witness rule great strides have been made in the
forensic sciences, advancements that the law should take into account by loosening the two-witness
rule. Ion, supra note 71, at 47 n. 16.
403. In the United States, the two-witness rule for both treason and perjury applies only to acts
and omissions susceptible of observation by witnesses, but not the defendant's motivations for
criminal acts or omissions. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945) ("What is designed
in the mind of an accused never is susceptible of proof by direct testimony. If we were to hold that
the disloyal and treacherous intention must be proved by the direct testimony of two witnesses, it
would be to hold that it is never provable. It seems obvious that adherence to the enemy, in the
sense of a disloyal state of mind, cannot be, and is not required to be, proved by deposition of two
witnesses."); see United States v. DeZam, 157 F.3d 1042,1053 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he two witness
rule is inapplicable when the only issue at trial relates to the state of mind of the accused").
404. Of course, "it is always a comfort to be able to hide behind the law," especially when
making irrational decisions. POSNER, supra note 151, at 255.
405. LIPPMAN ET AL, supra note 116, at 69 (stating that "a witness may not testify in a case
involving an immediate member of his family or in a case in which he may benefit from the
outcome of the proceeding.").
406. Civil-law countries generally are not known for possessing a developed body of
evidentiary law and Iraq seems to have inherited this defect. Hamilton, supra note 127, at 183.
407. Islamic law does not look kindly on circumstantial or non-testimonial evidence. NEw
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 354, at 419 ("It is not possible to incriminate someone in
shari'ah law upon circumstantial evidence; there must be witnesses, or the confession of the
accused. This makes the prosecution of criminal cases difficult, if not impossible, in practice.");
LIPPMAN ET AL., supranote 116, at 121.
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C. Absence of PleaBargaining
In addition to the CCCI's refusal to require defendants to testify under
oath and its scrupulous adherence to the two-witness rule, the CCCI further
inhibits the prosecution of terrorists by not allowing plea bargains.
Therefore, because American prosecutors have nothing to offer Iraqi
terrorists in exchange for their cooperation, their defendants have no
incentive to assist the prosecution, provide actionable intelligence, and
testify against other insurgents. Other than offering complete immunity
from prosecution, 4°8 the United States is unable to cut deals or offer potential witnesses reduced charges or lenient sentences in exchange for
valuable testimony against other terrorists. In American courts, U.S.
prosecutors and judges have observed that "[iun many cases it is impossible
to convict a criminal defendant without using the threat of prosecution to
get his accomplices to testify against him," and this has certainly proven
to be true in Iraq. Because of the difficulty in obtaining evidence, the
"disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and
the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential
component of the administration ofjustice,"41' but not in Iraq. There, U.S.
prosecutors, who have no standing in Iraqi courts, 4 " also lack authority to
offer deals to defendants. 4 2 True, the CCCI judges enjoy the authority to
408. The examining magistrate could offer immunity to a defendant to encourage him to
testify against another criminal, but American prosecutors were not free to propose this course of
action, and the investigating judges never approached the prosecutors with an offer to grant
immunity. See IRAQI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (English translation) [1971]
129(A),
availableathttps://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternetHomepages/ACCLAMO-Public.nsf
("The examining magistrate may offer immunity with the agreement of the Criminal Court, for
reasons recorded in the record, to any defendant accused of an offence in order to obtain his
testimony against others involved in its commission, on condition that the accused will give a full
and true statement.").
409. POsNER, supra note 151, at 108.
410. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,260 (1971). "[Elveryone understands that to nail
a really big criminal, the little criminals must sometimes be given a pass." POSNER, supranote 151,
at 146.
411. Finer & Mosher, supra note 72"(noting that the U.S. military prosecutors lack standing
before Iraqi trial courts); Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 ("the U.S. military has no official role
in the actual court proceedings, other than to provide witnesses and an interpreter"). Compare this
to the Yemeni tribunals that tried six individuals involved in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, which
killed seventeen U.S. sailors. Though the court was composed of Yemeni officials, American
prosecutors were permitted to represent the interests of the United States. Neil MacFarquhar &
Dave Johnston, DeathSentences in Attack on Cole, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at Al. The court
sentenced two of the six defendants to death, while two government officials who had forged
identification papers received only five-year sentences. Id.
412. The best that the American prosecutors could do is offer a co-defendant complete
immunity in exchange for his testimony. At trial, however, the judges would question why the
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permit American prosecutors to prosecute cases directly in that court, 41 3
rather than through Iraqi prosecutors, but they never utilized this power. In
any event, the Iraqijudges are unlikely to honor deals made by the United
States and defendant-witnesses.414
Part of this problem stems from the fact that plea bargaining is
completely foreign to Iraqi judges,1 5 as it is to most jurists of the civil-law
tradition. They perceive plea-bargaining to be unfairly inconsistent in the
treatment of defendants--some of whom may be treated leniently in

exchange for their cooperation--and contrary to the rule of law. 416 In
witness was not also charged, and probably would have either dismissed the case or would have
given the defendant a reduced sentence to punish the Americans for prosecuting only one of the
potential defendants, a practiced frowned upon in Iraq. Of course, in American jurisdictions, the
trial judge has no obligation to accept a plea agreement. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719
(1962). But because of burgeoning caseloads, judges have a strong incentive to dispose of as many
cases as they can by means other than full trials on the merits.
When crimes involved multiple perpetrators, only some of whom were captured by U.S. forces,
the Iraqi judges would question why only a few of the perpetrators were on trial. Similarly, on more
than one occasion, the Iraqi judges refused to hold trials for crimes in which the United States had
several defendants in custody but elected to prosecute defendants piecemeal, usually because of
transportation problems. Indeed, according to the CCCI judges, it is impossible under Iraqi law to
sever trials of defendants. As a matter of judicial economy this might make some sense, but it is
not as though the CCCI was inundated with cases. Indeed, most CCCI judges worked only half
days.
In contrast to the CCCI's practice, American law readily permits--and sometimes
requires--separate trials in cases involving multiple defendants. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a) ("If the
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, or information, or a consolidation for trial
appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts,
sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires."); Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding that two defendants may not be tried by the same jury where
the prosecution will present evidence that one defendant confessed to the crime of which both
defendants were charged and the confessing defendant is not available for cross-examination).
413. See CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36, § 17(1) ("The CCCI shall be able to request the
support from the international community, any authorized foreign military forces in Iraq or
diplomatic posts in Iraq for the investigation or trial of cases.").
414. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order creating the CCCI did permit judges to reduce
sentences, including mandatory minimum sentences, in exchange for cooperation, including
cooperation given after the sentence was imposed. See id. § 13(2). The power granted by this
provision was rarely, if ever, used.
415. Marlisle Simons, IraqisNot Readyfor Trials; UN. To Withhold Training,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2004, at AlIl (noting that the "notion of plea bargaining" is foreign to Iraqi judges and
prosecutors).
416. In the words of Merryman:
Civil lawyers criticize the common American practice of plea bargaining (giving
the prosecutor discretion to charge a lesser offense or call for a lighter sentence if
the defendant agrees to plead guilty). This practice seems to them to frustrate
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contrast, in the U.S. federal courts, roughly ninety percent of criminal
defendants plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. 1 7 Plea agreements,
therefore, prevent the federal and state courts in the United States from
grinding to a halt. An absence of plea deals would require substantially
more judges, prosecutors, investigators, and defense attorneys to deal with
the increased workload the full trials would entail.41 8 U.S. trials have
become lengthy and expensive affairs in part because defendants enjoy a
broad range of substantive and procedural rights.
In light of the time and expense of American trials, it has proven useful,
to both prosecutors and defendants, to enter plea agreements. Defendants
waive some of their rights and admit guilt-and in some cases assist the
prosecution by testifying against other defendants-in exchange for
something of value, such as the dismissal of some charges or a
recommendation from the prosecutor that the judge be lenient in
sentencing. Were this process permitted in Iraq, cases could be handled
with greater dispatch and efficiency, and would entail outcomes beneficial
to the United States, the defendants, and the Iraqi people.4 19
Most importantly, plea bargaining would give U.S. prosecutors
something of value to offer terrorists who possess valuable information
about their fellow militants which could help prosecutors obtain the
capture and conviction of these other terrorists. Beyond that, many of these
terrorists possess information that could be used to prevent future attacks,
and thereby save innocent American and Iraqi lives. Since some of these
terrorists are simply petty criminals who are paid a pittance by Baathists
to carry out attacks and are generally devoid of any real loyalty to the

legislative intent and the legitimate expectation of victims, and to compromise the
rule of law. Their law and their prosecutorial traditions both sharply limit
prosecutorial discretion.
MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 130.
417. Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 5.3,
U.S. District Courts. Criminal Defendants Disposed of by Method of Disposition, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
418. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number ofjudges and court facilities.").
419. This is not to say that plea-bargaining is a perfect solution to the problems posed by
extensive criminal litigation. But it does entail some concrete advantages to both society and
criminal defendants. The fact that both prosecutors and defendants freely enter into such

agreements confirms this.
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insurgency,420 it is probable that if offered incentives such as reduced
sentences, these criminals would quickly turn on their employers.
But without the ability to dangle this carrot in front of them, or the stick
of commensurate sentences to induce action, American prosecutors will
almost never be able to persuade Iraqi terrorists to provide intelligence or
testify against their fellow terrorists.42'
D. Closure of the Record and Refusal to PermitRebuttal Evidence

Another difficulty in prosecuting cases before the CCCI was the court's
practice of closing the record to the prosecution upon the investigative
judges' submission of the investigative report to the trial judges.
Accordingly, if the United States came across evidence not previously
obtainable, but after the investigative judge had submitted his dossier to
the trial court, the trial judges would refuse to allow this evidence to be
presented at trial. Indeed, in one case in which American prosecutors
discovered additional witnesses after the investigative judge had passed a
case to the trial court, but before the trial, American prosecutors attempted
to reopen the case. But the investigative judge adamantly refused to receive
the evidence. Thejudge claimed it would have been a violation of Iraqi law
to do so, and that there was no mechanism to reopen the case absent a
special order from the trial court. At trial, in turn, the CCCI trial judges
refused to hear evidence from witnesses who have not first testified before
the investigative judge.
Understandably every judicial system requires finality and a point
beyond which new evidence cannot be submitted. Without such a rule,
parties would have no incentive to diligently and expeditiously gather and

420. Richard Lowry, What Went Right, NAT'L REv., May 9, 2005, at 31 ("On the edges of this
core of the insurgency were criminals (Saddam emptied the jails in October 2002 in anticipation
of the invasion.)"); Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48 (noting the "rampant criminal activity from
thousands of criminals that the Baathist regime released immediately before the war").
421. One might suppose that creative Americans could devise a system whereby insurgents
might be rewarded for cooperation, but this has yet to occur. American special prosecutors have
no direct control over the length or conditions of detention-which is the province of the military
police-nor do they control intelligence gathering-which is the domain of military intelligence.
This separation of functions works to the detriment of bringing terrorists to justice and thus the
prevention of future attacks. There is also a mistaken belief, engendered by the vague language of
the Geneva Conventions, that providing special privileges to cooperative insurgents would violate
the provisions of Geneva. Heather Mac Donald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, CrrY J., Winter
2005, available at http://www.city-joumal.org/htm/15-1_terrorists.html (noting that legal
memoranda interpreting the Geneva Conventions would have precluded "providing a detainee an
incentive for cooperation-such as a cigarette or, especially favored in Cuba, a McDonald's FiletO-Fish sandwich.").
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present evidence, and cases would drag on for years, thereby denying
defendants a speedy trial and a prompt decision from the court. The
problem with the CCCI's rule is that it completely precludes the
prosecution from further developing the evidence from the time the
investigative judge submits his dossier to the trial court to the date of trial,
while the defendant is not similarly precluded form gathering new
evidence during this period. Were these rules the norm in American
jurisdictions, prosecutors would be precluded from offering at trial any
evidence that had not been previously submitted to the grand jury. In other
words, prosecutors would be forced to submit their entire case, including
the testimony of all witnesses, to the grand jury, and anything not
submitted to the grand jury could never be considered at trial. Furthermore,
the defendant would have the opportunity to see and hear all of the
prosecution's evidence, and thereby tailor his own testimony or that of his
witnesses accordingly.
So in cases where the American prosecutors sought to present evidence
to the investigative judges over the course of several weeks-usually
because transportation was in short supply and not all of the witnesses
could testify on the same day--they had to request that the investigative
judges not prematurely submit the cases to the trial court before all of the
evidence had been presented. But because the American attorneys enjoyed
no standing,422 and the investigative judge is the master of the case, the
investigative judges were under no obligation to accede to the American
prosecutor's request. Sometimes they did and sometimes they did not
A related problem concerned rebuttal evidence. As previously noted,
an Iraqi defendant is under no obligation to participate in the investigative
hearing, and can elect to remain silent and not present a defense during the
investigative stage of the proceedings. 424 The defendant is further
protected by the rule that no adverse inference can be drawn from his
refusal to testify, just as in the United States. 42 An Iraqi defendant,
therefore, may wait until trial to ambush the prosecution with a fullydeveloped defense, which admittedly is a wise course of action on his part.
At trial, Iraqi defendants would then frequently raise defenses-usually an
422. Finer & Mosher, supra note 72 (noting that the U.S. military prosecutors lack standing
before Iraqi trial courts); Spinner, supra note 101, at A12 ("[Tihe U.S. military has no official role
in the actual court proceedings, other than to provide witnesses and an interpreter.").
423. With one or two exceptions, the investigative judges were generally accommodating to
the American prosecutors, and would most likely hold a case until all evidence was presented. Such
requests for forbearance, however, could not be made in cases where new evidence was discovered
post-investigative hearing but pretrial.
424. CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36.
425. Id.
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alibi defense--to which the prosecution needed to submit rebuttal
evidence. 2 ' As mentioned above, under the CCCI's system, however, the
prosecution's case was considered closed upon delivery of the
investigative judge's report to the trial judges, and therefore no rebuttal
evidence could be submitted at trial.
Thus, no matter how unexpected and unfounded a defense might be,
American prosecutors could not offer evidence to rebut it. Such a system
invites abuse by defendants, and many Iraqi defense attorneys took full
advantage of this defect. Indeed, it was surprising that more attorneys did
not afford themselves the opportunity for deception that the CCCI extends
to defendants. Of course, this practice conflicts with Anglo-American
notions of a fair trial, and greatly impedes efforts to uncover the truth. But
42 which is presumably
it does comport with the Islamic law or Sharia,
why CCCI judges so tenaciously clung to this practice. The fact that the
rule thwarted American efforts to obtain justice also encouraged CCCI
judges to apply it in terrorism cases, perhaps to demonstrate their antipathy
for U.S. soldiers or to further encumber the American occupation of their
country.428

Military occupation courts are designed to prevent these shenanigans
by the judges of an occupied nation, and are in fact that only means of
controlling judicial decisions designed to encumber an occupation army.
As explained by Dr. Fraenkel:
The judicial process is essentially different from other forms of
administration, for it is subject to no orders from superiors.
Administrative agencies ofthe executive branch of government can
be subjected to outside supervision and control without changing
their basic structure, because in any case they function on the
principle of hierarchical authority. The activities of courts, however,
can be only accepted or rejected; if the independence of the
judiciary is to be respected at all, the courts cannot be subjected to
interference. For this reason an occupation regime must create its
own courts for all litigation that it is not willing to entrust to the free
functioning of the courts of the occupied country. 2 9

426. The Iraqi prosecutor never made an effort to obtain rebuttal evidence from the United
States, suggesting that he did not desire a conviction or he knew that the deck was stacked against
conviction such that presenting rebuttal evidence would be futile.
427. See LiPPMANETAL,supra note 116, at 121.
428. FRAENKEL, supra note 30, at 21-22.
429. Id.
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American military occupation courts certainly could have been used
effectively in Iraq, if for no other reason than to overcome the
anachronistic and burdensome rules of the CCCI under which American
prosecutors were and are forced to operate.
E. Lack of SubstantialCross-Examinationof the
Defendant andDefense Witnesses
A lack of cross-examination of defendants and defense witnesses was
yet another patent defect of the CCCI.43° This is ironic considering that a
portion of ancient Iraq, then known as Babylon, was the scene of perhaps
the greatest and most famous demonstration of the power of crossexamination to uncover truth.43 The story of this trial is set forth in the
Biblical book of Daniel, in which Daniel thwarts the evil machinations of
two judges who sought to seduce the virtuous Susanna, who rebuffed their
advances.432 As a result, the judges accused her of fornication, and claimed
that they had spied Susanna in the throes of passion with her lover.433
Daniel defeated this false accusation through the art of crossexamination. He separated the two judges and then questioned each one.
They tripped over their own lies when one testified that he saw Susanna
being ravished by her lover under a mastic tree while his partner in perjury
swore it was under an oak tree.434 Justice triumphed over evil when, after
Daniel showed both of the judges to be liars, the community sentenced the
malevolent pair to the death they would have inflicted on the God-fearing

430. Generally speaking, civil-law lawyers are not considered to be adept at cross-examination
as they rarely employ this tool. See MERRYMAN, supra note 133, at 115 ("The familiar pattern of

immediate, oral, rapid examination and cross-examination of witnesses in a common law trial is
not present in the civil law proceeding.").
431. For a briefdiscussion of Babylon and Babylonian civilization, see generally WIL.IAM C.

MOREY, ANCIENT PEOPLES (1914).
432. See Daniel 13:1-64 (New American Bible).
433. Id.
434. Id.
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Susanna.435 As Daniel observed after eliciting the contradiction from one
3
of the evil judges: "Your fine lie has cost you your head."'"
As Daniel demonstrated, there frequently is no better instrument than
cross-examination for the task of uncovering lies and getting at the heart
of the truth, especially when multiple witnesses testify untruthfully about
the same event.437 The U.S. Supreme Court, quoting Professor Wigmore,
called cross-examination "'the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth. "43 s In the words of one author: "no substitute has ever
been found for cross-examination as a means of separating truth from
falsehood, and of reducing exaggerated statements to their true
dimensions. "4'9 Not surprisingly, then, many practitioners believe that
cross-examination is "the most devastating weapon in the trial lawyer's
arsenal... ,,"0because sooner or later most liars get caught in a trap their
own lies have created. In the words of one trial attorney: "A thousand facts

435. This is consistent with the law set forth in the Book of Deuteronomy, and Iraqi law. The
Book of Deuteronomy states:
If a lying witness stands against a man, accusing him of transgression, Both of
them, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord in the sight
of the priests and the judges that shall be in those days. And when after most
diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his
brother: They shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother, and thou shalt
take away the evil out of the midst of thee: That others hearing of this may fear,
and may not dare to do such things.
Deuteronomy 19:16-20 (Douay-Rheims Bible). Similarly, the Sharia-influenced Iraqi Penal Code
states:
Any person who falsely testifies for or against the accused is punishable by
detention plus a fine or by one of those penalties.
If the accused is subsequently convicted as a result of that testimony, such
person is punishable by the penalty for the offense for which the accused was
convicted.
IRAQI PENAL CODE § 3, 252 (1969), at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Home
pages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nst0/d616b3e179d620285256d0a006391 flOpenDocument.
436. Daniel 13:55 (New American Bible).
437. "[C]ross examination isa tool used to flesh out the truth...." Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 77 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
438. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367).
439. FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 7 (4th ed. 1936).
440. BAILEY, supranote 15 1, at 18. Although "[c]ross-examination rarely succeeds in getting
the witness to admit that he lied," a demonstration of a witness's deceit is often sufficiently
worthwhile in itself, regardless of whether a witness actually confesses his mendacity. ALAN M.
DERSHOWlTZ, THE BEST DEFENSE

402 (1982).
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spring up to bedevil the lie; I never am so certain of success as when a
witness has deliberately fabricated evidence. For, if I am prepared and
persistent, such a witness cannot survive,""' as the book of Daniel
eloquently demonstrates." 2
But in present-day Babylon, it is now the evil judges' turn to have their
revenge, as they thwart the cross-examination-and justice-that led to
their demise at the hands of Daniel. Recall that American prosecutors have
no standing before the CCCI and so must rely on the Iraqi prosecutor and
judges to elicit relevant testimony from witnesses. Because most Iraqi
defendants testify in their own defense, and many construct grand
confabulations to mislead the court, it is relatively easy to ensnare them in
the web of lies they spin.
Many Iraqi jihadists are not particularly sophisticated and are
unaccustomed to thinking for themselves and on their feet. So even a
mediocre cross-examiner should have been able to uncover a defendant's
lies. But catching terrorists in their prevarications requires a little
preparation and some tenacity in conducting a cross-examination. Sadly
neither the Iraqi prosecutor nor the judges showed any inclination to
tenaciously cross-examine defendants, and many a dissembling terrorist
escaped with his criminal secrets unrevealed.
For example, several defense witnesses testified in one case that they
saw the defendant at his home or in his neighborhood about the time an
American military base was attacked. They swore that the United States
apprehended the defendant at his house later that night, even though the
defendant was captured outside the perimeter of the military base
immediately following the attack. In addition, the defendant was captured
with his AK-47 that was hot to the touch and spent AK-47 rounds, and he

441. Louis NIZER, My LIFE INCOURT 327 (1961); but see Richard Underwood, The Limits of
Cross Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113 (1997) (taking a less enthusiastic view of the
power of cross-examination).
442. Perhaps these sentiments, and the Daniel story, are manifestations of Aristotle's belief
that "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their
opposites .... ." Aristotle, Rhetoric (W. Rhys Roberts trans.) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE: THE REviSED OXFORD TRANSLATION 2154; 1355a (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984); but see
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 334 (1996) ("The economic marketplace penalizes bad decisions. The intellectual and
cultural 'marketplace'-in which the ideas of politics, the humanities, and most of the social
sciences, and popular entertainment are offered-imposes few or no penalties for being wrong,
even egregiously wrong. In fact, patently foolish ideas are likely to be regarded as daring."). Thus
the truth may not always prevail over fisity. See GEORGE F. WILL, Commencement Address at
Duke University, in THE LEVELING WIND: POLITICS, THE CULTURE AND OTHER NEWS 132 (1994)
("Truths increase arithmetically;, but errors increase exponentially.").
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was found in a vehicle perforated with bullet holes from U.S. soldiers
defending the perimeter of the base. It should have been easy to
demonstrate that the defendant's alibi witnesses were lying, especially
since they were the defendant's own family members and thus they had
added incentive to lie. But the Iraqi prosecutor and judges made no attempt
to obtain the truth from these witnesses. They never tested their grand story
for weaknesses or even minor contradictions, which should have been easy
to elicit considering the number of witnesses.
This reluctance to cross-examine defendants and defense witnesses may
stem from a lack of experience with the technique, since under Saddam
Hussein torture was regularly used to coerce confessions from
defendants. 3 So attorneys and judges had little need to develop their
cross-examination skills or other investigative techniques.' Similarly,
that the art of cross-examination is foreign to many civil-law
proceedings," 5 so this reluctance to cross-examine defendants and their
witnesses may be attributable to the CCCI's civil-law heritage.'4 More

443. Ambassador Bremer struck the provision in the Iraqi Penal Code authorizing torture as
a punishment. See CPA Order No. 7, supra note 3, § 3, 12; see Luhnow, supra note 35, at A14
("American officials have already amended the country's criminal code. The changes: a ban on
confessions obtained through torture..... ").
But old habits are hard to break, and apparently many Iraqi police officers would rather break
bones than the habit of relying on torture to elicit confessions. See CountryReport,supra note 119
(noting that "torture and ill treatment of detainees is reportedly 'commonplace"'); see Jefflrey
Fleishman & Asmaa Waguih, IraqiSecurity Tactics Evoke the Hussein Era,L.A. TIMEs, June 19,
2005, at 1 (noting that Iraqi police units are using torture "tactics reminiscent of Saddam Hussein's
secret intelligence squads"); see Bradley Graham, Army WarnsIraqiForcesonAbuseofDetainees,
WASH. POST, May 20, 2005, at Al ("Before leaving Iraq in February, the 1st Cavalry Division
compiled a list ofrmore than 100 allegations of abusive treatment of detainees over the previous six
months-not by U.S. troops, but by Iraqi soldiers and police."); see Jill Carroll, Old Brutality
Among New Iraqi Forces, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
6928105 ("[Iraq's] nascent justice system that has an erratic record of prosecuting insurgents, has
spawned a return of Hussein-era tactics among many of the country's security forces."); see Aldin
& Anderson, supranote 380, at 18 (discussing the continuing use of torture by Iraqi police forces
and security services); Struck, supranote 91, at AlO ("Iraqi police, jailers and intelligence agents,
many of them holding the same jobs they had under Hussein are'committing systematic torture and
other abuses' of detainees....").
444. The ability to cross-examine witnesses in an effective manner is not an innate skill.
Rather, it requires development through practice. John W. Davis,Foreword,in THE ART OF CROSSEXAMINATION, supranote 439, atxiii ("Undoubtedly cross-examination is among the most difficult
of all the arts of the advocate. It is also one of the most valuable.").
445. MERRYMAN,supra note 133, at 115.
446. Id.at 130 ("Tlhere is no developed system of cross-examination comparable to ours,
although the prosecutor may suggest questions to be put to the defendant by the judges.").
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likely, thejudges' disinterest in cross-examination also stems from Islamic
law, which frowns upon and may even "forbid" cross-examination." 7
"All trials before Mahommedan tribunals are short. Neither crossquestioning nor perplexing suggestions by counsel ever occur. Nothing
impedes a direct march to the point, when two witnesses are present to
establish a fact." 8 Under Islamic law, then, "witnesses are not subject to
cross-examination on the facts." 9 To the extent the CCCI judges are
influenced by Islam, they might consider cross-examination unworthy of
their time.45° There is also the possibility that the judges and prosecutors
were not inclined to uncover the truth. This is a plausible theory when one
considers that the CCCI prosecutor and judges did attempt crossexamination a few times, but only when the witnesses were American
soldiers. As discussed below, the CCCI prosecutor only attempted crossexamination of American witnesses, although he usually left defense
witnesses untouched.
Whatever its etiology, the CCCI's lack of skilled cross-examination
greatly reduces the value of conducting investigations or trials in that court.
Before entrusting terrorism cases to them, the United States should have
ensured that Iraqi prosecutors and judges had been tutored in the art of
cross-examination, perhaps by watching experienced American
prosecutors in an American-run court pick apart the terrorists' yarns and
those of their witnesses.45 Beyond its immediate pedagogical value for
effective trial advocacy, this approach could have demonstrated to Iraqis
that there is an effective alternative to torturing defendants until they
confess. They could have learned that a sound cross-examination is
superior, both intellectually and morally, to a coerced confession, since
cross-examination elicits the truth from the recesses of the defendant's
own guilty mind, rather than his body's aversion to pain.
F. Hostile IraqiProsecutorsCross-ExaminingAmerican Witnesses

Although the Iraqi prosecutor was reluctant to cross-examine Iraqi
terrorists and defense witnesses, he showed no hesitation in crossexamining American prosecution witnesses. These witnesses were nearly

447. Oriental Laws and Lawyers, supra note 126, at 21.

448. Id.
449. LiPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 70.
450. Id.

451. A substantial number of American civilian and military attorneys volunteered to come
to Iraq to instruct judges in modern jurisprudential techniques. Obviously it is difficult to instill

proficiency in such a short period of time, and the art of cross-examination was foreign to most of
the Iraqi judges. Judicial reformation is a long-term project.
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always U.S. soldiers or Marines, and the matters addressed on crossexamination were extraneous issues that were of no consequence to the
case, but which might demonstrate an imperfect memory.
On one occasion, the Iraqi prosecutor asked a succession of U.S.
soldiers the exact time that they encountered a defendant who had fired
upon them with his AK-47. Of course, the standard operating procedure for
U.S. soldiers is to return fire when fired upon; the standard procedure is
not to look at a clock and note the exact time. It is not surprising that when
answering the prosecutor's question, each soldier offered a slightly
different time, although all of their responses were times proximate to
5:00 p.m. Nevertheless, the prosecutor vigorously argued for acquittal
based on these "contradictions." It made no difference to the Iraqi
prosecutor that each of the witnesses testified correctly about the substance
of the attack, nor that the soldiers had recovered the weapon used by the
defendant. His hostility towards the United States was as obvious as his
efforts to derail the prosecution of the terrorists.
In another case, the same prosecutor cross-examined three American
witnesses about the date the defendant attacked them. Two of the witnesses
gave the correct date, but one could not remember the exact date; he was
mistaken by a difference of two or three days. The prosecutor used this
memory lapse to argue that the attack never occurred and that the whole
case had been fabricated by the United States. Whether this approach
proved successful is unclear because the CCCI frequently acquitted
defendants, including this defendant, for any number of reasons.
Under Iraqi law, prosecutors are called upon to independently evaluate
cases in an effort to determine whether witnesses, including prosecution
witnesses, are telling the truth. But the approach used by the CCCI
prosecutors is not a manifestation of a zealous loyalty to this duty. Rather,
it is an obvious attempt to assist the insurgency and publicly disgrace the
United States. The conduct of these prosecutors profoundly demonstrates
why Iraqis should never have been empowered to adjudicate cases against
Iraqi terrorists who attacked American forces. Time and again they have
demonstrated that their loyalties are firmly tied to the terrorists, and not to
impartial justice.
G. Minimizing Attempted Murder

Yet another anomaly arose in the CCCI's treatment of attempted
murder cases, the primary type of prosecution initiated by the United States
in the CCCI. Under Iraqi law, attempted murder is a crime carrying a
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mandatory sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment." 2 Fifteen years is a
respectable sentence, although it is arguable that this punishment is
insufficient considering the harm that could have resulted had the attempt
succeeded, the paramount need to deter this type of conduct particularly
during a military occupation, and the fact that U.S. soldiers could lawfully
have killed any terrorists caught in the act of attempting to murder U.S.
troops instead of capturing them and submitting their cases to the CCCI.
The fundamental problem faced in prosecuting attempted murder cases
in the CCCI is that, under Iraqi law as construed by the CCCI judges, the
crime of attempted murder is only committed when the victim is seriously
wounded and comes within a breath of dying. Or so the Iraqi judges held
in acquitting numerous terrorists who had attempted to murder American
soldiers and Marines.4 3 Without a serious wounding of the American
victim, the Iraqi judges refused to convict insurgents of attempted murder
and instead convicted them of reckless use of firearm or assault.l'
Ironically, at the same time they imposed this rule, the CCCI judges
imposed a rule that required the victim to testify at trial before they would
convict a defendant of attempted murder. This places an attempted murder

452. Under the Iraqi Penal Code, attempts are punishable by fifteen years imprisonment if the
underlying offense is punishable by life imprisonment. IRAQI PENAL CODE 31 (1969), at http://
www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/O/
d616b3e179d620285256d0a006391fl?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 12,2004). Murder is an
offense punishable by life imprisonment. Id. 405. Therefore attempted murder is theoretically
punishable by up to fifteen years of imprisonment. But the CCCI never handed down a fifteen-year
sentence for attempted murder.
453. Compare the less stringent proximity of harm requirement of attempted rape in Egyptian
law, which is similarly based on French and Islamic law, and influenced Iraqi criminal law. Safia
K. Mohsen, Women and CriminalJustice in Egypt, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra
note 105, at 21:
[Tihe law makes it possible for the woman to bring charges of attempted rape in
cases in which the sexual assault was interrupted for one reason or another. Thus
a man who pulled a woman by the arm and started to reach for her undergarments,
fleeing when the woman screamed for help, was convicted of attempted rape.
According to the logic of the Iraqi judges, these actions would not constitute attempted rape, but
rather simple assault, since penetration was not imminent, and indeed the man may have intended
only to steal the victim's undergarments. Despite the absurdity of this idea, if the victim were an
American woman, it is quite likely the Iraqi judges would adopt this nonsensical reasoning. If the
victim were an Iraqi woman, however, one could reasonably expect them to agree with the
Egyptian court.
454. In one attempted murder case involving a defendant who used a rifle to shoot at a U.S.
soldier, one of the CCCI trial judges told the soldier that the defendant obviously was not
attempting to murder him, since the defendant missed.
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victim in a difficult position: the victim must be near death (for there could
be no attempted murder when he was not so harmed) but must also testify
before the investigative judge and the trial court (which he is unlikely to
be able to do if he is near death or seriously wounded). It is nearly
impossible to meet this burden, at least in the short term, and thus a
defendant will be acquitted or his trial will be substantially delayed while
the victim recuperates. This takes formalistic adherence to evidentiary
rules to a new depth of absurdity.
The ostensible rationale for the Iraqi rule of attempted murder is
twofold. First, only severe injuries adequately demonstrate a defendant's
intent to kill the victim, an essential element to a conviction for attempted
murder. That is the judges claim that they cannot infer homicidal intent
merely from potentially homicidal acts, consistent with their reluctance to
rely on circumstantial evidence.455 Unless the victim is seriously injured,
it cannot be said with certainty that the defendant was truly attempting to
murder him, or so the asserted Iraqi reasoning goes.
The second rationale is that only serious injury warrants a punishment
for a defendant. Under the lex talionis "eye for an eye" calculus that is the
backbone of Islamic criminal law, the court cannot extract the defendant's
eye (or take away his freedom) absent a showing that the defendant
plucked the victim's eye or otherwise inflicted serious harm. According to
the Iraqi judges' view, absent a serious wounding, a terrorist inflicted no
palpable harm by merely attempting to murder American soldiers, and thus
there was insufficient harm to warrant a long stretch in prison. A contrary
rule, in their estimation, would punish defendants merely for harboring an
evil intent, as opposed to crimes they had actually committed.
Of course, the foolishness of this rule and the asserted rationales
becomes readily apparent after considering a few simple hypotheticals.
Take, for instance, a terrorist who grabs a pistol and shoots one thousand
rounds at a victim from a distance of six feet, but who is also a particularly
bad shot and thus is only able to nick his victim a couple of times or misses
him entirely. As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed: "I do not suppose that
firing a pistol at a man with intent to kill him is any the less an attempt to
murder because the bullet misses its aim."456 Certainly the victim is no less

455. Ofcourse, serious wounding does not necessarily indicate homicidal intent (the defendant
could accidentally injure or kill someone, and thus lack the requisite intent for murder or attempted
murder), and is merely circumstantial evidence of the defendant's purpose. So in the end, the CCCI
judges must rely on circumstantial evidence to determine intent regardless of the quality of the
wounding or the absence of an injury, and their distinction as to the seriousness of a wounding is
nonsense.

456. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 69 (Dover Publ'ns 1991) (188 1).
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psychologically traumatized by these near misses, and he very nearly
became a murder victim. Furthermore, under Christian ethical standards,
the defendant is guilty of murder for the evil intent in his mind.457 Yet under Iraqi law, as construed by the CCCI, this defendant cannot be
convicted of attempted murder. Similarly, if a defendant detonated one
thousand car bombs which failed to seriously harm anyone, he also could
not be convicted of attempted murder, even though he clearly and
repeatedly intended to murder, he committed the actus reus of murder
numerous times, and indeed satisfied every element of murder except the
production of a cadaver.45
Unfortunately, the CCCI rule exists in the real world and not just the
realm of the hypothetical. Take, for example, the case of a defendant
named Walid Saleby Al-Kaledi. He fired on U.S. troops with an AK-47 as
they were patrolling the area near Abu Ghraib market, a Sunni stronghold
and a particularly dangerous area for American troops. The defendant was
aiming at the gunner of one of the HMMWVs, 41 a Sergeant from the First
Cavalry Division, who was sitting in the gun turret and thus was directly
exposed to hostile fire. The Sergeant testified at trial that he heard the
bullets whizzing past his head and impacting around him. He also looked
directly at the defendant's face and saw that he was intentionally aiming
his weapon at the Sergeant.
Demonstrating great restraint, the Sergeant elected not to return fire
because, in his words, there were Iraqi children around and he feared
hitting one of them. The Sergeant's testimony was corroborated by three
other U.S. soldiers, and the defendant himself admitted that he was
shooting the AK-47, but used a standard Iraqi defense that he was at a
wedding and the shooting was celebratory fire not aimed at the American
soldiers.'
The Iraqi prosecutor, Abd Al-Wattab Salman, and the panel of trial
judges openly exhibited hostility to the American witnesses and attempted

457. This consistent with the legal maxim: Voluntas in delictis non exitus spectator.-In

crime, the will, and not the result, is looked to.
458. Again, although the Iraqi courts are ostensibly secular, Iraqi law and its judicial system

are steeped in the Islamic tradition and Islamic principles seep into the law every day. Thus, the
CCCI's deficient application of the law of attempt may stem from a reliance on Islamic law, which
has not developed law regarding attempt. See SCACHT,supranote 334, at 187 (discussing that in
Islamic law "any theory of attempt, or complicity, of concurrence is lacking").
459. "HMMWV" stands for High-Mobility Multi-purposed Wheeled Vehicle, also known as
a "Humvee" or "Hummer." See Carol J. Williams, Soldiers Get Extra Layer of Defense, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A4.
460. Defendants frequently claimed that they had fired their weapons in celebration of a
wedding, and U.S. soldiers just happened to have stepped into their line of fire.
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to create inconsistencies between the statements the witnesses had made
before the investigative judge and their trial testimony. For example, they
questioned one witnesses about his failure to mention at the investigative
hearing that the barrel of the defendant's rifle was hot to the touch." 1 But
this fact was not particularly relevant at the investigative hearing insofar
as the defendant himself admitted that he had fired the weapon, and the
defendant did not contest this point at either the investigative hearing or
the trial.
Instead of bringing this admission to the court's attention, and thus the
irrelevance of whether the witness truly detected a hot barrel on the
defendant's rifle, the Iraqi prosecutor intimated that the American officer
was lying. 2 Although in written submissions to the CCCI, the American
prosecutor had argued that the defendant was guilty of attempted murder,
the Iraqi prosecutor argued at trial that there was no evidence that the
defendant intended to kill the Sergeant or his fellow soldiers. Taking dead
aim at someone and firing a deadly weapon-a fully automatic rifle used
by military forces throughout the world-is not indicative of intent to kill,
at least to CCCI judges." 3 Of course, this "rule" may be a mere pretext for
more corrupt influences. It is worth noting that in this case, the Iraqi
prosecutor argued more forcefully for acquittal than the defense attorney
did. Perhaps the defense attorney already knew the outcome of the case, as
one of the judges, Ali Hussan Al-Shameri apparently was from the same
tribe as the defendant, and tribal affinities are strong in Iraq. 4 " In the end,
461. A better question might be why at the investigative hearing the Iraqi investigative judge
never asked the witness whether the barrel was hot.
462. Sharia law, which has influenced Iraqi law, abhors inconsistencies, even irrelevant ones.
See LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 70 ("[Under Sharia] only small inconsistencies are
permitted in proceeding to conviction.").
463. Time and again the Iraqi prosecutors and judges exhibited a reluctance to draw even
simple inferences. Without direct testimony supporting an idea, it apparently was forever denied
access to the judges' brains. Yet even under Islamic law judges will ascertain intent in murder cases
by looking at the type of weapon used. "In Islamic law, intent is discerned from the manner in
which the crime is committed, in particular the type of weapon used. The assumption is that an
individual intending to kill will use a weapon with lethal capabilities. Relying on this type of
visible, objective evidence avoids the necessity of determining what was in the mind ofthe offender
at the time." LIwPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 50.
464. SabrinaTavernise & Qais Mizher, In Iraq"s Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Trail
Links, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2006, Al ("'The Tribe in Iraq is the basic building block of
society...."'); Susan Sachs, The Sheik Takes Over, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, at A14 ("Today
there are an estimated 100 major tribes, 25 tribal confederations and several hundred cohesive clans
in Iraq, and experts estimate that perhaps 40 percent of Iraqis still feel a close affinity to their
tribes."); Scheherezade Faramarzi, Reward for Hussein Not Tempting to Many in Mosul,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 2003, at 29 (noting the strong tribal ties among Sunnis in
Iraq); Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48 (noting the pressure judges feel from tribal leaders to decide
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the court convicted the defendant of reckless discharge of a firearm and
sentenced him to 1.5 years of imprisonment," 5 a paltry sentence in light of
the harm he intended to inflict, tried to inflict, and almost accomplished.
Then there was the case of Faa'ez Mohaawish Zeidaan, who on July 5,
2003, attacked soldiers from the First Armor Division. The defendant was
driving his grey Mercedes after curfew, and when the soldiers attempted
to stop the car, he fired 15 rounds at them from an AK-47. Again, the Iraqi
judges convicted him of reckless discharge of a firearm and sentenced him
to ten months of imprisonment, which he had already served by the time
the trial commenced.' 6 The CCCI, therefore, obviously intended to put
Zaidaan back on the streets immediately, thereby enabling him to return to
his jihad.
A similar result was obtained in the case of Ali Abraham Akmeed. On
December 29, 2003, he fired an AK-47 at the gunner of a HMMWV. A
Humvee's gunner is frequently the target of terrorist attacks, as his upper
body is outside the HMMWV and thus exposed to bullets, shrapnel, and
explosive concussions. 17 They are unprotected from rapid ejections,
rollovers, and the head trauma that ensues, all of which have killed a
number of soldiers." 8 In short, the gunner is extremely vulnerable and
cases in accordance with tribal loyalty); Kenneth R. Timmerman, Iraqi Connection to Oklahoma
Bombing, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002, at 20 (noting that in Iraq, tribal "ties create bonds
of absolute loyalty").
465. Under sharia evidentiary law, it is common for Islamic courts to acquit a defendant of
a crime for which there is insufficient evidence and instead convict him of a lesser crime. See
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 73 ("In practice, the qadi may attempt to circumvent the
foregoing [evidentiary] rules. Should the evidence fail to establish a Hudud offense but the qadi
nonetheless believes that some crime was committed, he may impose a Ta'azir penalty, rather than
acquit.").
466. By contrast, recall that when Iraqis were polled about the appropriate sentence for Jeremy
Sivits, the least culpable of the Abu Ghraib soldiers, they said that he deserved to die simply for
snapping a picture of another soldier holding an Iraqi prisoner in a headlock and for failing to report
the abuse he had seen. See Abused Iraqi's Kin Seek Death Sentences, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, May
19, 2004, at A6 ("relatives of those still held at Abu Ghraib prison said Tuesday the only suitable
punishment would be death."). This sentence should also be compared to sentences handed down
in Germany after World War II, by U.S. military courts. For example, when a German teenager lied
to American military officials about his citizenship-hoping to escape the post-war hunger,
homelessness, and poverty plaguing Germany, he falsely claimed that he was an American-he was
sentenced to three years in prison, and could have been sentenced to death. NOBLEMAN, supra note
8, at 85.
467. See Juliet Macur, At War In Bomb Field, At Peace In FieldofDreams, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2005, at Al (discussing an attack on a convoy that injured Sergeant Dillon Ondo, who was
manning the gunner's turret of a Humvee).
468. For an account ofone hero's tragic demise, see Ann Scott Tyson, Horror Glimpsed From
the Inside ofa Humvee in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2005, at A 1,A 16 (describing Private Joseph
Knott, of the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment, who volunteered to serve as a gunner and who died

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/1

114

Frank: Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Crimin

TRYING TIMES: THE PROSECUTION OF TERROR5I'S IN IRAQ

presents an inviting target to insurgents."69 Fortunately Akmeed was not a
good shot, and the rounds missed the soldier's head, but just barely. The
convoy then pursued Akmeed, who surrendered when he saw that he was
cornered and outnumbered.
The American witnesses each testified to these facts at trial, that the
barrel of the Akmeed's rifle was hot to the touch, and that the odor of
gunpowder was prevalent, indicating that the weapon had recently been
fired. Although the defendant denied firing the AK-47, three other Iraqis
at the scene identified him as the shooter. Nevertheless, the CCCI
convicted him only of reckless discharge of a weapon, and sentenced him
to six months of imprisonment.'
Another problem with the CCCI's attempted murder policy is the lack
of guidance as to what type of injury is sufficiently severe to meet the
threshold for a charge of attempted murder. In one case, the CCCI judges
made clear that several slashes to a soldier's face, not far from his jugular
vein, were not sufficiently severe to constitute attempted murder. That case
involved a U.S. Army Specialist who was attacked while guarding a bank
in Karkh, Iraq. An insurgent by the name of Dhurghaam Eidaan Arabl AlKananni drew a knife and attacked the soldier, severely slashing his face.
Failing to kill the specialist with his knife, Al-Kananni grabbed for the
soldier's rifle, nearly pulling it away from him before two other U.S.
soldiers intervened and subdued the defendant.
At trial, evidence of the soldier's injuries, including photographs, were
admitted into evidence, along with testimony that he was hospitalized for
his injuries, and missed five days of duty. Typical of questions from the
bench, the presiding judge, Chief Judge Loqmaan Thaabit Abdur-Razaaq
of severe head trauma in 2005 when he was thrown from the turret of his Humvee); see also Hal
Bernton, Accident or Ambush?; Army Widow Pursuing Truth Finds Contradictions, SEATTLE

TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1 (discussing the death of Private First Class John Hart, who served as a
Humvee gunner in October 2003); see also Bob Herbert, The PainDeep Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2005, at A19 (recounting the death of a Humvee gunner who was trapped under the Humvee
after insurgents attacked with rocket-propelled grenades and caused the Humvee to roll).
469. Herbert, supra note 468, at A19.
470. Freeman, supra note 18, at 29 (noting that "[i]nsurgents convicted of serious weapons
and explosives offences in Iraq are escaping with jail terms of as little as six months ... in the
CCCI). Contrast this with post-World War II Germany, where a sentence of six months of
imprisonment might be given for crimes of omission when committed by elderly defendants, such
as when an eighty-five year old German failed to turn over an inoperable firearm to American
military authorities. NOBLEMAN, supranote 8, at 90. Six-month sentences were also handed out by
American judges for cases of simple assault where both the victim and perpetrator were Germans
and no U.S. soldier was targeted. Id. at 110. A defendant might have warranted a one-year sentence
for lying about membership in the secret police. Id. at 116. Obviously the American militaryjudges
in Germany took to heart their mission of ensuring law and order in occupied Germany.
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As-Samraa'i, asked the American witnesses a series of questions

suggesting that the Specialist had injured himself on security wire, as
opposed to having suffered his injuries during the attack by the defendant.

Of course, there was no evidence in the record to support this theory, but
that was no impediment to creative judicial minds seeking grounds for
acquittal. The witnesses unequivocally repeated that Judge Loqmaan's pet
theory had no basis in fact.
The defendant himself claimed that the soldiers jumped him for no
apparent reason, and he only drew his knife in self defense. In cryptic
comments the judges chalked the attack up to the defendant's youth-he
was twenty years old at the time-and convicted him of battery, sentencing
him to a paltry 1.25 years of imprisonment. Afterwards, in an informal

conversation with the American prosecutor, Judge Loqmaan said that the
injuries were not sufficiently serious to sustain a charge of attempted
murder. Unfortunately, there are too many other similar cases to discuss all
" ' Suffice it to say that rulings such as these only encourage
of them.47
attacks on American forces,4 72 and they follow no discernable rationale

471. For example, there was also the case of Al-adli Thar Mohammed, who was tried by the
CCCI panel of Lakman Thabit Adb Al Razek; Adnan Muhammed Hadi; and Quhtan Al Garrari.
On February 5, 2004, the defendant ran outside of his house and yelled at some U.S. soldiers
passing by. He then opened fired on them with an AK-47 rifle. The soldiers identified themselves,
but the defendant continued to fire at them. The soldiers used their vehicle to ram the gate
surrounding the defendant's yard; still, the defendant continued shooting at them, and stopped only
when he ran out of ammunition. He fled to another part of his house where he kept a stash of
bullets.
U.S. soldiers apprehended Mohammed as he was attempting to reload his rifle; he resisted them
until he was handcuffed. At trial, the defendant argued, somewhat inconsistently, that he did not
know that he was firing at soldiers and instead thought he was firing at someone else; he did not
shoot in the direction of the soldiers, but was firing his weapon into the air; and he is married and
has four children who are dependent upon him for financial support, and thus the judges should be
merciful. They were. The CCCI convicted him of unlawful possession of a weapon and sentenced
him to two years of imprisonment.
472. Even if they are convicted, insurgents are sometimes released and thus become free to
join the battle again. This happened in at least one case and probably many more. Some of the
terrorists were handed over to the Iraqi government, which promptly released many of the terrorists.
See Hanson, supra note 163, at C25 ("It turns out that the terrorist had been captured earlier in
December 2004, on suspicion of being involved in a deadly suicide attack on an American base.
Then he was turned over to the Iraqis, sent to the notorious Abu Ghraib jail and released. Once free,
he returned to his job of killing Americans.. . ."). To thwart such schemes, the United States had
until recently maintained custody of most of these insurgents even after their CCCI sentences have
expired, much to the consternation of the Iraqi judiciary and insurgency.
Despite these objections from the Iraqi judiciary, retention of Iraqi terrorists even after they
served their paltry CCCI sentences is lawful because it is designed to keep insurgents from reentering the fray. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("The purpose
of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss1/1

116

Frank: Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Crimin

TRYING TIMES. THE PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST IN IRAQ

other than a desire to minimize sentences and protect terrorists by
convicting them of lesser charges.
At best, these acquittals of attempted murder may be the result of a
belief that because the victims (narrowly) escaped injury, no harm was
done. But, this ignores the obvious: even unsuccessful attempts to murder
cause substantial injury, both to the individual who escapes death and the
American efforts to rebuild Iraq. For this reason, English courts convicted
criminals for their attempted crimes since the 1600s, a practice first
adopted by the Star Chamber,473 but which by the 1700s was also adopted
by the common-law courts.474 Iraqi judges, however, apparently have not
progressed that far.

Furthermore, in these attacks, the defendants demonstrate their
willingness to kill U.S. soldiers, and thus must be punished for the actions
they took to steal the lives of U.S. soldiers,475 just as apprehended thieves

arms once again."). The U.S. government is in a difficult position with regards to detention of
Iraqis. Ifthe Iraqis take custody, many insurgents will be released, but the insurgents will not have
recourse to American courts via habeas corpus actions. If the Americans retain custody, the
insurgents will be kept off the battlefield, but they may have recourse to American courts through
habeas corpus actions, thereby further encumbering an already overburdened American miliatry.
See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686,2696,2707 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("From this point
forward, federal courts will entertain petitions from these prisoners, and others like them around
the world, challenging actions and events far away, and forcing the courts to oversee one aspect of
the Executive's conduct of a foreign war."). At best, the insurgents could argue that they qualify
as prisoners of war. Under Article 118 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135, to ensure that the Iraqi
terrorists do not take up arms again, the United States can maintain custody of them at least until
the cessation of active hostilities, which obviously has not yet occurred in Iraq. But the insurgents,
because they fail to meet the four criteria of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, are not prisoners of war and would not be protected by Article 118.
Instead, the United States is simply required to act reasonably with respect to detaining them.
473. Francis Bowes Sayre, CriminalAttempts, 41 HARv. L. REv. 821, 828 (1928).
474. According to Sayre:
That those should not be allowed to go free who attempt to commit some crime
but fail, is a feeling deep rooted and universal. But the present generalized
doctrine that attempts to commit crimes are as such and in themselves criminal is
of comparatively late origin. Nothing of such a doctrine is to be found in the
treatises on criminal law prior to the nineteenth century, in spite of the fact that
records of cases going back to early times show occasional convictions where the
defendant failed to complete the crime attempted.
Id.at 821.
475. Fritzgerald writes:
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are punished even when they did not permanently deprive owners tof
their
46
property because their arrest resulted in the recovery of the goods
Larceny protects owners against permanent deprivation of their
property, but the law does not wait for this to happen; it steps in to
penalize the mere taking of property with such intent. Arson
protects owners against the destruction of their property by fire, but
once again the law does not wait till this result is achieved; it
intervenes to prohibit the mere act of setting fire to the property.477
This is done, not only for retributive purposes, but also to prevent the
defendant from acting on his criminal intent in the future (specific
deterrence), and to deter others from committing similar acts by
demonstrating that even failed attempts to steal, burn, or kill will entail
substantial penalties (general deterrence).47 s
[Tihe existence of a penalty for attempts affords an extra hazard to the would-be
criminal. The main deterrent is, of course, the penalty for the complete offence,
since most criminals aim to succeed, but the penalty for the attempt provides an
extra deterrent. Not only will he be punished if he succeeds, but also in the event
of failure.

P.J. FITZGERALD,

CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT

98 (1962).

476. Id. at 98.
477. Id.
478. Terrorists learn from the law, the way it is enforced or ignored, and legal decisions. They
shape their conduct accordingly. When the United States implemented a rule precluding troops
from holding Iraqi prisoners for more than three days unless they made incriminating statements,
a note on a prison wall instructed prisoners not to say anything and that if they remained silent, the
Americans would be forced to release them in three days. The Prisoners' Code, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Jan. 10, 2005, at 8. ("Sources say the prisoners know of the new rules. Arabic script
on the walls ofAbu Ghraib counsel the detainees to stay mum for the three days, and then they will
be set free. Out of fiustration, some units are detaining fewer suspects ....).
Similarly when the Pentagon denied interrogators the use of investigative techniques commonly
used bypolice forces throughout the United States, the insurgents knew and responded accordingly.
See Heather MacDonald, How to Interrogate Terrorists,CITY J., Winter 2005, http://www.cityjournal.org/html/l5_1_terrorists.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) ("The Iraqis already know the
game. They know how to play us,' a marine chief warrant officer told the Wall Street Journal ...
We can't even use basic police interrogation tactics."'); see also Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 9, at
1 ("The more clever insurgents [in Iraq] are learning the system and taking advantage of it."); see
also Editorial, The Pentagon and 'Lawfare,'WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at 20 ("U.S. officials
know al Qaeda briefs its cadres on U.S. law.... ."). So, reports of stiffer sentences rapidly would
have been disseminated among the Iraqi prisoners, and soon thereafter among the Iraqi populace,
including insurgents still at large, thereby deterring future attacks. Ifplea bargaining were possible,
stiffer sentences would also encourage captured terrorists to cooperate and inform on their coconspirators in exchange for lenience.
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The practices of the Iraqi criminal justice system with respect to
attempted crimes hardly comport with the notions of harm, prevention, deterrence, and criminal intent prevalent in modem criminal law. 479 At worst,
however, these decisions exhibit a bias by the trial judges against
Americans and in favor of the insurgency dominated by their fellow
Iraqis.48° So far, only one Iraqi judge has publicly admitted that his goal is
to acquit as many Iraqi terrorists who attack Americans as he can, but there
are bound to be more judges like him."
Perhaps he and his colleagues are motivated by an adherence to a brand
of Islam that rejects punishing Moslems for inflicting harm on "infidels"

479. Attempted crimes are punished-because it is a safe bet that an initially-unsuccessful
criminal will continue attempting his crime of choice until he succeeds, unless he is made to pay
the price for his unsuccessful attempts. Forcing terrorists and their accomplices to bear a burden
for their murders and attempted murders deters future attacks. One American military officer in Iraq
understands this concept. He has begun destroying all Iraqi "structures" near the location of lED
attacks, which hopefully will ensure that the "local community is inconvenienced" and thus
"perhaps they will put pressure on the insurgents to stop" their attacks. Pamela Hess, Officer
Commands Respect FromLocals,WASH.TIMEs, Sept. 26,2005, at A13. This is a small step toward
exacting a greater price from insurgents, thereby increasing the cost of their "business" and the
destruction they can produce. Judge Posner discusses the economic rationale behind prosecuting
criminal attempts, including the possibility that if attempts were not prosecuted, the criminal who
did not initially succeed would simply try again:
Consider now the punishment of attempts. A man enters a bank, intending to rob
it, but a guard spots him and seizes him before he can do any harm. The fact that
he came so close to robbing it indicates that he is quite likely to try again unless
restrained, so putting him in prison we can probably prevent some robberies. Also,
making the attempt punishable increases the expected costs of bank robbery to the
robber without making the punishment for bank robbery more severe ....He
cannot be certain that his attempt will succeed, and if it fails he will not merely
forgo the gains from a successful robbery but will incur additional (punishment)
costs. Punishing attempts is thus like maintaining a police force: It raises the
expected punishment cost for the completed crime without increasing the severity
of the punishment for that crime.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (6th ed. 2003).
480. Wong & Eckholm, supranote 46, at A12 CTere are also concerns that former Baathists
may be unwilling to stand too strongly against insurgents."). The Iraqi judges have had a habit of
basing their judicial decisions on their biases since long before the Americans arrived in Iraq. See
Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 48 ("Over the past thirty-five years, the Iraqi courts have been
characterized by bias and favoritism, with verdicts being routinely influenced by payoffs and tribal
affiliations.").
481. Rasan & Negus, supra note 21, at 8 ("One judge who refused to disclose his name said
he tried to let off lightly insurgents who had targeted Americans....").
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or non-Moslems.482 Whatever the underlying rationale, the CCCI's failure
to punish insurgents who attempt to murder Americans strongly militates
against the continued prosecution of such cases in this flawed court. It
would be better for the United States to admit that this course of action was
doomed to failure from the start, and begin trying these belligerents in
American military courts. As long as the CCCI continues to devalue
American lives, American prestige, influence, and any chance of success
in Iraq, will continue to decline.
H. Refusal To Convictfor the Crime of Conspiracy

One of the greatest difficulties faced by American and English
prosecutors at Nuremberg was the task of educating French and Soviet
attorneys about common-law concepts such as conspiracy and persuading
them to utilize this tool in the prosecution of the Nazis.483 The crime of
conspiracy is well-developed in Anglo-American law, but in 1945, this
doctrine was not widely utilized in Continental legal system . During the
discussion of conspiracy law, "the Russians and French seemed unable to
grasp all the implications of the concept; when they fmally did grasp it,
they were genuinely shocked."48" But the Anglo-American view ultimately
prevailed,486 and by using the theory of criminal liability inherent in

482. LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 50.
483. Count I of the Nuremberg Indictment of the major Nazi war criminals set forth a
conspiracy charge:
All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding
8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the
formation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which
involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and in accordance
with the provisions ofthe Charter, and individually responsible for their own acts
and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or
conspiracy.
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

(1947).
484. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG

TRIALS

29

36 (1992) ("The Anglo-

American concept of conspiracy was not part of European legal systems .... ."); BRADLEY F.
SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 52 (1981) ("[C]onspiracy is primarily an Anglo-American legal
conception with few parallels in continental and international law.").
485. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise,CommandResponsibility,andtheDevelopmentoflnternationalCriminalLaw,93 CAL.

L. REV. 75, 115 (2005).
486. Id.
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conspiracy law, the Nuremberg prosecutors were able to show the
criminality of those who participated in the Nazi conspiracy. 47 They did
this by ascribing responsibility for crimes to co-conspirators who, although
they were not always the most proximate cause of the evil acts committed,
facilitated these crimes in substantial ways or should have foreseen that
their co-conspirators would carry out such criminal acts in furtherance of
the Nazi conspiracy."
The common-law rationale for punishing co-conspirators is that
conspiracies, even those that fail, are more dangerous than crimes
committed by single actors.419 Multiple actors make it more likely that the
487. "Once the existence of a conspiracy is shown, slight evidence may be sufficient to
connect a defendant with it." LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF
WATERGATE 212 (1976). Importantly, the conspiracy "agreement need not be explicit; a tacit
agreement may support a conspiracy conviction." United States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th
Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1994)).
488. TAYLOR, supranote 484; at 630 ("In line with Jackson's conception of the prosecution's
case, these opening sections [of the Nuremberg indictment] were heavily laden with 'Nazi
conspirators' and the growth of a huge 'conspiracy.' The result was that "conspiracy pictured in
Count One completely dwarfed Count Two, crimes against peace .... ."). Not everyone approved
of this use of conspiracy law. Edmund M. Morgan, acting dean of the Harvard Law School and a
former lieutenant colonel in the judge advocate general's corps, wrote a paper commenting on the
idea of prosecuting the Nazis under a conspiracy theory:
"The conspiracy theory is too thin a veneer," Morgan declared, "to hide the real
purpose, namely the creation of a hereto unknown international offense by
individuals ex postfacto." Having uttered the Latin phrase most likely to cause
lawyer's knees to wobble, the acting dean advanced the view that it would be
better to abandon the whole conspiracy approach as "not only unwise but
unjustifiable."

SMITH, supranote 484, at 132-33.
489. United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 275 (2003) (internal quotations and
brackets omitted).
The conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the
commission of the relevant substantive crime-both because the combination in
crime makes more likely the commission of other crimes and because it decreases
the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of
criminality.
Id.; United States v. Shi, 317 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) ("Conspiracies are punished
separately from single-offender criminal acts, and often as severely even if the conspiracy fails to
achieve its aim, because a group having an illegal purpose is more dangerous than an individual
who has the same purpose."); United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.) ("One of the reasons for punishing conspiracy separately from the substantive offense
that the conspirators have agreed to commit is that a conspiracy makes detection harder by enabling
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criminal schemes will succeed, that the magnitude of the harm will be
greater than if a single defendant had acted independently, and detection
of the crimes and apprehension of the co-conspirators is more likely to be
thwarted by concerted activity!9° The consolidation of resources that cooperative criminal enterprises entail make such endeavors more dangerous
in each of these respects, and thus they warrant greater punishment, even
when they fail to achieve their objective.
Although ostensibly based on the French model, the Iraqi Penal Code
contains several provisions dealing with conspiracies and liability for
participation in conspiracies.49 ' Despite the presence of these conspiracy
provisions in the Penal Code, the CCCI judiciary clearly is not as
comfortable with the concept as are Anglo-American judges.4 92 But these
Iraqi statutory provisions permit the punishment of co-conspirators, even
a co-conspirator who merely "gives assistance to a conspirator or facilitates
the meeting of a group of conspirators or gives them shelter or helps them
in any way knowing the aim of the conspiracy....

members to be assigned different duties, including preventing detection.").
490. POSNER, supra note 479, at 230 ("The special treatment of conspiracies makes sense
because they are more dangerous than one-man crimes.").
491. The Iraqi Penal Code states:
A criminal conspiracy is considered to be an agreement between two or more
people to commit a felony or misdemeanor such as theft, fraud or forgery, whether
or not it is a specified offence or arises out of acts that are aided and abetted, even
though that agreement is in the initial planning stages or has been in existence
only for a short time.
IRAQI PENAL CODE 55 (1969), at http://www.jagcnet.army.rl/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/
AC/CLAMO-Public.nsfl0/d616b3e179d620285256d0a006391 flOpenDocument (last visited Aug.
12,2004).
492. A plurality of the Supreme Court recently held that "conspiracy" is not a crime under the
law of war. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780-81 (2006) (plurality opinion). Justice
Thomas's dissent, however, refutes this position. Id. at 2836 n. 14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (The law
of war and of the United States "has consistently recognized that conspiracy to violate the laws of
war is an offense triable by military commission."). Regardless, the plurality's view would not
prevent an American military occupation court from prosecuting Iraqi insurgents for conspiracy
because, under international law, an occupation government has the legislative power to create and
define crimes. MAINE, supra note 1, at 179. Also, conspiracy is already an offense under Iraqi
criminal law, and under principles of international law, an occupation government should retain as
much of the occupied country's criminal law as is possible. See Geneva Convention, supra note
110, art. 64 ("The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that
they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in cases where they constitute a threat
to security....").
493. Id. 58.
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Yet despite repeated promptings and pleas from American prosecutors,
the CCCI judges never charged a single defendant with conspiracy, either
for purposes of attributing responsibility to the co-conspirator or the
enhancement of sentences for their concerted activities. Thus, terrorists
fared the same in the CCCI whether acting in concert with others or acting
autonomously.4' The fact that a particular terrorist's crime would have
been impossible to commit without the assistance and support of a
conspiracy, and the fact that these terrorist conspiracies were tearing Iraq
apart, made no difference to the CCCI judges.
Part of the reason the Iraqis did not pursue criminal prosecution of
conspiracies, other than bias or the civil law's dislike of the concept of
conspiracy 4" could be that the conspirators appearing before the CCCI
generally failed to attain their objective: the death of American soldiers.
Thus, according to the judges' view of the law, these defendants merely
attempted crimes, but never actually committed a crime. ' According to
the Iraqi's logic, the conspirators had not inflicted harm on the U.S.
soldiers, even though many had missed their intended targets by a narrow
margin. As with attempt, under the Iraqi's "eye for an eye, tooth for a
tooth" system of justice,497 there was nothing to punish, since the victim
lost neither his eye, his tooth, nor his life.

494. This can easily be demonstrated by comparing cases in which there was a single actor
with those in which there were multiple co-conspirators. There are differences neither in the
CCCI's findings of liability nor in its sentencing, despite the dissimilarity of the two types of cases.
495. Islamic law apparently enhances the punishment for some concerted criminal activity,
suggesting that Islamic scholars perceived the increased danger that these cooperative criminal
enterprises entail. LIPPMAN ET AL, supranote 116, at 47 ("Banding together with intent to plunder
and murder is punishable by a discretionary penalty, usually imprisonment until the individual
repents.") (citing MUHAMMAD IQBAL SIDDIQUI, THE PENAL LAW OF ISLAM 141-43 (1979)). But
Islam does not recognize the law of conspiracy to the extent that it refuses to ascribe responsibility
for a co-conspirator's criminal actions to other members of the conspiracy. Nesheiwat, supranote
358, at 266 (Under Islamic law "a person cannot be held responsible for the acts of other people.
This principle is articulated in the Prophetic Sunnah and in the Quran with such verses as "'Each
soul is rewarded on its own account,' and 'No burdened soul can bear another's burden.'").
496. POSNER, supra note 479, at 230 (At common law, a "conspiracy that does not succeed
is still punished. It is a form of attempt.").
497. LwPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 23 ("Influenced by many elements, Islamic law
absorbed rules and codes from both the Old and New Testaments. The provision 'an eye for an eye'
was taken from the Bible, but it was mentioned even earlier in Hammurabi's code."). For the Old
Testament version of this principle, see Exodus 21:23-24 (Douay-Rheims Bible) ("But if her death
ensure thereupon, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot ... ."); Leviticus 24:19-20 (Douay-Rheims Bible); Deuteronomy 19:20-21 (Douay-Rheims
Bible). Cf Koran 5:48 ("Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and
wounds equal for equal.").
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I. Disdainfor MandatoryMinimum Sentences
If Iraqi judges lacked an affinity for their conspiracy statute, they
absolutely loathed mandatory minimum sentences.49 In the United States,
Congress has extensively utilized minimum sentences for various
crimes, 4' thereby making it mandatory for courts to impose the prescribed
sentences on persons convicted of committing the particular crime.
American judges balk at them, claiming that mandatory minimums invade
their inherent discretion in sentencing matters, but when push comes to
shove, American judges impose them as required by law. 5°° Not so in Iraq.
In Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer increased the maximum penalties
for a host of crimes that were undermining the security and stability of
Iraq,5'0 including kidnapping, rape, and the destruction of infrastructure. 2
He also initiated a mandatory minimum punishment for possession or use
of "special category weapons."5 3 Indeed, Coalition Provisional Order
Number 3, Weapons Control, requiredCCCI judges to sentence defendants to a mandatory minimum thirty years if they were found to have
possessed, transported, distributed, sold, or used "special category
weapons."'
The Order defined these as "explosives, improvised
explosives or incendiary devices, grenades, rockets, shells or mines and
any means of discharging such items, crew-served weapons of any kind,

498. Islamic law varies in the amount of discretion judges enjoy in meting out punishments
to wrongdoers. LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 87 ("There is little or no discretion in the
infliction of Hudud and Quesas punishments, which are prescribed by the Koran and the Sunna.
The Shari 'agives the qadiconsiderable discretion in the infliction of Ta 'azirpunishments, which
range in gravity from a warning to death.").
499. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(l) (establishing a five-year minimum sentence for receiving or
distributing child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (requiring a minimum sentence of five years
of imprisonment for enticing or persuading a minor to engage in prostitution).
500. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
comprehensive rules for the calculation of sentences for federal crimes, are merely advisory. See
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). This holding does not affect mandatory minimum
sentences imposed by statute upon conviction of particular federal crimes.
501. See CPA Order No. 13, supra note 36, § 13(l) ("The penalties imposed by the CCCI shall
be as prescribed for their equivalent courts under Iraqi law, as modified by CPA orders.").
502. See CPA Order No. 31, supra note 115, §§ 2(1), 3(1), 4(1).
503. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 3, Weapons Control (CPA/ORD/23 May
2003/03), § 6, 2(b) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 3], availableat http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/. There was an escape provision, permitting judges to deviate from the 30-year
minimum, but only in exceptional cases. Id.
504. Id.
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and Man Portable Air Defense Systems of any kind."' 5 The Order also
authorized a maximum term of life imprisonment for these crimes.5°6
Although stiff, these sentences are not as severe as the mandatory death
sentence that Islamic law imposes on insurrectionists, 7 which is what
those who carry special category weapons in Iraq generally are. The
mandatory sentences were also clearly warranted in light of the damage the
insurgency was inflicting on U.S. troops and Iraqi citizens, not to mention
the nascent Iraqi government.' These explosive devices that were
supposed to earn defendants a thirty-yearprison term include the IEDs that
literally were and are tearing U.S. soldiers apart.5" These LEDs are the
insurgent's weapon of choice due to their lethality and propaganda value.
Beyond killing Americans and destroying essential equipment, the
explosions demonstrate destructive power disproportionately greater than
the actual support the insurgents enjoy among the Iraqi populace? °
The explosions that rock the cities and communities of Iraq can be
heard and felt miles beyond the blast radius. They remind Iraqis that they
could meet the same fate as the latest victims, they instill terror in the
populace, and induce otherwise cooperative Iraqis to shun American
personnel, thereby further hampering efforts to rebuild Iraq. These
explosions also cause the Iraqi people to question the ability of the United
States and the American-backed Iraqi government to protect them and
remove terrorists from the streets, either by imprisoning or killing them.
In light of these substantial secondary effects, Ambassador Bremer elected
to implement a punishment generally proportional to the magnitude of the
harm caused by explosive devices.5 ' Because the extent of the threatened

505. See id. § 1, 9.
506. See id.§ 6, 2(b).
507. Elizabeth Peiffer, The Death Penalty inTraditionalIslamic Law and as Interpretedin
Saudi Arabia andNigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 511 (2005) ("Punishments for
these crimes are fixed: judges have no discretion once a person has been found guilty.").
508. Because sabotage of power-generating stations and kidnappings were also sapping the
country, Ambassador Bremer increased the penalties for those crimes. See CPA Order No. 31,
supra note 115, § 4.
509. Washburn, supra note 248, at A20 ("Improvised explosive devices, the roadside bombs
that insurgents build from castoff artillery shells and munitions, have become the No. 1 killer of
American troops in Iraq this year, despite a massive U.S. campaign to blunt their effectiveness.");
Graham & Priest, supranote 248, at Al 5 ('Roadside bombs-the military calls them 'improvised
explosive devices,' or IEDs--continue to rank as the number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq,

according to Pentagon figures. About half of all combat casualties in Iraq are attributed to them.").
510. See Tom Bowman, Pentagon Details US. Deaths in Iraq, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 13,
2005, at 4A ("Blast injuries from roadside and car bombs, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars
account for more than halfthe U.S. combat deaths in Iraq, according to a new Pentagon analysis.").
511. Charles L.B. Lowndes, ContributoryNegligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674,688 (1934) ("People
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harm was severe, including death and paralysis for troops, death or severe
injury for innocent Iraqi civilians, and civil war for the nation as a whole,
the punishment for possessors of special category weapons was also
justifiably great.
The efficacy of a punishment to deter antisocial behavior is directly
proportional to the magnitude of the punishment and the probability of its
implementation." 2 That is, the greater the severity of the punishment, the
greater the chance a potential defendant will avoid conduct that likely will
result in that punishment." 3 Although Ambassador Bremer could not
directly control the probability that an terrorist would be captured, 1 4 he did
his best to ensure that those who were caught would be punished
commensurate with the devastation their crimes engendered, hoping that
this would have a specific and general deterrent effect. Thus, mandating
thirty years of imprisonment for possession or use of an explosive device
or weapon was eminently reasonable, although the death penalty may have
been a more appropriate and efficacious punishment.
The Iraqi judges on the CCCI disagreed, however. They chafed under
the mandatory sentencing provisions,51 5 which, in their minds, were too
are punished to deter them from further sinning and scotch the potential peculations of their
fellows."). The severe punishment also could have communicated the extent of American
disapproval of possession and use of special category weapons. GEORGE F. Wn±, THE WOVEN
FIGURE: CONSERVATISM ANDAMERICA'SFABRIC, 1994-1997, at 204 (1997) ("[P]unishment should
do more than make offenders suffer; the criminal law's expressive function is to articulate society's
moral condemnation.").
512. POSNER, supranote 151, at 16-17 ("[A] model of criminals as rational maximizers may
correctly predict that an increase in the severity of punishment or in the probability of its imposition
will reduce the crime rate even if most criminals have serious cognitive or emotional deficits. They
are sufficiently rational to respond, though perhaps only moderately, to changes in incentives.").
513. "Punishment is the staple resource of the criminal law. It relies upon fear as a deterrent,
seeking to create a widespread fear of punishment and to bring this fear home to the would-be
offender at the crises of action." POUND, supranote 151, at 75-76. As even Pound concedes, "fear
is never a complete deterrent," but it is the best that the courts have to offer in the way of crime
prevention. Id.
514. For that, Ambassador Bremer had to rely on the U.S. soldiers who performed a police
function and the CCCI judges who adjudicated the particular cases. Theoretically, he could have
requested more troops (and Ambassador Bremer now claims that he made such a request), thereby
increasing the number of U.S. soldiers hunting terrorists and, concomitantly, the chances of
capturing terrorists. The problem is that, due to the downsizing of the U.S. military following
Operation Desert Storm, there are an insufficient number of troops to wage the war in Iraq while
permitting the soldiers a predictable schedule of one year in Iraq or Afghanistan followed by one
year in the United States.
515. Even in the United States, judges dislike mandatory sentencing schemes, and are not
above criticizing them and finding ways to circumvent them. See United States v. Detwiler, 338
F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Or. 2004). Many judges see them as infringing on their power to sentence
criminals. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the legislature has the constitutional power
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severe for Iraqis who only desired to rid their country of meddlesome

Americans. The judges quickly made their disagreement known in various
ways, each of which resulted in terrorists escaping the mandatory
penalty. 6
First, there were outright acquittals in cases that should have carried the
mandatory minimum sentence. But the CCCI judges realized that they
could keep this up for only so long, so they quickly employed other tactics

and excuses. For example, there was the case involving defendant Ra'ad
Sa'eed Rasheed Al-Qaisy, who was caught red-handed with over thirty

grenades, rocket propelled grenade launchers, and various components of
improvised explosive devices, all of which are special category weapons.
Persisting in their refusal to order punishments proportionate to the danger
of these weapons, the judges simply ignored the law and imposed a term
of imprisonment of only seven years. When the U.S. prosecutor inquired
about this, the judges initially claimed that the mandatory thirty-year
sentence was an American law that did not apply to an Iraqi court. Of
course, if that were so, the mandatory sentences meant nothing and had no
effect since there was no American or Coalition-sponsored court in Iraq
other than the CCCI. That is, if, as the judges claimed, the laws only
applied to American courts or Coalition courts, enacting these laws was
utterly futile since there were no American or Coalition courts in Iraq, and
Ambassador Bremer possessed legislative authority only in Iraq.
Perceiving the fatuity of their argument, the CCCI judges later
abandoned it. They claimed instead that they had employed their judicial

discretion and had elected to charge the defendant under Iraqi law, rather
to mandate a sentencing range or even a mandatory sentence for a specific crime. See Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) ("Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence
for a federal crime ...and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to
congressional control."); see Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27,42 (1916) (White, C.J.) ("[Tlhe
authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative.... ."); see United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (Marshal, C.J.) ("[Tlhe power of punishment is vested in the
legislative not thejudicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment.").
516. In one case involving a defendant named Mohammed Ahmed Mahmood, the court did
sentence him to the mandatory minimum thirty years. Mahmood was found with eleven 60 mm
mortar rounds in his car. His defense was that he had found the rounds and was taking them to the
police station. Soldiers in the area noted that after his arrest, the number of mortar attacks declined
sharply. See American Forces Press Service, Iraq's Central Criminal Court Convicts Insurgents,

availableat http://www.defenselink.miVnews/Aug2004/n08022004_2004080205.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005). Notably, other defendants with more powerful weapons received lesser sentences
than did Mahmood. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author was the
special prosecutor who appeared on behalf of the United States at the investigative hearing in
Mahmood's case.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

127

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 18

than the CPA provision, and thus the CPA mandatory minimum sentences,
though perhaps applicable to the CCCI, did not apply in that particular
case. Using the same logic, the CCCI continued to hand out inadequate
sentences well below the mandatory minimum sentences required by the
Coalition order." 7
In a later case, the judges changed their rationale again. They argued
that they could not impose a thirty-year sentence without first having the
opportunity to observe in camera the actual explosive devices the defendant possessed. Of course, the judges knew that explosives are so
dangerous that the American military units that discover such materials
destroy them on-site. The judges also knew that the Americans were not
going to transport explosive devices through a combat zone to the
courthouse, and thereby jeopardize the lives of the transporting soldiers.
Finally, when all these false rationales failed, the CCCI judges would
hold that a particular case was "exceptional" and according to CPA Order
No. 3, they could depart from the mandatory minimum."' I The judges did
not articulate what made a particular case "exceptional," nor why they
departed so drastically from the mandatory thirty-year sentences. 5 9 For
example, in one case involving a defendant named Mahmod Jabr Khaliil
AtTa'abi, the panel should have sentenced the defendant to the mandatory
thirty years, since the defendant was found in possession of four RPG
rounds, four fragmentary grenades, six sticks of TNT, multiple blasting
caps, two automatic rifles and one heavier machine gun, along with
miscellaneous ammunition and magazines. The panel, however, ordered
the defendant incarcerated for ten years because the court, in Judge
Loqman's words, "felt mercy" for the defendant.

These practices, besides negating any specific deterrent value that the
mandatory sentences had, soon became known to terrorists and their
attorneys. Even the media widely reported the judges' practice of evading
the mandatory sentences called for in the regulations.' This sent a loud
517. See, e.g., Department ofDefense, IraqiCourtConvicts ThreeofPlantingRoadsideBomb,
availableat 2004 WL 65722257, Apr. 14,2004 (relating that three Iraqis caught planting aroadside
bomb composed of 12 to 14 pounds of C-4 explosive material were sentenced to ten years in
prison).
518. See CPA Order No. 3, supra note 503, § 6, 3 ("The mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment of 30 years is subject to the proviso that in exceptional circumstances relating to the
offender or the offense, the punishment may be reduced. The transport, distribution, sale or use of
a Special Category Weapon shall never constitute exceptional circumstances.").
519. The judges of the CCCI finally did impose the mandatory minimum sentence in the case
of Mohammed Ahmed Mamood, as discussed above.
520. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Walter Pincus, Bremer's EdictsLeave His Mark, SEATTLE
TIMEs, June 27,2004, at AlI ("Judges on the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, who were appointed
by Bremer, have refused to impose 30-year sentences on people detained with grenades and other
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and clear message to insurgents that the Iraqi judiciary did not believe that
their conduct warranted serious punishment. This was certainly not the
message that the American military wanted to send, nor the American
people. The rule of law requires that judges, especially unelected judges,
52
follow the law, regardless of whether they personally disapprove it. 1
Until the CCCI judges start consistently applying the laws that require
mandatory minimum sentences, it cannot be said that they follow the rule
of law.
IV. CONCLUSION

Small portions of the Iraqi judicial system have taken small steps
towards implementing the rule of law, but Iraq still has a substantial
distance to travel before these efforts come to fruition. The creation and
nurturing of the CCCI was a noble attempt to assist the Iraqis in achieving
this goal. But in light of the substantial defects from which the Iraqi
judiciary continues to suffer, it is unclear why the United States continues
to entrust the CCCI with the task of adjudicating criminal cases that
directly impact the22effectiveness and success of the U.S. effort to liberate
and stabilize Iraq.
In Iraq, ruthless insurgents continue to prey upon American soldiers
who strive to keep the peace and reconstruct Iraq. At times, the terrorists
have been so well organized that they effectively ruled entire cities, a direct
threat to the authority and prestige of the United States, two essential
components of a successful military occupation. Litigation is not an
effective countermeasure in itself, but in conjunction with forceful military

military weapons.").
521. This is even more true in cases where an occupying power gives an order to judges of the
occupied nation, such as ordering them to sentence defendants according to a fixed sentencing
scheme. FRAENKEL, supranote 30, at 227 ("The rule of law in a democratic state is based on the
consent of the citizens. In an occupied territory, public power is enforced upon the residents
regardless of their inner feelings.").
522. Elsewhere the author has argued in favor of Iraqi nationals trying Saddam Hussein and
other high-ranking Baath party officials because Iraqi citizens were their primary victims. The
caveat is that the United States should have the opportunity to retry any defendants who do not
receive justice at the hands of the Iraqis. According to this logic, U.S. personnel should be judging
Iraqi insurgents who attack American Forces, since Americans are the primary victims. See, e.g.,
PETER PAPABATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 1 (1964) (noting that the Nazi Adolf Eichmann was tried
before Israelis judges; Jews were Eichmann's primary victims). To the extent that insurgents are
also committing crimes against the Iraqi citizenry, the Iraqi courts should also be entitled to charge
them, when the United States is finished with its own trials.
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operations, the prosecution of captured terrorists can be an important
component of the effort to dismantle an insurgency.
Because of the pro-insurgency rulings of the CCCI, the terrorists who
are arrested for their crimes usually evade the punishments warranted by
their misdeeds, effectively negating much of the value of capturing them
in the first place.523 Not only are these militants not deterred, their coddling
by the CCCI sends a strong message to other terrorists: attack the
Americans and you will never be punished. Thus, it is not surprising that
the insurgency continues to tear Iraq apart. It is also no surprise that Iraq
has become an international academy for terrorists which specializes in
"hands on" instruction in the art ofdestruction.524 Because of the CCCI, instead of facing execution or long prison sentences, these terrorists will
soon graduate from their school of terrorism,525 and will migrate to other
parts of the world to ply their new trade.526 They have already attacked

523. West, supra note 22, at 27 ("Iraqi judges, often intimidated and .openly suspicious of
written testimony from American soldiers, tend to free the accused. Net result: Over 85 percent of
those detained are released within six months.").
524. See Rod Nordland, TerrorforExport, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21,2005, at 38 ("IfAfghanistan
under the Taliban was a backwoods school for terrorism, Iraqi is an urban university."); Ellen
Knickmeyer, General Decries Callfor Timetable in Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at A26
(Army Major General William Webster"said he believes it is 'a distinct possibility' that insurgents
now were training in Iraq for attacks in other countries."); Michael Slackman & Souad Mekhennet,
JordanSays Bombing Suspect Aimed to Avenge Brothers,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2005, at A3 ("The
Central Intelligence Agency recently warned that a new generation ofjihadists was being trained
in the Iraq war, and that these fighters could soon take their cause to other countries."); Canadian
Spy ChiefCalls IraqHome for Terrorism, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A20 ("Iraq has become
a 'kind of latter-day Afghanistan' that is training foreign terrorists and providing a testing ground
for new terrorist techniques that are being exported, the head of Canada's intelligence service said
Thursday."); Dana Priest & Josh White, WarHelps Recruit Terrorists,Hill Told, WASH. POST, Feb.
17, 2005, at Al ("'These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of
urban terrorism."') (quoting former CIA Director Porter J. Goss).
525. Michael Slackman & Scott Shane, TerroristsTrained by Zarqawi Went Abroad,Jordan
Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at I (Abus Musab al-Zarqawi "recruited about 300 who went to
Iraq for terrorist training and sent them back to their home countries, where they await orders to
carry out strikes."); Thom Shanker, Abu GhraibCalledIncubatorforTerrorists,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2006, at A12 ("American commanders in Iraq are expressing grave concerns that the
overcrowded Abu Ghraib prison has become a breeding ground for extremist leaders and a school
for terrorist foot soldiers."); Dan Murphy, Iraq'sForeign Fighters:Few But Deadly,CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1 ("Iraq has become one of the global centers for the recruiting
and training of. . . 'neo-Salafi' terrorists. These are essentially Islamist fighters that share Al
Qaeda's extreme rejection ofnon-Muslim 'infidels' and seek to create Islamic states patterned after
the Arabian peninsula of the 7th and 8th centuries.").
526. Sami Yousafzai &Ron Moreau, UnholyAllies, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at40 (noting
that al Qaeda has "opened an underground railroad to and fromjihadist training camps in the Sunni
Triangle" of Iraq, and that "graduates" of the terrorist training program have moved elsewhere in
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Jordan and reportedly have made their way into Kuwait and Europe.52 7
Nobody, then, should be surprised when one of their terrorist cells turns up
in New York or Houston."
The results-oriented judging that regularly occurs in the CCCI
demonstrates that at least portions of the nascent Iraqi judiciary are largely
unwilling to administer justice when this entails punishing fellow Iraqis
who oppose the American forces.52 9 The U.S. service members who have
sacrificed all that they have and who risked their lives in Iraq deserve
better than this. 530 They deserve to know that when they detain Iraqis who
have attacked them, those war criminals will be punished in proportion to
the severity of their crimes and the harm they intended to inflict on the
United States. Ironically, in creating the CCCI, Ambassador Bremer
intended for the court to become the model for all Iraqi courts and he said
that the CCCI will "allow us to try particularly egregious criminals quickly

the world, including Afghanistan, equipped "with more-effective killing techniques and renewed
enthusiasm for the war against the West").
527. Slackman & Mekhennet, supra note 524, at A3 (discussing the November 2005 suicide
bombing of three hotels in Jordan); Jay Solomon et al., Radicalsin Iraq Begin Exporting Violence,
MideastNeighborsSay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2005, at Al ("Three al Qaeda operatives crossed from
Iraq into Jordan in August, smuggling seven Katyusha missiles in the underbelly of an aging
Mercedes with a hidden second gas tank. Their orders were to bomb the headquarters of Jordan's
intelligence service and the U.S. and Israeli embassies.").
528. See supratext accompanying note 527; see Nordland, supra note 524, at 38 (quoting "a
senior Taliban official who uses the nom de guerre Abu Zabihullah" for the proposition that "Iraq
is where the fierce encounters take place, where we recruit and dispatch fighters'"); Scott Shane,
London, Madrid,Bali.And Yet Nothing Here,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005 (noting that Stephen E.
Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations and others "fear that the lessons jihadists learn in
Iraq--in urban combat, the use of explosives and especially attacks on strategic sites---may one day
threaten the United States"). President George W. Bush himself has expressed fears that Iraqitrained terrorists will apply their skills in other locations, such as the United States. Solomon et al.,
supra note 527, at Al ("President Bush voiced concern yesterday that al Qaeda and others want to
make Iraq a base from which to launch operations against the U.S. and other secular
governments.').
529. It is inherently unwise to give such great power over the occupation to citizens of the
occupied country. FRAENKEL, supra note 30, at 224 ("It is perhaps conceivable that in some
circumstances an occupied country would not feel hostility toward the occupying power, and that
its courts would interpret... [the applicable laws] with the same objectivity that they would apply
to their own constitution. But even in that situation-if it ever existed-it is highly doubtful
whether the courts of the occupied country are the proper agencies to review the actions of the
occupants.").
530. In the words of President Bush, we must "'honor them by completing the mission for
which they gave their lives, by defeating the terrorists, advancing the cause of liberty, and building
a safer world."' George W. Bush, quoted in Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Pays Tribute to
GenerationsofFightersKilled in Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al5. Trying Iraqi terrorists
in courts that actually punish them would go a long way toward accomplishing these goals.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

131

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 18

to show people that we are serious about creating law and order .... , 531
Instead, the court has quickly become of model of incompetence that turns
violent terrorists into ebullient acquitees and shows them that, so long as
the CCCI is in charge of justice, there will be no law, order, or justice in
Iraq. The CCCI has failed to live up to the Ambassador's irrationally high
hopes, and it further subtracts from the existing dearth of law and order in
Iraq. Regardless of whether Iraqi judges are intentionally sabotaging
justice, America's hopes for justice in Iraq are not being realized in the
CCCI.

Much of the insurgent activity in Iraq warrants a strong military
response, not a judicial one. But to the extent that judicial proceedings are
useful to determine the culpability of particular terrorists, these
proceedings should be conducted by military commissions staffed by
American military and civilian personnel-the primary victims of the
terrorist attacks 532-using procedural rules suitable for crimes committed
in a war zone. 33 Only then can the United States ensure that justice is
properly administered to the terrorists destroying Iraq. Using the CCCI as
an instrument to accomplish this task has not only resulted in a failure to
531. Luhnow, supra note 35, at A14; see Fox, supra note 35, at 213-14 (noting that the CCCI
"was created both to serve as a model for furtherjudicial reform and to try 'those serious crimes
that most directly threaten public order and safety'). The CCCI also was supposed to be a forum
staffed by judges cleansed of any anti-American sentiments. Doug Simpson, Louisiana-Trained
Lawyers Become a Legal Force in Iraqi Courtrooms, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 16, 2005 ("The
court was created... to prosecute insurgent fighters because the military was concerned that Iraq's
provincial courts would be influenced by anti-Americanism, and be more likely to acquit those
guilty of attacks.").
532. Because they are the primary victims, U.S. personnel would be more likely to ensure that
justice is administered to the insurgents, as history demonstrates:
Countries typically worry more about war crimes when their own citizens are the
. After World War I, France and Belgium pressed hardest for
prosecution of German war crimes, precisely because they had taken the brunt of
the war. Britain was somewhat less concerned, but took particular interest in
German U-boat warfare--the war crime that most directly affected the British
sailors. And America, even under the moralistic Woodrow Wilson, was the least
enthusiastic of all, having suffered the least.
victims. ..

Gary J. Bass, Atrocity andLegalism, 132 DAEDALUS 73, 80 (2003). Even Islamic law suggests that
Americans should be trying terrorists who attack Americans. Under Islamic law "retaliation is the
right of the person injured or his family." Rahim, supra note 127, at 186.
533. Military Commissions can utilize "'rules of evidence that take into account the unique
battlefield environment that is different from peacetime law enforcement practice.'" Neil A. Lewis,
Guantanamo TribunalProcess In Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at 129 (quoting Col. Wayne

Dillingham).
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properly punish insurgents, but has also spawned a host of new

evils-including damaging the prestige and undermining the authority of
the United States-all while emboldening terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.
The United States has forfeited a golden opportunity to demonstrate to Iraq
and other developing nations how the essence of the rule of law can be
implemented, even under wartime conditions. The United States can do
better, and must do better if it hopes to administerjustice and introduce the
rule of law to those parts of the world desperately in need of justice and
law.
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